



**DELHI UNIVERSITY**  
**LIBRARY**

DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. V58:2:N3

Ac. No. 44643

Date of release for loan

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of one anna will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.



THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
SOVIET UNION

50 2 N3.16 (CFC)



11643

THE GOVERNMENTS OF MODERN EUROPE

---

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND

BY WILLIAM E. RAPPARD

*University of Geneva  
Switzerland*

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

BY WALTER RICE SILLARP

*University of Wisconsin*

THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT OF ITALY

BY HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

*Columbia University*

THE GOVERNMENT OF GREATER GERMANY

BY JAMES K. POLLOCK

*University of Michigan*

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION

BY SAMUEL N. HARPER

*Late University of Chicago*

THE DEMOCRATIC MONARCHIES OF SCANDINAVIA

BY BEN A. ARNESON

*Ohio Wesleyan University*

THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND

BY R. K. GOOCH

*University of Virginia*


---

A GROUP OF BASIC TEXT BOOKS  
UNIFORM AS TO  
OUTLINE, ORGANIZATION AND PRICE

# THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION



SAMUEL N. HARPER



NEW YORK  
D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.  
250 FOURTH AVENUE

## PREFACE

In the conditions of the general collapse to which three years of participation in the World War brought it, the former Russian Empire with its Tsarism saw the rise of Bolshevism. Bolshevism became the Russian experience of social revolution, deriving its name from one of the Russian socialist parties which had been organizing and working on a program of revolution for many years. It was the former Bolshevik (majority) faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workman Party that led and assumed the responsibility for the second revolution that came to Russia in that year 1917. This Bolshevik revolution is now called by its followers the "Great Proletarian Revolution" or the "October Revolution" of 1917.

The institutions through which the October, 1917, Revolution deployed were Councils or *Soviets* of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, produced by the earlier revolution in February of 1917, and on the model of a closely similar institution of a still earlier revolution in Russia in 1905. Thus Sovietism became the institutional expression of Bolshevism; the republics set up by the Revolution were called Soviet republics and in 1923 came together as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, generally designated in abbreviation as the "Soviet Union."

The Soviet system, as it came to be called from the name of its governmental organs, was not only the product of revolution; it became the instrument of a continuing revolution. Its authors still insist on the essentially revolutionary character of their régime even after twenty years. At the present writing the Bolsheviks speak of a "turning-point" in the political life of the country and in the politics of the Revolution, which is taking the form of new constitutions and at the same time of the most extensive and ruthless "purge" in the history of the Revolution.

COPYRIGHT, 1938, BY  
D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

---

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.*

---

*First Published, January 1938*  
*Reprinted, August 1938; February 1940;*  
*July 1943; May 1946*

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



COPYRIGHT, 1938, BY

D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

---

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.*

---

*First Published, January 1938  
Reprinted, August 1938; February 1940;  
July 1943; May 1946*

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## PREFACE

In the conditions of the general collapse to which three years of participation in the World War brought it, the former Russian Empire with its Tsarism saw the rise of Bolshevism. Bolshevism became the Russian experience of social revolution, deriving its name from one of the Russian socialist parties which had been organizing and working on a program of revolution for many years. It was the former Bolshevik (majority) faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workman Party that led and assumed the responsibility for the second revolution that came to Russia in that year 1917. This Bolshevik revolution is now called by its followers the "Great Proletarian Revolution" or the "October Revolution" of 1917.

The institutions through which the October, 1917, Revolution deployed were Councils or *Soviets* of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, produced by the earlier revolution in February of 1917, and on the model of a closely similar institution of a still earlier revolution in Russia in 1905. Thus Sovietism became the institutional expression of Bolshevism; the republics set up by the Revolution were called Soviet republics and in 1923 came together as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, generally designated in abbreviation as the "Soviet Union."

The Soviet system, as it came to be called from the name of its governmental organs, was not only the product of revolution; it became the instrument of a continuing revolution. Its authors still insist on the essentially revolutionary character of their régime even after twenty years. At the present writing the Bolsheviks speak of a "turning-point" in the political life of the country and in the politics of the Revolution, which is taking the form of new constitutions and at the same time of the most extensive and ruthless "purge" in the history of the Revolution.

Under a revolutionary régime of constant and intense struggle, political control and manipulation have been extended to all fields. Thus the Soviet system represents a type of "totalitarian" state. It will be necessary in this analysis of the Government of the Soviet Union to include institutions and organizations that ordinarily play only secondary rôles in the political structure of a community. The Soviet trade or labor unions and the co-operative societies have functions which would be classified as essentially governmental in western parliamentary systems. The word "government" in the title must therefore be understood in a very broad sense. It would perhaps have been more correct to have entitled this study "the functioning of Bolshevism."

One of the outstanding features of the Soviet system is the rôle played by the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), which enjoys a monopoly of political leadership and is unique in its structure. By its "ruling" position in all Soviet institutions and organizations the Party is the governing authority in a very specific and almost technical sense. It is on these grounds that the Program and Rules of the Party have been given as the first items in the Soviet section of the *Source Book on European Governments* prepared to accompany this series. In the recently adopted new constitutions for the Soviet Union and the eleven national republics which constitute it, this special leading position of the Party, which has always been the acknowledged and all-important political fact, has been given a formal legal basis.

From the beginning, the aims of the Revolution have been clearly set forth: socialism as a first stage of communism. Thus there has been a large-scale attempt to apply in practical life what has been written about for generations. It is claimed that at last socialism has been "in the main" established; the new constitutions of the last year (1936-37) register this claim by using the term "a socialist state." In the earlier constitutions and in the formal titles the word "socialist" had the value of indicating a program. This analysis of the institutional aspect of the Soviet system will furnish material for a clearer definition of the term "socialism" as used by the Bolsheviks. The emphasis in this study will be on the type of political machinery which has been set up and used to estab-

lish the conditions and habits which are believed to be the premises and means for "building socialism" and "socialism is the first, lower stage of communism," to cite Bolshevik terms and definitions.

The dynamic, constantly moving character of the Revolution has been reflected in its institutions. The aim of the volumes of this series is to analyze governmental systems in their contemporary forms and methods. But Soviet institutions have been modified as obstacles were met, and also as anticipated problems were solved and the Revolution progressed to its next stage and tasks. Therefore the Party and the Soviets, labor unions and co-operatives have undergone certain changes in structure and functions. However, in this evolution certain basic principles have always been observed and certain characteristics of Soviet institutions and organizations have prevailed throughout the several periods of the twenty years.

Terminology presents a special problem in this discussion, for the Soviet leaders use words that have wide currency in describing other political systems, but use them with meanings often different from those associated with the same words when applied to western parliamentary systems. It is constantly asserted in Bolshevik writings that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest type of democracy"; it is clear that terms must be carefully explained if this statement is to be understood. This analysis will aim to point out in what senses the words "democracy" and "dictatorship" are applied by the Soviet leaders to the system which they have evolved. It should be noted, for example, that its "democratism" is claimed for the results of the carrying out of the program more than for the methods used.

The Soviet system on its economic side represents the concept and practice of planned economy. The principles, methods and results of state economic planning as applied in the Soviet Union constitute a subject of interest. In this study, however, the treatment of this subject must be limited to the noting of the economic functions of Soviet institutions. Even under this limitation it will be necessary to enter extensively into the field of economic organization. But the discussion of this aspect will emphasize the institutional side of planned

economy. Particular stress will be given to the question of the extent of effective mass participation in the plans, for such participation is an illustration of the Bolshevik slogan formulated at the very beginning by Lenin, that under the Soviets "the house-wife will learn to run the state." The realization of this slogan is one of the bases for the claim that the Soviet system is one of the most "democratic."

Social revolutions are ruthless and costly processes. The suppression of opposition is direct and unsparing; the political and "treason" trials of the last year are examples of revolutionary reprisals based on what is called "revolutionary vigilance." The Bolsheviks have used a combination of educative and compulsive measures for the furtherance of the positive side of their program, with the promise that persuasion will gradually replace coercion as the program is carried out. Also the concept of "revolutionary legality" has developed with the progress of the Revolution. But the special concept of law of the Soviet system must be kept constantly in mind, and for this purpose an official interpretation of Soviet law and the Soviet codes is included in the *Source Book*. Not fully based on law in its first stages, the Soviet system has evolved its own law and principles of legality. Thus, for example, the procedure for legislation has been standardized by the new Union constitution. And in this same document there is the promise that judicial procedure will replace the administrative procedure so widely applied to enforce the new norms being established.

One of the main aims of the Revolution has been what is termed "the liquidation of classes," as a condition precedent to the building of socialism. The belief that basic differences between classes have been eliminated and that in any case so-called "exploiting classes" have been abolished from the Soviet system, is another of the bases for the formal designation of the Soviet Union as "a socialist state" in the first paragraph of the new Union constitution. Because of the fundamental importance of this question of "classes," a recent current discussion of it by one of the leading Soviet political theoreticians has been given in the *Source Book* (A. Stetsky: "The Liquidation of Classes in the USSR"). All Soviet institutions have been geared to the class struggle, which has been the revolu-

tionary instrument for abolishing classes. The doctrinal principle of the class struggle has been literally applied in all institutions and organizations. The discussion of this underlying doctrine will be brought in as part of the analysis of structure and functioning, rather than as a subject by itself. Within the limits of this study points of doctrine can be covered only as they affect the working of the system.

Thus, for example, the Marxian doctrine calls for the "withering away" of the state with the attainment of communism and its co-operative commonwealth. Some Soviet writers had suggested the completion of the second Five-Year Plan (1937) as the date for the actual, palpable setting-in of this process. This view has been vigorously condemned as part of the recent "purge" and its authors officially discredited and penalized. For Lenin can be quoted as refusing to set a date for the beginning of this process of "withering away." Also, the changes in attitudes, and the increase in production so that "all will receive according to their needs," have not been attained, the Bolsheviks themselves emphasize. Until these features of the new social order are fully present, the state must increase its powers. Therefore the state is an integral part of socialism as at present established in the Soviet Union, we are told, and the state, like law, has a specific content of its own, which in turn gives it a form of its own, making it "socialist," and not a "bourgeois heritage" which has not yet been outlived. Under Marxian dialectics, it is explained, the very strengthening of the state at the present stage will contribute to the "withering-away" process when the latter is made possible by the new social-economic conditions.

The Soviets were set up by revolutionary methods in opposition to, and in fact in competition with, the other political systems of the world. At the beginning, in the conditions of the World War and of armed intervention against the new Soviet régime by both groups of belligerents, the Soviets entered into active competition with the non-Soviet world. This was the period of active propaganda for world revolution, and in Moscow there was set up the Communist International as the "general staff" of this world revolution. Then, when world revolution did not come, it was decided that the

program of the Revolution could be carried out in the single country of the Soviet Union. The competition which the Soviets represented accordingly became passive, and their propaganda came to be mainly by example, which is a legitimate form of propaganda. With the recent development of tension in the international situation, in Asia as well as in Europe, particularly with the rise and growth of fascism, a sharp conflict of ideologies has ensued. In the new, more active competition, this time initiated by fascism, Sovietism has remained to date on the defensive. But the foreign policy adopted by the Soviet Government in conformity with its policy of peace, and its supporting armament program have influenced the institutional development. The new Union constitution envisages the international situation and the place in it of the Soviet Union. A last chapter will attempt to summarize the position of the Soviet Union in the world today.

Bolshevism and its Soviet system, as the expression and instruments of social revolution, have aroused feeling outside the actual area of the revolutionary struggle. The internationalism inherent in Bolshevism and the character of the struggle that has taken place and still goes on within the Soviet Union, have challenged principles and institutions of pre-war liberalism, on which many of us have been brought up. It must be kept in mind, however, that the Bolsheviks consider as constructive what others may look upon as utterly destructive, as for example, the class struggle. The provision for the single party is for the Bolshevik a *plus* and not a *minus*. There seems to have come a reassertion of the principles and practices of the Revolution in the recent months, while critics have accused the Moscow leaders of "betraying the Revolution," and skeptics have thought to see in recent developments a "drift back to capitalism."

But the fact of the Bolshevik experiment going on with considerable success for some twenty years, covering almost one-sixth of the land surface of the earth and involving directly some 170,000,000 human beings, is an undisputed one. Soviet writers characterize their country as a "proletarian power." The new constitutions speak of the "government of workmen and peasants" and the governmental bodies will

be called in the future the "Soviets of Toilers' Deputies." These terms illustrate the Bolshevik claim that a new type of state with a new form of government has in fact been set up in the Soviet Union.

One can note two distinguishing features of this new type of state. In the first place, while its leaders insist that Bolshevism is primarily a method of action, they base their action on a doctrine which with its intolerant conceit frequently takes on very dogmatic forms. In the second place, under the Soviet system the state assumes direction of and responsibility for economic activity, and therefore not only guarantees the pursuit of happiness but must itself make the more abundant life. Curves of production and distribution will be referred to as representing, short of a war, the most tangible tests of a political system of the Soviet type. The production can come only by mass participation in the economic plans, for the later will fail if they remain purely bureaucratic programs imposed from above, we are told. In this mass activity the Soviet system is expected to bring about an effective alliance in the field of production of urban and rural toilers—of workmen and peasants. A new type of technical expert produced in the new social-economic order is expected to add a full measure of co-operation. And, finally, national units, while preserving their identity, are to co-operate economically under a single political authority. These main features of so-called "Soviet democratism" will be the subjects emphasized in this study.

SAMUEL N. HARPER.

University of Chicago  
August 1, 1937.





# CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	vii
CHAPTER	
I. THE SOVIET UNION AS A COMMUNITY . . . . .	1
1. Physical unity . . . . .	1
2. Economic unity . . . . .	2
3. Power motives . . . . .	4
4. Nationality problem under Tsarism . . . . .	5
5. Soviet nationality policy . . . . .	8
II. THE POLITICAL HERITAGE . . . . .	11
1. Autocracy to 1905 . . . . .	11
2. Beginnings of Constitutionalism . . . . .	12
3. "Exceptional Measures" . . . . .	14
4. Forcible Russification . . . . .	15
5. Legal class divisions . . . . .	16
6. The Intelligentsia . . . . .	19
7. The professional revolutionary . . . . .	19
8. Political parties after 1905 . . . . .	22
9. Constitutional progress . . . . .	23
10. War and collapse . . . . .	24
III. THE TIME-TABLE OF THE REVOLUTION . . . . .	26
1. Paris Commune . . . . .	26
2. Revolution of 1905 . . . . .	26
3. World War . . . . .	27
4. February Revolution . . . . .	28
5. Seizure of Power . . . . .	29
6. Civil war . . . . .	30
7. "War Communism" . . . . .	30
8. First Soviet Constitution . . . . .	32
9. The <i>Nep</i> . . . . .	33
10. "Cultural Revolution" . . . . .	34

CHAPTER	PAGE
11. Resumption of socialist offensive . . . . .	35
12. Sharpening of class struggle . . . . .	37
13. First Five-Year Plan . . . . .	38
14. Second Five-Year Plan . . . . .	39
15. New Union Constitution . . . . .	40
16. Political turning-point . . . . .	41
IV. STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM . . . . .	42
1. The Union . . . . .	44
2. The Soviets . . . . .	46
3. Party . . . . .	51
4. Komsomol . . . . .	55
5. Labor Unions . . . . .	56
6. Cooperatives . . . . .	58
7. "Mass activity" . . . . .	59
V. THE DETERMINATION OF POLICY . . . . .	62
1. The Party line . . . . .	63
2. Central Committee and Political Bureau . . . . .	65
3. Stalin . . . . .	66
4. Disputes in Party . . . . .	69
5. An opposition . . . . .	70
6. The Soviet Press . . . . .	73
7. Education . . . . .	76
8. Pressure groups . . . . .	78
9. "Self-Criticism" . . . . .	81
10. Issues at elections . . . . .	83
VI. LAW-MAKING . . . . .	85
1. The Soviet Assembly and Congress . . . . .	87
2. Executive Committee and Presidium . . . . .	89
3. The Party and legislation . . . . .	91
4. Referendum . . . . .	93
5. Central and Local Government . . . . .	95
6. Codes and precedents . . . . .	97
7. Scope of Soviet legislation . . . . .	98
VII. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . . . .	101
1. Scope of public administration . . . . .	101
2. "Mass Control" . . . . .	103

# CONTENTS

xvii

CHAPTER	PAGE
3. Combatting "bureaucratism" . . . . .	104
4. Party and administration . . . . .	106
5. The Office Worker . . . . .	108
6. "Functionalism" . . . . .	109
7. "Single Responsible Authority" . . . . .	110
8. Graft and favoritism . . . . .	112
9. Return to politicizing . . . . .	113
VIII. THE PUBLIC SERVICES . . . . .	116
1. Taxation . . . . .	118
2. The State Budget . . . . .	121
3. Public expenditure . . . . .	123
4. The "Police" . . . . .	127
5. The Red Army . . . . .	129
IX. THE PUBLIC SERVICES ( <i>Continued</i> ) . . . . .	136
✓ 1. Administration of Justice . . . . .	138
2. The "Socialized" Wage . . . . .	143
3. Public Health . . . . .	145
4. Housing rights . . . . .	146
5. Public Education . . . . .	147
6. The Family . . . . .	149
7. The Church . . . . .	150
8. "Mass Participation" . . . . .	151
X. THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL . . . . .	153
1. The "collective" and the individual . . . . .	154
2. The right and obligation of work . . . . .	158
3. Rewards for work . . . . .	163
4. Property rights . . . . .	167
5. Freedom of conscience and opinion . . . . .	169
XI. THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD . . . . .	175
1. World Revolution . . . . .	175
2. "Socialism in one country" . . . . .	177
3. Peaceful coexistence . . . . .	179
4. Co-operation for peace . . . . .	180
5. Alliances . . . . .	181
6. "Imperialism" . . . . .	182
7. Armament . . . . .	184

	PAGE
8. "Nationalism" . . . . .	185
9. The Spanish conflict . . . . .	187
10. The treason trials . . . . .	189
11. Foreign trade . . . . .	191
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . .	195
INDEX . . . . .	199

## CHAPTER I

### THE SOVIET UNION AS A COMMUNITY

The Soviet Union, which emerged under Bolshevism from the Russian Empire, inherited the greater part of the territorial area where the latter had established itself during the centuries of expansion through colonization and conquest. This area is often called "Eurasia," for it comprises the vast Eastern European plain and the northern portion of Asia. The Ural Mountains which separate Europe and Asia in this region have not been a real line of division; they are crossed easily at several points. Also the general physical conditions of Western Siberia are very similar to those of the country to the west of the Urals. The Russian traders followed by settlers had crossed the Urals in an early period of the Russian eastward diffusion.

#### *1. Physical unity.*

This Eurasian plain seemed to constitute a physical unity. The political center from which the expansion took place, the Muscovite state of the fifteenth century, was seeking both "natural frontiers" easy to defend, and the "outlets" to this plain on which it had established itself. There were no physical obstacles beyond mere expanse to this gradual and apparently inexorable spread of the Great Russian center, until what can be considered as a distinct continent, covering almost one-sixth of the land surface of the earth, had been integrated into a single political entity. Thus Russia, and later the Soviet Union, came to extend from the Baltic to the Pacific, and from the White Sea and the Arctic to the Caspian and the Black Sea. In the course of the readjustments in Eastern Europe following the World War and the Revolution, the Soviet Union, as compared with the former Russian Empire, lost Finland and the former Baltic and Polish prov-

inces, which re-established their former independence as Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. On the south-western frontier Bessarabia was lost to Rumania, although this transfer of territory has not been formally acknowledged by the Soviet Government, being only acquiesced in as a matter of practical politics. A small area was also lost to Turkey.

These territorial changes have given the Soviet Union a less securely guaranteed "outlet" on the Baltic, being limited to the control of the head and one littoral of the Gulf of Finland. The topography of Eastern Europe does not permit of a clear physical demarcation of frontier, so that it is difficult to determine whether the straightening and shortening of the western frontier of the Soviet Union, as compared with that of the former Russian Empire, gives strategically more "natural" frontiers.

## 2. *Economic unity.*

On the economic side also this vast Eurasian plain always presented, and with economic development has come more definitely to represent unity. The economic motive contributed to the early policy of expansion of the central Muscovite state; there were markets to win and exploit and outlets to secure. As the political and administrative centers of St. Petersburg and Moscow became the trade and later the industrial centers, the sources of food supply and raw materials, supplied from the south and east, became of greater importance, and there developed a reasonably balanced interdependent economic unity covering the entire vast area. The development of the oil fields of Trans-Caucasia gave special significance to this point of penetration into Asia Minor. The Central Asian region which Russia had absorbed in her eastern expansion began to assume special significance in cotton growing when the textile industries in Central Russia began to develop at the end of the nineteenth century. So-called "colonialism" was present in a very distinct and often harsh form in the Russian Imperial policy, but there was also economic gain for these backward border regions, especially for those to the east and southeast, in the inclusion in the larger unit. Colonialism expressed itself in the particular emphasis

on the economic and industrial development of the European part of the Empire. The building of the Trans-Siberian Railway had as one of its aims the economic opening up of Siberia, in order to bring it more fully into the economic life of the country as a whole.

The divisions of the Eurasian plain from north to south present another aspect of economic correlation, for they include both arctic and tropical zones. The frozen tundra to the north and the steppes to the south have offered little except hardship for human beings. Development under the Soviets gives promise of economic and cultural progress; for the vast forests of the north are one of the world's largest sources of supply. Technological developments have brought production also in the vast steppes to the south. As has been noted, the Eurasian plain has been for many years one of the granaries of the world. In the more southern regions, the production of tobacco and tea and the extension of vineyards have had a marked development since the beginning of the present century. With respect then to these sources of food supply, and of construction material in this "country of wood," Russia had the basis for self-development and self-sufficiency on the condition of an integrated economic policy.

In the matter of mineral resources, Russia has always been credited with having an enormous supply. There has been considerable exaggeration in the statements regarding these resources, but many rich deposits have been exploited and the presence of others definitely established. Often the inaccessibility of many of these mineral resources has been responsible for the comparatively meagre exploitation of them. The extent to which these natural riches are to be found in the border regions and to the east of the Urals explains both the expansion policy and the effort throughout Russia's history, and in the present Soviet period, to establish and maintain a political unity in this Eurasia. In fact, the European portion of Eurasia is less richly endowed in mineral resources than is the Asiatic portion. One distinct handicap from which the Eastern European plain suffers is, for example, the marked absence of rock and gravel, this paucity of supply having become a real problem with the development of motor transport with its need for roads. River-bed stones have had



to furnish the road-making materials in Central Russia, until more suitable materials could be brought in from Finland, the Urals or the Caucasus. On another ground, therefore, namely that of mineral resources, there developed the possibility of an economic integration of the Eastern European plain and its counterpart across the northern portion of Asia; and the setting up of a single political entity embracing these physically united regions was motivated in part by this possibility.

### 3. *Power motives.*

The desire for power and control was also behind the expansion of the Principality of Muscovy into the Russian Empire and then behind the Soviet claim to succession to the territory of the latter. The success of this policy led to an outstanding feature of the Russian Empire, and its successor the Soviet Union, namely its heterogeneous ethical composition. The Grand Prince of Moscow first gathered in all the "Russian lands," after they had thrown off the Tatar yoke under which they had suffered for over two centuries. The Russian principalities which had escaped the Tatar domination by coming under the Polish-Lithuanian state to the west were also included in this program, but they were "saved" only by the end of the eighteenth century, some of them to be "lost" again in the post-war settlement of 1920. The separate khanates into which the Golden Horde of the Tatars had broken up were conquered and absorbed. The penetration east of the Urals, started in the earliest periods of Russian history, continued as the policy of Muscovy as part of the building up of the Russian Empire. Thus more Asiatic peoples came into the rapidly expanding Empire of the Tsars. From the time of Peter the Great the Ukraine with its Ukrainians or Little Russians, the Baltic provinces with their Esthonian, Lettish, Lithuanian and German racial groups were tricked or conquered by the increasing power of Russian Tsarism. Under Catherine the Great, Russia secured the lion's share in the partitions of Poland and with this acquisition of territory brought Poles and also a large number of Jews into her Empire. A weakened Turkey gave her traditional rival to the north what the latter had been long striving

to secure, namely the northern littoral of the Black Sea with its Turko-Tatar population. Next came the acquisition and gradual conquest of the Caucasus, with its multifarious peoples, of whom the most distinct and nationally conscious were the Georgians and Armenians. Finland was part of Russia's reward for a temporary alliance with Napoleon, and a distinct non-Aryan people culturally influenced by the Scandinavian countries added another element to the heterogeneous racial pattern of Russia. The strategic and economic considerations that contributed to this policy of expansion and conquest of other peoples have been noted. The importance of these motives made possible the carrying out of a program that entailed a terrific burden on the conquerors as well as on those conquered. For the Great Russian the program was to a considerable extent one of necessity, colored by a sense of mission at least in the rulers and their ruling classes. And there was for those conquered often only a change of ruler and a change that seemed to promise an advantage, or at least a measure of relief.

#### 4. *The Nationality problem under Tsarism.*

Some of the peoples brought into the Empire were closely related ethnically to the Great Russian, such as the Little Russian or Ukrainian, and the White Russian. Culturally these three groups of the larger Eastern branch of the Slavs were also on approximately the same level. In the matter of religion the three "Russian" groups had been originally of the same Greek Orthodoxy and had this strong bond in common. Among the White Russians a Uniate movement under Polish influence had led to a hierarchical relationship with Rome; and among the Ukrainians an Old-Believer movement hostile to the doctrinal and administrative authority of the established Orthodoxy produced many dissenters. The language differentiation ~~between~~ these three Russian peoples was also definite, having produced three sister languages, although the politically stronger group, the Great Russian, considered the Ukrainian and White Russian as mere dialects of its own language, which was made the official language for the whole Empire.

The Poles belonged to another branch of the Slavs, known

as "Western Slavs." Because of their centuries of independence while the Russians were under the Tatar yoke, and their closer contacts with Western Europe, the Poles were culturally considerably in advance of the Russians. Further, Roman Catholicism had come to Poland, while the Eastern Church had won over the Russians. And Polish was of course a distinct language resting on its own literature and a broad program of education. Increasing the differences between Russians and Poles was the long-rivalry between their respective states. This rivalry had been active for centuries, and at one moment, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Poles had established themselves as the temporary rulers in Moscow itself.

The distinct racial, political and also cultural status of the Finns has been noted and they did not come into the Empire as a compact group until the nineteenth century. Scattered Finnish elements had survived as small settlements, for the original inhabitants of the upper portion of the plain where the Russians established first their principalities and then their empire were Finnish. Protestantism had spread to the Finns through their close political and cultural relations with Sweden.

A clear differentiation, extending to the political and cultural fields, existed for the Georgians and Armenians, of Trans-Caucasia. The Letts and Lithuanians were in a somewhat similar position in the old Russian Empire. These smaller groups, sharply differentiated from the Russians, wished to re-establish their independence and used to this end the conditions of war and revolution which brought the old Empire to the point of collapse. The Letts and Lithuanians were successful in their aspirations while the Georgians and Armenians failed. This later development is noted at this point to bring out the fact that many of these non-Russian national minorities accepted their place in the Empire only under compulsion, their status of conquered peoples always remaining deeply enrooted in their consciousness.

The Tatars and other Turkish and Asiatic peoples, all situated in the main to the east of the Great Russian center, had lost their formerly strong national consciousness, although they clung tenaciously to their language, and par-

ticularly to their religion. Mohammedanism had many millions of followers in the old Russia. It was not, however, considered as an active and dangerous competitor by Greek Orthodoxy, as were Roman Catholicism or Protestantism. Culturally the Tatar and eastern peoples were more backward than the Russian masses; many of them were nomads on the steppes or in the wilds of Siberia. They constituted the majority of the population of the territorial areas in which they lived, but these sections were scattered, particularly in the East, and with the exception of peoples of Russian Turkestan, far from a frontier that gave ground for concern.

Two other racial groups require special mention because of the peculiar circumstances of their position in the Empire. The Jews have been mentioned as coming to form an important element in the ethnic make-up of Russia as a result of the partitions of Poland. They had been subjected to strict limitations and they remained, as they had been in Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe, a distinct and almost segregated group. The Jews felt with particular force the severity of the militant and exclusive Russian nationalism of the Tsarist régime.

A small but compact German element in the Baltic provinces, the descendants of the old Livonian Order, formed a similar distinct group—privileged rather than subjected to disabilities—because of their economic and cultural background. And compact German settlements in Central Russia on the Volga and in the "New Russia" to the south of the original Ukraine, dated back to the period of Catherine, who had, in part because of her German origin, conceived this plan of German colonies in her adopted country of Russia.

This general outline of the results, in the matter of its racial composition, of the growth and establishment of the Russian Empire, suffices to indicate that there was in the latter no racial unity. Russia was an outstanding instance of the racially conglomerate state. Because of this fact, and the status of these national minorities, the present Soviet leaders constantly refer to the Russia of the Tsars as "the prison of peoples." The political and legal status of these non-Russian national minorities will be discussed in the next chapter, but mention is here made in order to contrast the

situation in respect of racial unity with the physical and economic factors that make for unity in the old Empire.

In these non-Russian groups strong separatistic tendencies were constantly present, stronger in certain groups, and always more definite at moments of crisis. On the other hand, while there was for the more cultured and nationally self-conscious groups a certain humiliation in being under a Russian régime, there were distinct advantages in being protected by a large and strong power, and economic advantages in being a part of a single economic unit.

In the expansion and welding together of the old Russian Empire the methods used were often those of brutal aggression and cynical disregard of national rights. But the process took place in a country and of a people that had suffered for over two centuries the Tatar domination, in an inhospitable geographic area, being at the same time the object of constant aggression from neighbors. The economic backwardness left no margin of security, for the old Russia was always just a little more than equal to the task it had to face, to maintain itself.

##### *5. Soviet nationality policy.*

Resting on the physical and economic factors making for unity of the bulk of the territory it inherited from the Russian Empire, the Soviet régime set out from the very start to establish a firmer political union of the divergent national groups. In the first Soviet unit the nationality policy followed the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia (see *Source Book*) and it was a Russian Socialist *Federated* Soviet Republic. After a period of disintegration there came a reintegration. Not until 1923, with the formation of the Union, was the federal principle of the Soviet system given its full expression. The basis for the coming together was two-fold. There were common interests of defense of these Soviet units. And all were in a state of economic collapse after the years of civil war and intervention, which was to be met by the closest economic co-operation. Since that date "autonomous regions" have been promoted to "autonomous republics," and several of the latter to "independent republics." Under the new constitution of 1936 the Soviet Union is com-

posed of eleven independent and twenty-two autonomous republics, nine autonomous regions or areas and nine national districts.

The nationality policy of the Soviet Union is based on the principles of voluntary membership and equality of rights. One may well question whether any present member republic of the Union could withdraw, as a matter of practical politics, although the emphasis which the Soviet leaders put on this right should be noted. There is also the fact that many of those charged with treason and counter-revolution in the recent purges were accused of working "to dismember the Soviet Union." Many of the Party members reached by the purge were in the Party organizations of national republics—the Ukraine, White Russia and the Caucasian and Central Asian republics.

On the other hand the national units are coming more and more to enjoy equal rights as compared with other local communities, and in instances a privileged position in respect of cultural rights. At first mistakes were made in handling the special cultural or economic problems of a given national minority, but on the other hand many have been given special assistance to rise from their cultural and economic backwardness. Thus the Soviet Union became "national in form" also for the national minorities. In the programs of economic expansion the aim has been to make regions, including the national republics, more self-contained while continuing to emphasize a particular line of production on the basis of resources. The former sharp distinction between "consuming" and "producing" regions is being consciously reduced. By this policy it is believed that a more effective economic unity of the whole will be secured.

Further details on this federal feature of the Soviet Union will be brought out in the discussion of the structure and functioning of the Soviet system as a whole. The general facts were noted here to show that the Soviet Union represents a community more completely and effectively than did the Russian Empire, although it owes its unity in considerable degree to the efforts of the latter and to positive traditions of the past.

These positive traditions of the past are being more empha-

sized in recent years, as the attitude of suspicion toward Russians engendered by the former exclusive Russian nationalism is being outlived. The still leading position, culturally and politically, of the Russian national group is being more frankly admitted, although there is a parallel tendency to emphasize the culture of the national minority. A few years ago the current expression met in Soviet writings was "the interests of the *peoples* (plural) of the Soviet Union." In the last year the term "the Soviet people" (*singular*) has come to be used. The welding together in a conscious union of the many peoples supplied the basis for the appearance in Soviet terminology of the expression, "a national interest."

## CHAPTER II

### THE POLITICAL HERITAGE

Bolshevism, of which the Soviet system is the institutional expression, is theoretically internationalist. But in point of fact it has to date been limited in its practical political application to what is still often spoken of as "Russia." Therefore the Soviet system reflects at many points the background of the country and peoples of the former Russian Empire. A considerable number of specific features of the Soviet system can be explained, in part at least, by the political and social experience—and lack of an extensive constructive experience in matters political and social—of the Russian people, and of the other Slav and non-Slav peoples associated with them in the course of the building up of the old Russia.

#### 1. *Autocracy to 1905.*

Until the Revolution of 1905 Russia was under an absolutistic form of government; in the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire, the Emperor, or Tsar as he was more generally called, was an "unlimited autocrat." While the tendency in Western Europe had been toward more democratic forms of government, in Russia, on the other hand, particularly from 1881 on, there had been a conscious effort to maintain and strengthen the principle of autocracy. Corresponding to the so-called revolutionary "nihilism," there was a nihilism of reaction, represented for example by Pobiedonostsev, Procuror of the Holy Synod and close adviser of three successive sovereigns. In his *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* Pobiedonostsev argued with considerable skill his championship of the autocratic principle, thus adding moral support to the policy of self-defense which the old régime adopted and pushed with all the power inherent in an established and strongly entrenched authority.



## 2. *Beginnings of constitutionalism.*

The Revolution of 1905 secured a certain modification of autocracy. An elected body with legislative powers, the Imperial Duma, was introduced and this institution marked the beginnings of constitutionalism. Legally the autocratic régime came to an end on October 30, 1905, with a Manifesto that granted this elective representative institution, and promised also the civic liberties which had been denied by the practices and principles of autocracy. However, during the years following the Revolution of 1905 the new constitutional institutions were unable always to enforce their powers and the practices of government continued to be arbitrary and "autocratic." With the outbreak of the World War in 1914, the sovereign attempted to reassert his "historic authority" and to "be the autocrat," particularly after he assumed in person the position of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It is often stated that Tsarism was not definitely overthrown until the Revolution of February 1917, when the Emperor abdicated. This statement is based on the fact of the continued conflict between the two principles of autocracy and constitutionalism that characterized the period of 1905-17. It should be noted, however, that constitutionalism, as represented by the Duma, was making rapid progress during these years. The World War had evoked a great national effort, in which even the broader masses of peasants and workmen were being included. This effort further strengthened the public or social institutions which were developing.

Thus the Russians were being educated in self-government, and were beginning to have the experience and sense of a legal order. Policy could be and was discussed, in the Duma, in the press and in scientific writings. In the field of administration, however, the system and practices associated with the pre-1905 régime—with "Tsarism"—were less modified by the introduction of the Duma. The Duma's powers of control over the executive branch of government were limited and frequently disregarded. Thus both before and after 1905 central and local administration was largely in the hands of an appointive bureaucracy, which tried to maintain and enforce its monopoly. Breaches had come in this rigid bureau-

cratic system with the introduction in 1864 and 1870 of elective local-government bodies, the Zemstvos in rural districts and Municipal Councils in the larger cities. Limited to local matters and under constant supervision by the representatives of bureaucracy, these institutions did not represent self-government in the full sense of the word. Also, the trend had been toward a limitation rather than a gradual extension of the powers and activities of these public or social, as opposed to bureaucratic, bodies. After 1905, under the protection of the Duma, the local-government institutions were able to assert their powers more successfully, and thus extend their work, which centered on the important fields of education, public health, and, in the rural districts, on the improvement of methods of agriculture. During the years of the World War these local-government units succeeded at last in forming "All-Russian Unions," and thus furnished channels through which ever-increasing numbers could take part in various forms of public effort to meet the problems and burdens of a war.

Another breach in the monopoly of administrative functions, which the bureaucracy of Tsarism strove to exercise was in the organization of the peasant villages. Rural Russia had a system of self-administration which had survived even the centuries of serfdom and was given a more systematic form and a responsible function as part of the Emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Despite the limitations on their activities enforced by strict supervision, through their village and cantonal institutions the peasants handled many of their local peasant problems, such as the distribution of the communal land, disputes over inheritance, in the peasant families and petty offenses against law and order. But the trend in the last years of Tsarism was toward stricter bureaucratic supervision and control over the peasant village assemblies, and the elders and judges elected by them. To this end a new set of officials, called Rural Chiefs, was introduced in 1889, authoritatively to direct the peasants. Despite this increased tutelage to which they were thus subjected the peasants continued to have certain rights of self-administration.

number of limitations imposed on them intensified for them the arbitrary character of the bureaucratic control. The Revolution of 1905 brought little relief to the non-Russians; in fact the position of these groups became definitely worse because of the active part they had quite naturally taken in the revolutionary events of 1905. War conditions from 1914 on served as the pretext for further persecution of many national minorities, for they occupied the border provinces behind and in the region of the fighting.

Under the influence of the constitutional development from 1905 on a more genuine Russian nationalism began to manifest itself, however. With the outbreak of the World War this new nationalism became more articulate and in view of the character of the conflict was accepted by many of the national minorities. Forced to express themselves their leaders found it possible to accept the conflict with Germany, which had not given Jews or Poles encouragement in their cultural national aspirations. They hoped the alliance with France and England would influence the Russian governmental policy toward them in a liberal sense. They knew that Russian liberals and socialists were strongly opposed to the exclusive official nationalism. The aim to unify the country had a constructive side, but the policy adopted to attain this end made for disunity, for it did not allow for the satisfaction of even the cultural traditions and aspirations of the racial groups which made up the Empire. It was an "official nationalism."

#### 5. *Legal class divisions.*

The Tsarist bureaucratic régime had another characteristic. Tsarism rested on a system of legal classes that had its roots in the past but was consciously fostered as part of the policy of self-defense of autocracy. Serfdom was abolished in 1861 but up to 1905 the process of emancipation was still going on. As late as 1915 the peasants were still subject to certain legal limitations connected with their former status of a "tributary class." No longer "rightless" as he had been to 1861, the peasant was still set apart from other classes. The village institutions were exclusively peasant institutions, the peasants voted separately in the elections to Zemstvo and Duma, and

peasant children had to go through special formalities to gain admission to secondary schools.

At the other end of the formal system of classes was the so-called "nobility," originally a "nobility of service," the privileged position resulting from service to the state. This class had enjoyed a monopoly of the right to own agricultural land and serfs up to the time of Emancipation. It had continued to be the main land-owning class although peasants and members of other classes had been gradually acquiring property rights in land. The higher positions in government service were practically open only to members of this so-called nobility.

In a Zemstvo, a Municipal Council and the Imperial Duma the landed nobility was given weighted representation, so that members of this class predominated in these bodies, particularly in the Zemstvo. The Rural Chiefs, appointed in 1889 over the peasants, had to be selected from the local nobility class; this special provision in the law was the basis for a widespread rumor among the peasants that the landlords' police powers of the time of serfdom were about to be re-established. The nobility had its own assemblies, dating back to the time of Catherine the Great, and the elected Marshal of Nobility in any district was *ex-officio* chairman of the Zemstvo Assembly and member of other important public boards. The retention of the old system of legal class divisions therefore served, as was the aim, to make the landed nobility a distinct ruling class under Tsarism. Thus there was the basis for the Bolshevik view that the Tsar was not only the largest of the landlords, but also represented primarily the interests and privileges of this class.

Between landlord and peasant—the two main classes of an agricultural country just emerging from a form of feudalistic relationships—there were three other classes, whose designations would be found for example on the passport which every Russian had to have and present on demand from the police authorities. These three designations were "clergy," "merchant" and "burgher."

The clergy of the numerically dominant and "established" Greek Orthodox Church constituted another official serving class. The church also enjoyed extensive property rights.

There was a line of demarcation between the higher bureaucracy of the church which was drawn from the Black Clergy (unmarried), and the parish priesthood known as the White Clergy. The official status of the clergy, its subordination to the civil authorities and their aims, and the very limited amount of social service rendered by the church and its leaders, tended to separate the church from the public. The formalism of Greek Orthodoxy also served to set the clergy apart as a distinct group in the community.

The merchants were organized in guilds, originally for purposes of taxation. As this class grew in size and economic importance with commercial and industrial development, it came to include the "captains of industry" and other businessmen, and became the other large propertied class side by side with the landlord class. The growth of this "bourgeois" class strained the legal class divisions that were retained and artificially strengthened by special privileges to the landowning nobility. For the "merchant" was not only socially looked down upon by the ruling nobility class; he was also discriminated against in the matter of representation in Zemstvo, Municipal Council or Duma, and in admission to certain higher educational institutions.

The last class designation of "burgher" represented a category which embraced those who did not come under any of the other four. In this group were the small shop-keepers, clerks, artisans and those factory workmen who had definitely given up their membership in a village community. The term as translated is misleading, for many permanent urban workers were still legally "peasants," such as domestic servants, cabmen and even a considerable percentage of the factory workers. This anomaly was another result of the retention of the obsolete system of strict class divisions and designations. For the rapidly growing industrial workman class this anomaly had a real significance, however. The fact that so many of the Russian workmen could be classified as peasants was one of the reasons for the refusal to provide for or permit any legal organization of workmen, such as the peasants enjoyed. The workman class was thus in a sense outside the legal structure of the community.

### 6. *The intelligentsia.*

In a discussion of the classes in the pre-Revolutionary Russian community the so-called "intelligentsia" must be mentioned. Representing the politically liberal-minded elements, and also the radical and socialist trend among the educated minority, the intelligentsia was recruited from all classes. Originally it was made up largely of "repentant" nobles. Gradually individuals from "other ranks" acquired education and rose to intellectual leadership. As education began slowly to spread to workmen and peasants the intelligentsia became more democratic in its composition. One of its branches was the so-called "third element" in the Zemstvo—the employees of the local provincial councils working in the fields of education, public health, statistics and agronomy.

The intelligentsia was opposed to Tsarism and especially to its class system, and claimed to be above class distinctions and privileges. It was interested in securing the abolition of the privileges of the nobility and the repeal of the limitations to which peasants were subjected. It was thus a middle class, growing in size and importance with the educational and industrial progress. The intelligentsia supplied the leadership of oppositionary movements, constantly receiving fresh recruits from the students of the higher educational institutions, working educationally and also politically among the workmen and peasants, often financially supported by the rising "bourgeoisie." But one of the results of the social structure of the old Russia was the existence of a wide gulf between the educated class and the "masses," to bridge which was one of the constant aims of the members of the so-called intelligentsia, and often the primary purpose of many of the underground, revolutionary societies or parties organized by it to further its opposition to autocracy.

### 7. *The professional revolutionary.*

Political parties similar to those of the western parliamentary system did not, of course, exist under Tsarism up to 1905. All efforts at organization for any purpose outside the formal institutions provided, or for political purposes within these institutions, were forbidden and severely

penalized. Organized opposition to autocracy had to take the form of underground and illegal activity which from the point of view of the authorities was always "revolutionary." The intelligentsia could not realize its aims of leadership, even in the field of education, without some degree of organization. The political aims and activities of the intelligentsia required definite organization and such existed as early as the sixties of the last century. Then, in the seventies, the revolutionary "Will of the People" instituted the campaign of terrorism, culminating in the assassination of Alexander II. During the eighties and nineties small "circles" were established among workmen and peasants, having political as well as general economic and cultural aims. Finally, between 1898 and 1904 formal "parties" at last were organized by the more radical elements of the intelligentsia, and a loose "union" was formed among the liberal, reform elements.

The liberals set up abroad, to escape censorship and the arrest of its editors, a publication called *Liberation*, copies of which were mailed or smuggled to sympathizers in Russia. Around this publication rallied those working for a constitutional régime, for larger powers to local-government bodies, for judicial as opposed to administrative procedure in the administration of justice, and for the civic freedoms of press, speech, conscience and association or union, and for equal rights to the national minorities. The liberals tried to keep within the law in their activities, but their leaders were constantly subjected to penalties in administrative procedure; they were exiled to Siberia or "sent out" from their places of residence and work. Around the *Liberation* published in Germany a loose form of union functioned, its members exchanging views and discussing aims when they met in Zemstvo Assemblies, at fairs, or in small social gatherings. To this "Union of Liberation" adhered the active liberal-minded Zemstvo leaders of the nobility class, many representatives of the rising "bourgeoisie," members of the liberal professions and younger elements of the intelligentsia, especially school teachers and university students.

The two principal parties which finally emerged from the radical and frankly revolutionary tendency in the Russian

## THE PROFESSIONAL REVOLUTIONARY

intelligentsia, were the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats. The Socialist Revolutionary Party represented a Russian form of socialism, resting on the peasantry. The members of this party worked in the main among the peasants, some along exclusively educational lines, others with frankly political aims. They spread socialist propaganda and in instances agitated for peasant protests. The difficulty, and often the impossibility, of carrying on this work among the peasants because of the severe measures taken to prevent and repress it, induced the Socialist Revolutionaries to revive the use of the weapon of terrorism against higher officials, especially of the police. It should be noted that the comparatively meagre progress which the Socialist Revolutionaries made among the peasants was due also to the indifference and often hostility of the latter.

In the Revolution of 1905 the Socialist Revolutionaries organized a Peasant Union which, with its rapid spread, substituted for the elemental sporadic agrarian disorders a more organized and articulate peasant movement for rights and for land. The official slogan of this party was: "The Land to Those who Till It," and on this basis it represented a frankly socialist program, to be attained by revolutionary methods.

The other organization of Russian socialists, the Russian Social Democratic Workman Party, had adopted the socialism of Karl Marx. Under this doctrine these Russian Social Democrats looked to the workman class as the basis for a struggle against autocracy and a revolutionary movement for socialism. They organized conspiratory circles among the workmen, and with greater success than did the Socialist Revolutionaries among the peasants. These underground groups could escape detection more easily in the large cities and the workmen responded more sympathetically to the program presented to them. The workman strikes, which came despite the fact that they were forbidden, served to increase the influence of the propagandists and agitators of the Social Democrats. And many leaders from the workman class itself were produced by the strike movement and the organizations associated with it.

In 1903 the Social Democrats divided into two groups,



on the basis of a sharp difference of opinion as to tactics and method of organization. The group having the majority at the congress, held abroad, at which this split occurred, came to be called the Bolshevik (Russian word for "majority") faction, while the other group called itself the Menshevik or minority faction of the Social Democratic Party. The Bolsheviks insisted on a carefully controlled and strictly disciplined membership so that the party could act positively in working for a definitely revolutionary movement. They believed that a membership made up of all who in general sympathized with the program could not supply a leadership, or develop in the leadership the will to act necessary for the success of a revolution. The Bolsheviks had already at this date a clear conception of the "professional revolutionary." It was Lenin who led the Bolshevik faction in 1903 and became by that fact the founder of the party which came later to bear the name of "Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)."

Thus if autocracy did not permit of the development of a wide and effective experience in self-government, it produced the professional revolutionary, the "socialist with a will to act," as the Russian Bolshevik has defined himself. The Bolsheviks have also always emphasized the prison records of their leaders and these experiences under the Tsarist police contributed to the "peculiar stuff" of which the Bolsheviks boast they are made, to that hardness and ruthlessness with which they later acted when they came into power.

#### 8. *Political parties after 1905.*

✓ In the Revolution of 1905 the oppositionary parties could act more openly. The liberals founded their Constitutional Democratic Party. Both factions of Social Democrats, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, were able to have their official press organs and their headquarters. The Socialist Revolutionaries could not come out in the open as an organization because they still believed in and practiced individual terrorism; they were the active force in the Peasant Union, however, and later in the Group of Toil, in the Duma.

With the institution of the Duma political parties in the

western sense became possible. But the indirect system of the elections for the Duma, except in a few large cities, reduced the importance of party organization. In the Duma itself the political parties assumed the functions exercised in the multi-party parliamentary systems of Western Continental Europe. A Nationalist Party was formed on the extreme right. The so-called "Octobrists," taking as their platform the October, 1905, Manifesto, represented the conservative but constitutional elements. The Constitutional Democrats formed the liberal center. On the left were the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions of the Social Democrats and the Group of Toil composed in large measure of the Socialist Revolutionaries. There were other smaller parties adhering to the right, center and left, including national groups such as the Polish. As in the party systems of Continental Europe there were groups representing personal interests and views. Of the Russian parties of the constitutional period of 1906-17, the Constitutional Democrats resembled more fully a political party of the western parliamentary system. The socialist parties continued to engage in underground activities, forced to do so by the prohibitions and restrictions still enforced, and also because they did not abandon their revolutionary aims with the institution of the Duma.

#### *9. Constitutional progress.*

The Revolution of 1905 strengthened the leadership to which the intelligentsia had long aspired; and the constitutional progress of the following years added to its place and prestige. In the social organizations formed to aid in mobilizing the resources of the country during the World War the intelligentsia found at last the possibility of a wide and practical realization of its aspiration to be an active public force. A co-operative movement among the peasants, which assumed large proportions, furnished a field for public service and an effective organic contact with the masses. In a sense the February, 1917, Revolution was the work, at least in its initiation, of the Russian intelligentsia and its failure was due in part to the weakness of this leadership. We shall note the difficult position in which the intelligentsia found itself with the advent of Bolshevism, and under the new Soviet system.

For with all its idealism and self-sacrificing activity it was not able to accept the implications of the social revolution when the latter came in October, 1917.

✓The February, 1917, Revolution brought absolute freedom of organization, and in the sharp political struggle which the Revolution introduced the parties became more clearly defined in their platforms and tactics. The conservative parties were practically eliminated. The liberal Constitutional Democratic Party absorbed all the non-socialist tendencies, and the socialist parties entered into conflict with one another on the questions of program and tactics which had differentiated them in the previous periods. The three main tendencies within Russian socialism became those of the Socialist Revolutionaries, one of whose principal leaders was Kerensky, and the Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, the last led by Lenin and also Trotsky, who had joined the Bolshevik faction after long and bitter opposition to it.

#### *10. War and collapse.*

To summarize this sketch of the political experience before the advent of Bolshevism in October, 1917—Russia had finally secured a semi-constitutional régime by the Revolution of 1905 and was making considerable progress toward a democratic, legal order when the World War and its heavy burden brought the political and economic crises at the beginning of 1917. The February Revolution represented an attempt to meet these crises by western parliamentary democratic methods and within the framework of the capitalist system, while at the same time carrying on the war. The economic collapse of the country, on the background of a limited and short experience in self-government, led to the failure of this attempt. The sharp class divisions which the old régime had retained and in fact strengthened, despite the democratic tendencies and forces at work against them, fostered class antagonisms and class struggle. The policy of restrictions on the racial minorities had developed in these a resentment that made for disintegration of the entity known as Russia into its different national component parts. Finally, there was the cultural backwardness of the masses which worked against a democratic and peaceful solution of the crises.

In the midst of the struggle of the summer of 1917 Kerensky, as leader of the moderate Socialists, appealed to one group which he was addressing not to act like slaves in revolt. The long tyranny of Tsarism, only partially mitigated by the beginnings of constitutionalism from 1906 on, the tyranny of ignorance which was one of the heritages of Tsarism, had produced on the background of the economic distress that prevailed after three years of war a mass discontent, of which one group of leaders was able to take advantage to further its program. This group had long anticipated a situation in which it could act, and that of October, 1917, in Russia seemed to them and proved in fact to be their opportunity. And they found a response from the Russian masses, which have always shown outbursts of feeling—generally resentment, and upsurges of energy—often along destructive lines when no constructive way was seen or indicated by a leadership. With their many contributions to other fields the Russians had shown little genius in political and social organization. An enormous Empire had been built up, but Tsarism was notorious as an instrument of oppression, a by-word in the setting of advancing and progressive liberalism in the pre-war world. Many Russians of all classes had fought Tsarism in all its aspects, but the latter held out, surviving the Revolution of 1905, and becoming ever more ruthless under its policy of self-preservation.

## CHAPTER III

### THE TIME-TABLE OF THE REVOLUTION

An outline of the background and course of Bolshevism is essential to an understanding of its present functioning, and aims to supplement the introductory summaries of the community to which Bolshevism came, and the political heritage on which it rested. The principal doctrinal foundations of Bolshevism can also be adequately summarized for our purposes, and in their perspective, by noting the distinct stages of development of the application of this doctrine which is also a method of action.

#### 1. *Paris Commune.*

✓ In the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian Bolsheviks saw, more than have other followers of Marx, an application of Marxian principles, especially that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the basis of his analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Paris Commune, Lenin insisted on the setting up of the type of organization which the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democrats became from 1903 on; he had in mind the need of a positive and adequate leadership when the opportunity to seize power would again present itself, and Marxian theory insisted that proletarian dictatorship would be the inevitable historical development.

#### 2. *Revolution of 1905.*

✓ The Revolution of 1905 produced conditions which seemed to offer the opportunity for action, in the General Strike of October, followed by the establishment of Soviets of Workers' Deputies and leading to the Moscow Armed Uprising of December. Despite the complete failure of the uprising, Lenin would not admit that it had been a mistake to attempt it, even in the light of the evident inadequacy of preparation

of the revolutionary group for leadership and of support from the masses, particularly from the peasant-soldiers and workman-soldiers. The Revolution of 1905 was considered by the Bolsheviks as a useful rehearsal. This view helped to maintain the morale of the group in the years of reaction that followed.

A somewhat similar view determined the attitude of the Bolsheviks toward the semi-constitutional régime that was secured by the Revolution of 1905. Their policy was to utilize the freer conditions for the further and better organization of the revolutionary groups. It was not until 1912, however, that these continued efforts at propaganda and organization met with any measure of success. After the tragedy in the Lena Gold Fields in 1912, where workmen and their families were ruthlessly shot down as they protested against the conditions of employment and living, a fresh wave of strikes pointed to the revival of the workman movement that had been on the wane after 1905.

### 3. *The World War.*

On the eve of the World War, in the summer of 1914, extensive strikes broke out in several industrial centers, particularly in the capital. The extent to which the professional revolutionaries were contributing to this strike movement has not been clearly determined. Nor is it possible to state definitely on what basis the strikes suddenly ceased with the declaration of war in the first days of August, 1914. In Russia there was an unusual, in fact unexpected, acceptance of the war, if only to the extent of an absence of active or violent protest. The Russian socialists, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, came out, as did the socialists of the other belligerent countries, in support of the war as one of national defense. It is noteworthy that the most definite and positive protest against the war came in Russia, voiced publicly from the tribune of the Duma by its four Bolshevik members. These deputies were immediately expelled by the Duma, and arrested and exiled to Siberia. And the Bolshevik leaders headed by Lenin, in voluntary exile in Switzerland, with several other left-wing socialist groups, issued an appeal "to convert the imperialistic war into civil war in all countries."

This was their interpretation of the internationalism of Marxian socialism. If the message of their leaders reached the members of the Bolshevik organization in Russia, the latter found it impossible actively to respond to it. There was a minimum of revolutionary propaganda or activity up to the very eve of the February, 1917, Revolution. The Bolshevik organization numbered only some 30,000 at the beginning of the revolutionary year of 1917.

#### *4. The February Revolution.*

On the other hand, the eight months from February to October became the period of the widest propaganda and agitation of the Bolsheviks for their program and tactics. With the freedom of the press, speech, organization and union which the February Revolution secured, and in the political struggle between socialists and non-socialists, and between the strongly differing and bitterly opposed socialist groups, the Bolsheviks presented fully their program and actively urged their tactics. The positive character of their program and the proposal to solve problems by direct revolutionary action made a strong appeal to a people weary and literally hungry after two and a half years of war. The character of the Bolshevik organization, with its highly centralized leadership and strongly disciplined membership, made for an effective mass campaign among workmen and peasants throughout the country, and also among the soldiers at the front. The principle of a carefully restricted membership was maintained, so that on the eve of the October Revolution the Bolsheviks numbered only some 200,000.

For the Bolsheviks the February Revolution was only a prelude to another and proletarian revolution. Opposed to continued participation in the war, the Bolsheviks were not concerned with the effect of their policy of "deepening and broadening the revolution" on the unity of the country and the problems of production and of the prosecution of the war. They opposed on principle the idea of a coalition government, which the other socialists who supported the war as one of national defense had to accept in order to organize the national effort necessary to continue the war.

It was from and through the Soviets of Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies, established by the February Revolution on the model of the Soviets of the 1905 Revolution, that this co-operation of the socialists with the non-socialists was effected. Because of this rôle of the Soviets, the Bolsheviks did not at first see in them an institution that could be adapted to their program. But as the Soviets tended to follow a policy independent of and in opposition to that of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks concentrated their attention on them and gradually secured the majority of the membership of the most important Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow. They then came forward with their demand that the Soviets take over all authority to insure and hasten the convening of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage. The political slogan of the Bolsheviks—"All Power to the Soviets"—was supplemented by the more general one of "Peace, Land and Bread," representing their promises to the groping masses.

#### *5. Seizure of power.*

On the eve of the convening of a second Congress of the Soviets the Bolsheviks in control of the Petrograd Soviet through its Military Revolutionary Committee issued orders to its constituency, the soldiers of the regiments of the capital, and by direct action took possession of the governmental buildings, railway stations and telegraph and telephone offices, arresting those members of the Provisional Government who did not have time to flee. Then they appeared before the Congress with the proposal that it assume authority. Thus in October, 1917, under the leadership and on the responsibility of the Bolsheviks the Soviet régime was set up.

The Bolsheviks had prepared the slate for the new executive, which was practically exclusively Bolshevik; a few Socialist Revolutionaries, who broke away from their party, supported the Bolsheviks and received in return several lesser posts in the new government. Decrees on peace, land to peasants and workman control over industry had been prepared and were presented and accepted. There then began the systematic struggle to establish the new authority throughout the country.



### 6 *Civil war.*

From the outset the revolutionary policy was to suppress all opposition, and as this opposition became more active, assuming the form of White Armies, the struggle soon developed into civil war. Intervention from the outside and on the part of the Central Powers as well as the Allies and America, unquestionably prolonged the struggle, although the development of civil war was clearly anticipated by the program of the Bolsheviks and made inevitable by their tactics. The next years of internal struggle and undeclared wars with other countries entailed a destruction of life and property that probably equalled Russia's losses during the three years of her participation in the World War. But the new Soviet authority won out on the political front, suppressing ruthlessly all opposition. It triumphed also on the military front, defeating and literally driving out the White Armies and the forces of foreign intervention. But the effort had brought economic collapse and a clear threat of famine, and in these conditions protests among the peasants and workmen, and even among some of the soldiers and sailors, were taking the form of active opposition, although there was no danger of an actual overthrow of the new régime.

### 7. *"War Communism."*

The economic collapse was the result in part of the dislocation of economic life under the conditions of fighting on all sides and throughout the country. The economic policy of the new order was also responsible for the breakdown of production in industry as well as in agriculture. This economic policy was dictated in part by the conditions of the struggle for political victory; many economic measures aimed primarily to weaken the opposition by destroying its economic base. On the other hand, the economic policy was in line with the doctrine of Bolshevism, having as its aim the establishment of the new socialist order. To the outside observer the economic policy seemed to be an attempt to introduce ideal communism by direct and forceful action. Thus all means of production were completely nationalized—land, banks, industrial enterprises including even the small

handicraft industries, and commercial establishments. The postal and telegraph services were already state enterprises, as were most of the railways. The taking over by the state of all means of production extended also to printing and publishing establishments, theatres of all kinds, municipal transportation and other services, and in the urban centers the larger dwelling houses as well as buildings used for public purposes. Private trade was forbidden. A system of rationing was introduced for the urban population. The peasants had to turn over to state collecting agencies all they produced above what they needed for their own subsistence; theoretically they were to receive in return consumers' goods and other manufactures. Housing, light and fuel, transportation and entertainment, including newspapers, were allocated. In industry the system suggested a single workshop in which the state was the supreme master. And the Soviet Constitution contained a provision that "who does not work shall not eat."

In explaining their economic policy as introduced by decrees and enforced by the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation—the *Cheka*—the Soviet leaders always referred to their Bolshevik program, and its aim to establish a classless society with the abolition of all private ownership of the means of production and of the exploitation of one man's labor by another. Later, when the economic policy of the first years of the Revolution was radically altered, the Bolsheviks characterized this first period as one of "War Communism," claiming that the conditions of the struggle for power and against intervention had forced them to deviate from their original program. There was an element of truth in this *post facto* explanation. Yet Lenin on one occasion justified the "direct assault on the citadel of capitalism" which the economic policy represented, insisting that if it had succeeded it would have saved time and expenditure of resources.

During this first period of "War Communism," often referred to as the "heroic period" of the Revolution, the measures of repression and compulsion reached their maximum height. It was the period of the Red Terror, of the *Cheka*, of the "expropriation of the expropriators," of the

"liquidation of the bourgeoisie." For workmen and peasants it was the period of labor mobilizations, labor armies, compulsory labor-union membership and forcible seizure of surplus food products. For the consumers it was the period of rationing by categories. These measures of compulsion were necessary in order to try to keep production going, and then, as it declined, to retard if possible its rate of decline. For workmen and peasants were not working and producing, because of the objective conditions of life and also their subjective attitude toward the new authoritative regulation of all the details of life and work. There was, of course, a far from favorable economic setting in which to try to organize new economic and social relationships and establish a new social order.

#### 8. *First Soviet Constitution.*

For the setting-up of a new type of political structure—the Soviet State—the conditions of civil war and acute class struggle were also not favorable. The first Soviet constitution was adopted in June, 1918, with its principles of class rule, occupational representation and federalism, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the abandonment of the principles which it represented. But the local Soviets were not re-elected regularly and at frequent intervals as provided for in the constitution. Their Executive Committees exercised both legislative and executive functions and the Party organs and the *Cheka* became the real authorities.

In this first period of the Revolution there was set up at Moscow as an integral part of Bolshevism and representing its essentially internationalist character the Third or Communist International. This institution spoke of itself as the "general staff of world revolution," and was the source of active support to revolutionary elements or efforts in other countries. For the Soviet régime was practically at war with all "bourgeois governments" in this period of armed intervention and the formal blockade of the new régime by the non-Soviet world.

The failure of the economic policy of this "war" or militant communism led to the adoption of the New Economic

Policy, in 1921, and the Revolution passed into its second period of the *Nep*, to use what soon became the current abbreviation abroad as well as at home.

9. *The Nep.*

The *Nep* made certain concessions to the very principles against which the Revolution was directed, such as the individual control of means of production, individual profit from such control, individual employment of labor and private trade for individual profit. There was not, however, a complete abandonment of the former economic policies and practices. Large-scale industry and foreign trade remained completely nationalized and the state continued to intervene in the fields of internal trade and agriculture. In banking and credit and in transportation and means of communication, including all publishing, the state also retained its position of effective control. The greatest concessions of the *Nep* were made to the peasants for whom individual tenure and exploitation of the land were again permitted, with the right to trade in surplus production after the payment of taxes.

The Bolsheviks spoke of their economic structure of this period as falling into two sectors, the one "capitalist" and the other "socialist." Through the socialist sector the proletarian state, it was explained, controlled the commanding economic heights. It was expected that the socialist sector would gradually prevail over the capitalist, by its inherent economic superiority as well as the privileged, favored position secured to it under the proletarian dictatorship. Administrative pressure, supplementing policies of taxation and credit, was used to aid the socialist elements in the economic structure to compete successfully with the capitalist.

The policy was one of maneuvering, to strengthen the socialist sector while correspondingly weakening the capitalist, and always, so far as possible, encouraging all types of production in order to revive the productive processes. When the communists became really concerned by the growth of individual "capitalist" activity in a particular field, measures of repression were used to keep individual initiative within safe limits. Such action was not contrary either to the spirit or letter of the *Nep*, for the concessions granted by

the latter were from the beginning announced as partial and strictly limited. The policy in economic terms was to re-establish production and this aim was practically achieved by 1927. And in the re-established economic system the socialist sector had become increasingly dominant, to the point where the Bolsheviks believed it could carry the main part of the load of clothing and feeding the country.

In the socialist sector the factor of economic planning was applied. The first plan was for the electrification of the country, under a formula proposed by Lenin that "Electrification plus the Soviet Authority equal Communism." For the electrification project aimed at the technological reorganization of the national economy—an industrial revolution. The economic plans became more concrete and more extensive in scope, and contributed to the rapid growth of nationalized industry. The working of planned economy was blocked by the resistance to positive direction of the capitalist economic forces, however, and when this conflict became more sharp, it prevented any further increase in production; the economic possibilities of the hybrid New Economic Policy had become exhausted. The individualistic tendencies in the capitalist sector were getting stronger, despite all the restrictions under which individual enterprise had to carry on, and these tendencies suggested the possibility even of the re-establishment of capitalism. These developments all contributed to the decision that there must be a change of policy, an abandonment of the *Nep*, if in fact the trend was to be, as indicated by the slogan of this period of the Revolution: "from a Russia of the *Nep* to a socialist Russia."

#### 10. "Cultural Revolution".

There was another feature in the developments during the period of the *Nep* that brought the decision to resume a more active policy in line with the economic program of the Revolution. This other development was the undoubted progress that had been made in promoting in the Party and particularly in the non-Party mass institutions and organizations of the Soviet system, propaganda of, education in and organization for the principles of Bolshevism. On the basis of a larger, more effectively organized and unified Party,

supported by communist organizations in the younger generation, of more active Soviets, of an enormous labor-union membership and of a network of co-operative societies for production as well as consumption, it was believed that a second drive for socialism would be successful. During the period of retreat, of the *Nep*, it had been possible to give more attention to the "cultural front" of the Revolution, to general education and "communist training," among adults as well as children. The "cultural activity" of all institutions was definitely propagandist and in preparation for mass participation in a program of "reconstruction," when the political leadership would determine that such a program was necessary and also possible of achievement.

11. *Resumption of socialist offensive.*

A third distinct period of the Revolution came with the "resumption of the socialist offensive" in 1928. The concrete expression of the new policy was the first Five-Year Plan, formally dating from October 1, 1928. On the basis of progress made in the first years it was decided that the Five-Year Plan could be completed by the end of 1932, that is, in four and a quarter years. And at that date it was announced that the Plan had "in the main" been carried out successfully.

The Plan called for a phenomenally rapid industrialization of the country under a most extensive program of new construction, of modern equipped factories and power plants, and of exploitation of natural resources. All these new enterprises were state undertakings, so that it was a program of socialist industrialization. By 1932 the participation of private enterprise in industry had been reduced to an insignificant per cent, the capitalist elements in this economic field having been driven out by special taxation, by the cancelling of concessions and by other measures, including arrest and exile of the individuals who, under the *Nep*, had been allowed and in fact encouraged to take over on a concession basis and operate for their individual profit, many of the smaller manufacturing enterprises.

In agriculture the Plan called also for technical re-equipment through mechanization on the basis of collectivization.

The individual peasant households were to be brought together in large collective units with varying degrees of socialization of the means of production. The "grand offensive" against the prevailing individual land tenure took place in the winter of 1929-30, and involved the "liquidation" of the so-called *kulak* or rich peasant as a class and administrative pressure on the other peasants. Local authorities overreached in carrying out the program and had to be reprimanded for showing "dizziness from success." The number of *kulak* households to be expropriated, and their members exiled from their villages or arrested and transported to lumber camps in the north or new construction jobs in Siberia, was officially reckoned at around one million. The excess of zeal of local workers for the official program of collectivization led to the inclusion of many middle peasants in the very large list of the inevitable casualties. The collectivization of agriculture was the most revolutionary feature of the revolutionary program. It led to civil war in many villages, for it represented "pulling capitalism out by the roots" by the expropriation of the last important capitalist elements in the Soviet economic structure.

By the end of 1932 over 60 per cent of the former individual peasant households, numbering some sixteen million, had been brought together in 220,000 collective units. This percentage of collectivization exceeded almost three times the original schedule of the Plan. Accordingly the degree of mechanization of the collective units fell short of the planned program. The destruction of horses by peasants opposed to collectivization and by embittered rich peasants, actually reduced the available traction power. The internal management of the collective units was inefficient and the peasants worked the fields carelessly and uneconomically. The resulting decline in the production of grain and other food-stuffs led to the resumption of the system of rationing, to shortened rations for all and in some districts to actual famine conditions. But by this collectivization program, supplemented by state agricultural enterprises, agriculture was brought over from the capitalist to the socialist sector as defined by the Bolsheviks, so that the latter became unequivocally dominant. It could therefore be announced that the

"foundations of a socialist structure had been completed" by the establishment of a new modern technological base for the economic reconstruction of the country.

In the field of trade the resumption of the socialist offensive aimed to eliminate private trade, substituting for it co-operative trade and state distribution. "Liquidation" procedure by administrative measures was adopted also against the private traders. In the rural districts the *kulak* was often also the local trader. As trader, and also moneylender, the *kulak* had been, before the Revolution, an exploiting element of the worst type, one of the most unsympathetic figures in rural Russia. The urban private trader of the period of the *Nep* had been forced by the very conditions of the *Nep* to adopt flagrantly speculative methods and also represented a most unpleasant type. The revolutionary ruthlessness of the process of liquidation of these *Nepmen* was not unwelcome to a large element in villages and cities, in the conditions of shortage of all supplies. The leadership did not fail to make the greatest possible political capital of this fact.

#### 12. *Sharpening of class struggle.*

The "sharpening of the class struggle" that accompanied the resumption of the socialist offensive reached into every field of life. Technical experts trained under the old régime were looked on with suspicion. This attitude was to be one of "healthy suspicion," but it led to the practice of "baiting" the representatives of the old intelligentsia, and to wholesale accusations of sabotaging the program of socialist reconstruction. Many of these so-called *spetsy*—specialists or technical experts—were arrested, exiled and even shot. The trials were held in such a setting as to give a political color to the alleged acts, of omission as well as commission.

A neutral attitude toward the program of building socialism was no longer permitted and literature and science had to make their contributions to the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan. The programs of educational institutions were co-ordinated with the Plan, as were also the theatre and the movie. The press and the radio became more definitely state organs of organization, propaganda and agitation behind the drive for socialism. All life was politicized by



the all-embracing character of the Plan. The strain on the resources of the country and on the nerves of the people was terrific, and the result was a marked decline in the living standards for all, including those more favorably rationed as the "leading" and most important effective factors for the achievement of the program.

Within the leadership of the Revolution there were "doubters" as to the wisdom of the terrific pace adopted. These doubters were eliminated from their positions of leadership on the ground that they were unable to understand the mechanics of the class struggle in this new period. Those who were unable to submit to the discipline of the Party were also penalized by exclusion from membership. The Party membership was allowed to increase, however, in order to enlarge the proletarian or workman element in the organization. Through their communist organizations the youth and even the children were brought into the struggle for the Plan, in the organized effort to promote a mass "pathos of construction."

### 13. *First Five-Year Plan.*

It should be noted that the order of the three basic motives behind the first Five-Year Plan was altered by the conditions of the struggle, at home and in the world-setting of the Soviet Union. The building of socialism was presumably the first aim, and this was to be expressed concretely in terms of a raising of the standards of living and the development of a broader and deeper cultural life. Military considerations came to the fore, however, and were responsible for the emphasis on the development of heavy industry, to the sacrifice of light industry and the production of consumers' goods. The opposition of the peasantry, which was more active and sustained than was anticipated, led to more emphasis on the proletariat as the politically leading class; the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was strengthened during and for the drive for socialism. The primarily military and political considerations therefore overshadowed the economic aims of developing the natural resources and organizing the processes of production so as to bring an easier, fuller and richer life to the masses. However, the result was to make the Soviet

Union sufficiently independent of the outside non-Soviet world so that it could continue its program of socialist industrialization, even in the face of the hostile attitude of the outside world, in which the Bolsheviks always saw the danger of a deliberate economic boycott such as they had to face in the first period of the Revolution. This industrial development strengthened the Soviet Union's preparedness for defense, the need for which was clearly suggested by the hostile attitude toward Sovietism of several strong and militant neighbors.

It was in 1931 that Stalin stated that the Soviet Union was from fifty to one hundred years behind the larger industrialized countries. He then set as the task of the Soviet system to overcome this handicap in ten years, insisting that this must be done to avoid being crushed by these "capitalist" industrialized states. That the latter would try to prevent the rise to a position of power of this first "proletarian" state, was part of the revolutionary psychology of the Bolshevik. Stalin also had in mind and called attention to the fact that Russia had often been defeated in the past and always because of her technological backwardness.

The pace set by the first Five-Year Plan was necessary, it was believed, because of the danger of attack. It was also useful to arouse, especially the youth, for the effort and sacrifices required. It added to the cost, in human and material values, of the program. It made more rigid the enforcement of policy, and heavier and more extensive the pressure to push through the policy.

#### *14. Second Five-Year Plan.*

With the passing to the second Five-Year Plan in 1933, there came an easement of the strain. The emphasis was shifted to the mastering of the new technique and the new social organization. There was held out the definite promise of a marked rise in living standards. The class struggle was to continue, however, for the second Plan, still in progress, is to eliminate completely all capitalist elements in the economic structure. Collectivization is to be completed. "Soviet trade," supported by consumers' co-operative and collective-farm bazaars, is to take over the field of

distribution of consumers' goods. By the end of 1935 it was reckoned that already over 95 per cent of "production funds"—capital goods—had been socialized, the last remnants of individual control of means of production no longer constituting a "hostile economic force."

The second Five-Year Plan aimed to eliminate also "capitalist elements in the thinking of the people," thus completing the communist retraining of the masses by the development of a new attitude toward work as a matter of duty and glory. The difference in conditions of work between rural and urban workers and between brain and manual workers was to be reduced if not eliminated, and a similar, general attitude toward work produced, thus bringing at last the elimination of classes and the completion of the socialist economic structure. Within the established framework differentiation of wage, on the basis of differences in skill and application, was allowed to develop as consonant with the principles of socialism.

The third and fourth years (1935-36) brought marked improvement in the fulfillment of the schedules of production, and also in the reduction of costs and the increase in the productivity of labor. While the crop in 1935 was an unusually good one, the climatic conditions in 1936 entailed a decline, but not of menacing proportions; the usual ravages that have resulted in the past from the periodic droughts to which the country with its continental climate is subject, were reduced by better organization and agricultural methods. There came a most welcome increase in the supply of consumers' goods with more efficient distribution. It was possible to abandon again the rationing system. There seemed to be a slight reduction in the tension and consequent regimentation that had accompanied the drive for socialism.

#### 15. *The New Union Constitution.*

✓ And at the end of the year 1936 these achievements were registered in a new constitution, adopted after several months of wide discussion. The new constitution, with its definition of the Soviet system, and its promise of new and more democratic features, will be one of the main subjects

of this study. With changes also in the structure of the Party and labor unions, the constitution furnishes the channel for what the Soviet leaders call a "turning-point" in the political life of the country, involving a more active politicizing of the whole system.

*16. Political turning-point.*

One aspect of this re-emphasis on the politics of the Revolution has been the purge of the Party, and accordingly of government, army, labor unions and also cultural institutions—a purge of extreme ruthlessness related by the Soviet leaders to the socialist and democratic trends represented by the constitution and its provisions. This relationship will be noted in each context in the analysis to follow. This political turning-point had features suggesting a crisis, and there was a break in the former upward trend of the production curves, thus illustrating the basic relationship between politics and economics in the Soviet system.

In this last period the position of the Soviet Union in the world became more important because of the increased tension in the international situation. The very fact of the existence of a Soviet system was one of the causes of this tension, while at the same time the Soviet Union was very definitely a factor for peace. But the renewed emphasis on politics extended to the question of the position of the Soviet Union in the world, leading to a greater emphasis on the "capitalist encirclement" in which the Soviet system finds itself.

The claims of achievement of Bolshevism, and particularly the claim as to the direction of the development of the Soviet system, will come into the subject matter of the following chapters. It was necessary to outline the aims of the Revolution, and the policies adopted to attain them, before undertaking an analysis of the present-day functioning of Bolshevism, under the headings of the determination of policy, the administration of public affairs and the relation of the individual to the state.

## CHAPTER IV

### STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

General characterizations of the institutions and organizations of the Soviet system have been noted in the preceding chapters. Here certain structural features will be analyzed in more detail, the emphasis being put on those which the Soviet leaders point to as differentiating their system from what they call "bourgeois democracy." The claim of superiority of the Soviet system will be noted, but will be discussed more fully in the following chapters on the determination of policy, the procedure for law-making, public administration and the rights of the individual.

The boast of the authors and leaders of the Soviet system is that it provides for effective mass participation and control in public affairs, under positive and purposeful leadership of this mass activity. Because of frequent citing in Soviet writings, Lenin's classic statement may again be noted, to the effect that under the Soviet system the housewife will learn to run the state. The Soviet institutions and organizations in their structural forms aim to provide the instruments for this process in their actual functioning. The claim that the Soviet system is becoming more democratic is based on the gradual perfecting of this structure in the course of the experience in its functioning.

Combining the various current official designations one can give the following general definition of the Soviet system. It is a union of national republics in which the state and also the government is one of workmen and peasants, organized, however, as a dictatorship of the proletariat, this dictatorship being effected by the vanguard of the workman class as organized in the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). One can list the following distinctive character-

istics of the Soviet system. It permits of only one party, the organization called "Party" enjoying a monopoly of legality in political organization, being at the same time a novel, peculiar type of organization, distinctly different from what is understood by "party" in the western parliamentary systems. The Party has been described by its own leaders as the motive power of a highly geared machine, the other parts of which are the Soviet assemblies and committees, the trade or labor unions, and various types of co-operative societies and groups. The Party assumes a "ruling position" in the Soviet Government, and positive leadership in all other organizations, acting, as defined above, as the vanguard of the proletariat. Special structural features of the Party aim to fit its membership for this responsibility of leadership, as an organization and as individuals.

The Soviets in the narrower technical sense are the governmental organs, to date forming a single structure, to include both local and central government, the higher units elected by and from the lower. Labor unions and co-operative societies, while essentially economic organizations, form with these Soviets the so-called "non-party mass organizations" of the Soviet system. To use the classification of the Webbs, in the Soviet assemblies and committees the workman, office worker or peasant functions as a citizen; in labor unions, collective farms or industrial co-operatives he functions as a producer; and in the various other co-operatives he functions as a consumer. The Soviet system as a whole therefore presents a multiform and highly integrated type of constitutional structure.

The structural forms of the Party, labor-union and co-operative organizations resemble closely those of the present Soviets, presenting a pyramid-shaped hierarchy formed by the election of all higher units from the immediately lower unit, with a central committee or central board at the apex. There has been no suggestion that the structural organization of the Party or labor union is to be altered by the introduction of direct election of secondary and higher units, as is to be done for the Soviets at the next elections under the new constitution. At any given level in the pyramid structure the organs of Party, Soviet, labor union

or co-operative for a given territorial area parallel one another, thus making possible the close integration of their respective functions. The pyramid form of structure aims to secure the combining of mass initiative with specific direction and control under the formula of "democratic centralism."

Because of the character of the economic structure of the Soviet Union—the socialization of practically all means of production, including land—public administration and what would be called business management in other systems are practically identical. This is another and most important illustration of the high degree of integration of the Soviet system. The Soviet state may therefore be brought, with certain reservations, under the definition that has become recently current, of a totalitarian state.

These introductory definitions and characterizations will now be elaborated in certain details, having been noted in order to give a general perspective to the discussion of the specific points to be taken up.

#### 1. *The Union.*

One of the first "Declarations" of the October Revolution was on the "Rights of the Peoples of Russia" (see *Source Book*). In the first Soviet unit to be set up the federal feature was introduced (see *Source Book* for Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic). As other Soviet units were established some of them also presented the federal principle in their structure. Then these Soviet units came together, in 1923, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see *Source Book* for Union Constitution of 1923). In the revisions of constitutions of the last year (1936-37) the Union constitution was the first to be drafted and adopted (see *Source Book*), and subsequently the constitutions of the national republics have been altered, to conform to the basic Union constitution. These constitutions of the various republics present differences of detail to meet local conditions, but in general principles they are all similar, and the sections covering the basic principles of the Soviet system are identical with the sections of the Union constitution of December 5, 1936.

The number of basic republics constituting the Union has been gradually increased from seven in 1923 to eleven under the 1936 constitution. The number of autonomous republics within the independent units has increased from ten to twenty-two during the same period, while that of autonomous regions has declined from sixteen to nine. In 1929 another lower grade was introduced, called a "national district," and there are now nine of these under the new constitution. Thus units have been promoted from a lower to a higher grade of autonomy, and finally to what is termed "independence." The conditions necessary for independence were indicated by Stalin in his report on the new constitution at the extraordinary Congress of Soviets in November-December, 1936. There must be a compact, self-conscious national group of at least a million population, and the territory occupied must be on the border of the Union so that the unit can exercise its right to secede.

In the matter of representation the national minorities have been taken into account from the beginning, in a Commissariat of Nationalities at first, and then in the Soviet of Nationalities when the Union was set up. This Soviet of Nationalities was part of the Central Executive Committee, the other section being the Soviet of the Union, and its members were selected by the respective republics and confirmed by the Congress of Soviets, while the Soviet of the Union was elected directly by the Congress of Soviets. Under the new constitution the Soviet of Nationalities, of the new Supreme Soviet, is to be elected directly in each unit, on the basis of the following allocation of seats: independent republics—25; autonomous republics—11; autonomous regions or areas—5, and national districts—1.

In working out their system of planned economy the Soviet leaders developed the idea of economic regions, and this plan for economic re-regionizing cut across the lines of division based on the principle of nationality. An accommodation between the two factors was effected by definite concession to that of nationality. However, the national units and also the larger administrative units within them, fit into the economic plans. The maps supplied have been based on the divisions by nationality because of their politi-



cal significance, which has become greater rather than less in the course of the changes of the last years.

## 2. *The Soviets.*

The Soviet Union is "national in form but class in content," to cite a current definition. In all of the national units the Soviets have been class institutions, as their full name indicates. Originally Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies before October, 1917, they became Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies. Later the term "Cossack" was added. In the case of "soldier," "red-armyist" and "Cossack" the workman or peasant in military service or organization was envisaged. When house-wives, office workers, students and the "toiling intelligentsia" in general were admitted to the suffrage there was no change of name, for as the new constitution states, it was and still is a "state of workmen and peasants." But with the practical liquidation of classes that has come the Soviets are to be called "Soviets of Toilers" after the next elections.

The electoral system to date had in mind the enforcement of the class-principle, and this was one reason for its two main features, namely occupational representation and indirect election. By having the majority of those who voted do so at their places of work—the factory, the administrative or educational institution, the barracks, and in the rural district as the community of peasants—the electoral procedure readily and effectively excluded those who were denied the suffrage—all so-called "bourgeois elements." Occupational representation also made it possible to weight the workman vote against the larger peasant vote and thus to ensure the hegemony of the workman class—the proletarian dictatorship. It should be noted that voting in one's place of work gave more significance to the act, could be done more intelligently and also with less expenditure of energy. It has been objected that this system of voting made it possible to force individuals to participate in the elections, as absence from the election meeting could be readily detected. The large percentage of participation at Soviet elections is in part due to these two factors, of ease and a certain degree of pressure.

The Soviet voter's civic duty in actual voting has been concluded when he has elected the deputy to the primary unit—to these some 70,000 urban and rural Soviets. For under the indirect system district, regional and republic congresses, and finally the All-Union Congress, have been elected by the immediately lower unit. This indirect system was adopted for several reasons. It was the practice in the elective institutions of the pre-revolutionary régime. It made the task of voting easier for the workmen and peasants whose experience in the former elected bodies had been very limited. The indirect system facilitated the special weighting of the workman vote, for which there was the definite theoretical basis already noted in discussing the principle of occupational representation.

With the introduction of universal and equal suffrage there will no longer be the need for occupational representation, and with the direct election of the secondary and higher units of Soviets there will be no possibility of applying it except in the case of a few very large enterprises or institutions. This interesting and essentially "Soviet" feature of occupational representation may be retained for the election of the primary units, to the same extent to which it has been practiced to date. But with the new system of elections that has been introduced for the district, regional and republic Soviets and the Supreme Soviet for the whole Union, there will have to be election districts. The new constitution for the Russian unit has fixed the approximate size of the new election districts as follows: 300,000 of population for the Supreme Soviet; 3,000 for the Moscow and Leningrad Soviets; 100-1,000 for other cities; 15-40,000 for regions; 500-1,500 for districts, and 100-250 for villages.

In all Soviet elections to date the voting has been by show of hands; the use of the secret ballot was positively forbidden. The argument advanced for the system of open voting was that it forced all opposition to expose itself; but critics of the Soviet system have insisted that it made the elections meaningless. The reason for the introduction of the secret ballot now given by Soviet leaders is the one that has usually been advanced, namely that it increases the re-

sponsibility of the one elected, and control by the electors. With the introduction of direct election of the higher units by large election districts a formal ballot becomes necessary and is to be the secret ballot.

In the Soviet electoral system to date the presenting of candidates has been very informal. The Party would present the list of candidates, generally including a few non-Party individuals on its list. Although voting by list was forbidden when its practice led to a decrease of interest in the elections, the Party list has generally gone through without alteration or difficulty. Under the new electoral law there is provision for nomination of candidates by labor unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and other societies. All nominations can be challenged and each candidate is to be voted on individually.

Election meetings are preceded by so-called "reporting meetings," at which the deputies in office report on what the Soviet has accomplished and their individual part in this work. On the basis of these reports the "mandate" for the deputy to be elected is drawn up, often covering hundreds of points. The mandate usually emphasizes matters of practical concern, such as transportation facilities, public baths or telephone services, to note only a few as illustration.

The provision for recall of a deputy, at any stage but practiced especially in the primary units, aims to enforce responsibility to the electors, although the too-wide exercise of the power of recall has come to be discouraged, because it made for inefficiency by giving a very fluid character to the personnel of the assembly and its executive committee. The earlier policy to encourage the selection of new members at the re-elections in order to bring larger numbers into the activities of the Soviets has also been abandoned in the interest of the greater efficiency from a greater continuity of personnel. The gradual extension of the interval between general re-elections to three years in the case of the last elections, aimed to give the deputies time and opportunity to develop experience. The Soviet system has had time to produce already the "professional" legislator, but as such are generally also the Party members they come under the Party

discipline which has as one of its purposes to train and control the acknowledged profession of leadership. Groups organized by deputies in large enterprises and institutions represent another device by which the deputy is expected to keep in touch with his constituency in order properly to represent it. These "deputy groups" hold regular formal meetings and consultation hours to hear complaints or suggestions.

Another method for increasing interest and actual participation in the activities of a given Soviet is to associate voluntary workers with the "sections" of a Soviet. These sections are the committees in which the deputies elect to work, and include the fields of the jurisdiction of the Soviet: economic, cultural, administrative and so forth. Members of these sections constitute the so-called "Soviet active element"; among rural voters this active element has been estimated to number several million, or over 8 per cent of all rural voters. For members of the intelligentsia association with a "section" of the local Soviet is part of their "social activity," which while not obligatory is politically advisable. Through the enormous numbers of these volunteer workers in Soviet sections the base of these mass institutions is made still broader.

More discussion, particularly at the reporting meetings, less direction from the Party chairman, independent nomination and voting on each candidate have given more meaning to the last Soviet elections of 1929, 1931 and 1934. The adoption of the secret ballot, which has been introduced for the coming elections of 1937, will add to the significance of the elections, and with the introduction of direct elections and equal suffrage, promises to produce a system of representation which will be closer to the standards of the western parliamentary system, some of which the Soviet leaders have announced they are ready to accept.

The Soviet system as practiced to date was well adapted to the conditions of apprenticeship for a people which had had only one experience in general elections, and that a very limited one in an abnormal state of affairs—the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in the confusion and conflict of the first weeks of the October Revolution. The proposed changes in the election system are explained as

evidences of the development—and a rapid one—of a Soviet democracy—a form of democracy which the Bolsheviks insist has already given evidence of being in the Soviet economic setting a more effective instrument for mass participation in public affairs than the western democratic system, which they consider “formalistic” and accordingly in many respects irresponsible.

All grades of Soviets have had their executive committees, elected by the general assemblies. In the case of the Union it has been the “Central Executive Committee,” and for the republics the “All-Russian Central Executive Committee,” “All-Ukrainian . . .,” and so forth. These latter will now be replaced by Supreme Soviets elected directly as the “highest organs of state power” with permanent Presidia. The Union Presidium has been characterized as the “collective presidency” of the Union. As “organs of state administration” the Union and the individual republics, autonomous and independent, will have their respective Councils of People’s Commissars, while the local organs of state power—the Soviets of Toilers—will continue to have their executive committees.

The People’s Commissariats fall into three groups. There are the All-Union Commissariats which “direct the branch of administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the Union,” and are the following: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Railways, Postal and Electrical Communications, Water, Transport, Heavy Industry and Defense Industry. The Union-Republic Commissariats, represented in the Councils of People’s Commissariats of the republics as well as in that of the Union, are the following: Food Industry, Light Industry, Timber Industry, Agriculture, State Grain and Livestock Farms, Finance, Internal Trade, Home Affairs, Justice and Public Health. The integration of these combined organs of administration will be noted in the discussion of their functions. People’s Commissariats to be found only in the Council of a national unit are the following: Education, Local Industry, Municipal Industry and Social Security. The large number of governmental departments in the Soviet system is the result of state economic planning and extensive public services. In addition to

the Commissariats there are important All-Union Commissions and Committees: The State Planning Commission, the Committee on Agricultural Supplies (state collections), a committee on Higher Education and one on the Arts.

### 3. *The Party.*

The unique character of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) has already been noted. Among the terms used to indicate more clearly its peculiar nature are "revolutionary order," "revolutionary brotherhood" and "vocation of leadership." The last term, given by the Webbs, is more applicable to the present stage of its history, although the others, relating especially to its past, are in line with features which have been carried over from its pre-revolutionary activity. The Bolsheviks themselves constantly emphasize that they constitute a "party of revolution"—the organization holding itself responsible for the Revolution and its progress. Membership in the Party is strictly limited as to numbers. In October, 1917, the total membership was around 200,000. By 1921, after some three years as the ruling party the membership had been allowed to increase to only 650,000. Then, in preparation for the retreat of the *Nep* and the dangers of this retreat, under provision for such in the Rules of the Party (see *Source Book*) a thorough "purge" was effected. Some 200,000 were found unworthy of continued membership, and were not re-registered. By 1928 the membership had increased to 1,500,000. In 1924, 200,000 had been taken in as a special contingent in memory of Lenin, and in 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Revolution another large group was admitted. These have been the only instances of mass recruitment to membership, and the new members were selected especially from among bench workmen who must constitute the majority of the membership.

After such an increase a second purge was instituted in 1928, to check up on those who had been admitted; some 10 per cent failed to pass the very meticulous examination of their records. From 1928 to 1933 a policy of admitting new members more freely brought a further increase to around three million. Many collectivized peasants and

technical experts were urged and allowed to join. But in 1934 a third purge was ordered, and during its progress the doors of the Party were temporarily closed. This last purge has been the most severe, and continued for two years. It was followed by a re-issuing of all membership documents as a further check. The local secretary had to give the membership certificate personally to each member of the unit under his jurisdiction, verifying his identity and past with particular care. The purge was not completed until November 1, 1936. Since that date there has been another kind of purge, affecting in the main Party members, but for crimes against the state and not merely for violation of Party discipline or "behavior unbecoming to a communist." By the 1934-36 purge the total membership of the Party was again reduced to around two million. It is impossible to estimate the loss of membership in the general severe purges of Government and Party leaders of the last year. Also there apparently has been no considerable admission of new members since the decision of November 1, 1936, again to consider applicants.

The term "members" has been used above to include both full members and so-called "candidates." The latter have to pass through a period of probation, varying according to the class to which they belong. A new category of "sympathizers" was introduced in 1934, but this group, not included in the membership as noted above, has not as yet clearly defined itself or assumed large proportions; during the period of the third purge it was in abeyance.

These periodic cleansings, supplemented by constant expulsions of individuals or even whole local groups, are also the sanctions behind the strict discipline enforced by the Party over its members. The Bolshevik must know his revolutionary theory, must be active, and must be an example in his place of work. On the other hand, he must not be a careerist, and in his leadership must not adopt the methods of a drill sergeant. In his personal life he is not limited except in such matters as would bring discredit on his and the Party's leadership, such as habitual drunkenness or abuse of the divorce law.

There was until recently a so-called "Party maximum,"

that is, a fixed monthly salary or wage for Party members regardless of the amount and quality of their work. This maximum salary was abolished for skilled workmen, engineers and managers, in connection with the emphasis on learning the new techniques of production. It had always been qualified for writers and lecturers in view of the importance of developing the technique of propaganda of the new ideas and methods. For the Party workers in the field of political leadership the maximum has been retained for the monetary salary payment, supplemented by many perquisites that go with positions of leadership.

The Party illustrates in the clearest way a principle of organization which is characteristic of all Soviet institutions and organizations, namely so-called "democratic centralism." All Party committees and secretaries are elective. These organs of the Party must report back regularly to their electors. The minority must submit to the majority. All Party decisions are obligatory on the next lower unit of the organization, and on all members.

In a recent (March 5, 1937) speech on the Party, Stalin took occasion to estimate the size of its staff of leadership. The highest leaders—who might be called the "generals"—number from three to four thousand. Under these are the "officers' staff" of from thirty to forty thousand, resting on the "lower party commanding-staff" of from a hundred to a hundred and fifty thousand. These latter select each two alternates and train them. Party schools add theoretical training to the practical experience in leadership.

The taking of stock in connection with the recent purge has brought out the fact that intra-party democracy has been extensively violated in the primary and intermediary tiers of the Party organs. The principles of election of the committees and secretaries and of reporting back to the general body, have been replaced by co-optation and appointment, with failure regularly to convene the general membership of the given unit. To eliminate these practices and at the same time prepare the Party for the test of the coming Soviet elections, the Party organs were re-elected—the process going on at this moment of writing. In these Party elections the secret ballot was introduced; also the procedure for nomination of candi-



dates was made more formal, with provision for the challenging of all names proposed.

These re-elections of the primary units of the Party—about one hundred and thirty thousand, formerly called “cells,” but now called “committees”—have brought a considerable renovation of the Party’s apparatus of administration, especially in the small towns and rural districts. Party organizers and instructors representing the Party workers in the field have been pushed forward, while inactive or distrusted leaders who had escaped the recent examinations were eliminated. This first use under the Soviets of the secret ballot has apparently been eminently successful in promoting more activity on the part of members and freer exercise of judgment respecting the qualifications of candidates presented for election.

The recent trials of so-called “old Bolsheviks” and of persons high in the Party councils and positions of responsibility have brought out several features of the Party structure. The self-incriminating confessions should be related to the discipline of this revolutionary order which the accused had accepted and worked under for years. Violation of this discipline had been noted previously in the case of most of those involved, and considerable leniency had been shown them in the past. This time the violation of discipline had led to crimes against the state, it was alleged; several of those accused stated in their confessions that this was the inevitable logic of an initial violation of the discipline of the Party.

The Party discipline and the very concrete sanctions behind it had not prevented these Party members from securing and holding high positions, and using them not only for self-enrichment but also for conspiracy. The decline of “revolutionary vigilance” and the partial breakdown of intra-party democracy were responsible for this failure of the Party control over its members, it was explained. To date the purges have apparently accomplished one of their several aims, namely the closer serrying of the ranks and the promotion of a greater sense of responsibility of Party membership. The apparent acceptance of the charges against those eliminated by the recent trials would imply a feeling of confidence in the Party because it had the courage to face the

fact of its mistake in the selection of some of its most prominent leaders. The immediate re-election, with secret ballot, of all Party organs aimed to consolidate this confidence in the rank and file of the Party and also in the larger "non-party mass."

#### 4. *The Komsomol.*

The Communist Union of Youth—*Komsomol* in abbreviation—is closely associated with the Party although it is now designated as a "non-party mass" organization. In structure it resembles the Party closely. It has a larger number of primary units—200,000—because it reaches into institutions which the Party does not cover, such as the secondary schools; also in some villages there are members of the youth organization where there are no Party members. Admission to membership is less controlled than is admission to the membership in the Party, but like the latter is guarded by conditions and formalities. The discipline of the *Komsomol* over its members is less strict than is that of the Party, but there is provision for expulsion for violation of the rather strict rules of the organization.

Active politically in the first years of the resumption of the socialist offensive, the *Komsomol* later had its attention directed toward the technological training of its members. In the last year emphasis on political training has been re-established. For the *Komsomol* is one of the organizations that will present candidates at the Soviet elections under the new constitutions. The *Komsomol* organs, from the bottom to the apex of the pyramid structure, are being re-elected in preparation for the Soviet elections. As in the recent Party elections the secret ballot has been introduced, to combat the bureaucratic tendencies that had manifested themselves in the apparatus of administration. It was seen that the *Komsomol* was losing membership and prestige among the youth, and it represents one of the most important channels of influence and leadership of the Party.

From the *Komsomol* the Party has drawn in the past a large percentage of its new members, on the basis of the training received in this organization of the youth, often called the "reserve corps" of the Party. The *Komsomol*

has been the "immediate helper" of the Party in political leadership, often supplying the enthusiasm and daring shown in meeting a task. Embracing young people between the ages of fifteen and thirty years, the *Komsomol*, with its present membership of over five million, is the channel for positive political activity of young people, enabling them to enter more fully into productive work and political leadership. It represents, therefore, more than a general youth movement.

#### 5. *The labor unions.*

The organization of the wage-earners is of particular importance in the "toilers' state" and under the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Their labor unions have been characterized by the Bolsheviks as "bulwarks of the proletarian dictatorship" and also as "schools of communism." They are also "the mass organization of the ruling class" and "direct participants in state authority." For the performance of these functions the structure of the labor unions has been given particular attention. The main features of this structure will be noted here.

Theoretically membership in labor unions is voluntary; it was made so in 1921 after an unsuccessful experiment with the principle of obligatory membership. There are, however, many advantages in being a member of a union, and certain positive disadvantages in being outside the organization. The membership has therefore grown rapidly with the economic expansion of the last years. At present the total membership is around twenty-two million of the twenty-five million now constituting what is often designated as the "proletarian" element of the Soviet community, namely those working for wages and salaries.

Originally there were only twenty-three unions, one for each general field of industry and organizations for workers in the fields of education and public health, or in administrative or commercial establishments. With the growth of membership the large units were divided up, first by specific fields and then, in 1934, also by territorial areas. At the present moment there are one hundred and sixty-three units in the general organization, each with its central committee co-ordinating the intermediary committees of republics or

regions and of districts, the latter co-ordinating the primary factory and local committees which number around one hundred and eighty thousand, with membership ranging from five to fifty, according to the size and importance of the given enterprise, institution or territorial area covered. Thus the pyramid form of structure was adopted for the labor unions as in the case of the Party and the Soviets. At the apex of the pyramid is the All-Union Central Soviet of Labor Unions, which has the function of directing the whole network of this mass organization.

In the earlier stages the unions of industrial workmen were given the rôle of positive leadership with respect to the non-industrial organizations. And within each unit the manual workers were expected to influence the so-called "technical-engineering sections" which were included within the particular labor union. In this way the hegemony of the workman class was secured, as in the Party and the Soviets. The splitting-up of the large units was adopted in 1934 because this need for special control by the manual worker was considered no longer necessary. Efficiency of leadership required smaller units and the organization of these by more specific fields.

The labor unions, with their important functions of collective bargaining, inspection, administration of the social insurance fund and the promotion of cultural activities, have developed a large apparatus of administration. The labor-union organs are elective and must report regularly to their electors. This democratic feature in their structure has been found to have been very widely violated during the last years, however. Local and central committees co-opted members to replace those who dropped out, and failed to convene general meetings to which they would report. Thus there had developed in the labor unions the same bureaucratic tendencies which have been noted in the Party and the Soviets. Re-election of all labor-union organs is in progress at the present writing, and for these elections the secret ballot has been introduced. The recent "purge" reached many highly placed labor-union officials, who were charged with disrupting the organization by their bureaucratic methods, and also with using their positions of responsibility and power

for self-enrichment. Instances of favoritism were also exposed in the recent house-cleaning.

Around the apparatus of administration of the labor unions, to assist and also to control it, a large staff of volunteer workers has been organized. These members help collect the monthly dues, assist in the administration of the social insurance fund and contribute to the cultural activities as part of their "social activity." This so-called "active element" of the labor unions is one of the best illustrations of what the Soviet system is expected to develop. For this "active element" is one of the instruments for combatting bureaucratic tendencies and thereby promoting "social administration." A new statute for labor unions is being prepared for the more efficient functioning of this basic organization of the Soviet system.

#### *6. Co-operatives.*

The co-operative organizations and societies of the Soviet system present a very varied picture; there are many types. Also the local co-operatives are less integrated than are the Soviets or the labor unions. But one of the last slogans put forward by Lenin before his death was: "Soviets plus Co-operatives equal Communism."

Co-operative societies of consumers and producers had developed widely before the Revolution, especially among the peasants. Under the Soviets the co-operative movement has been given different forms and content and has been harnessed to the economic policy of the state. Under direction the co-operative societies serve as another instrument of mass organization, through which mass activity can express itself.

In the various co-operatives, theoretically voluntary, large numbers have participated in the election of boards of management, and of control boards. These democratic features have not always been observed and the control by the membership has not been effective, although it is claimed that twenty million attended the elections of the boards of local consumers' co-operatives in 1936. But with these admitted defects the co-operatives have been a useful apprenticeship for their millions of members, in running public affairs. Statutes define the rights of members, the responsibility of elected

boards and managers, and the services to be rendered the membership.

The very broad reach of the various types of co-operative organizations has made them a "mass institution" in the literal sense of the word. Thus practically all retail trade in rural districts is handled by the rural consumers' societies. The two hundred and fifty thousand collective farms are a special type of co-operative but should be noted as part of the general set-up. In industry there are some twenty-five thousand producers' co-operatives, with a total membership of three million. Mutual credit associations have assumed considerable proportions in both cities and villages. Finally; thousands of co-operatives have been formed to build and manage living quarters for members.

Local consumers' co-operatives are brought together into "unions" by administrative regions. These are co-ordinated by republics and there is a "Central Union." The industrial co-operatives have elective "Soviets" by regions or republics and there is an "All-Union Soviet of Industrial Co-operatives." Thus the pyramid form of structure is to be found also in the co-operative organization, although, as has been noted, the degree of integration is less than in the other institutions and organizations of the Soviet system.

In the first years of the Revolution co-operative societies of workmen were favored as compared with those of others, in both consumers' co-operatives and housing co-operatives. These workman co-operatives were expected to lead and set the tone in the movement in general. The many shortcomings of the co-operatives have been due, it is stated, to failure of Party members to give the proper measure of attention to them; there was a tendency on the part of the Party member to look down on these societies, which catered mainly to the interests of the consumers. But through co-operatives the proletarian dictatorship—the exercise of the powers of the state over the community—had a most important lever of influence in the political as well as the economic field.

#### 7. "Mass activity."

In all the institutions and organizations here noted the apparatus of administration was expected to be kept in close

and constant touch with those who elected it by frequent elections and regular reporting back. In addition, in all these institutions an "active element" was organized as a channel of influence between the mass membership and its apparatus. The recent official exposures of breakdown of the system in many of its links represent, the Soviet leaders believe, the inevitable children's diseases of a new structure. In admitting the defects and taking positive steps immediately to combat them the Bolsheviks believe they can eliminate them. The recent "shaking down" is not the first one; it has been necessary several times to take steps and change methods in order to "vitalize," now the Soviets, now the labor unions, now the co-operatives. In the case of the Party the process is constant, and part of the discipline of the organization. The shaking down is often accompanied by exposures that suggest a crisis, but such exposures are part of the Bolshevik method of organization. The recent "crisis" has been presented as one of the more serious, in order to emphasize the political turning-point which the Soviet leaders believe their system has reached in its growth and progress with the adoption of the new constitutions.

The recent re-elections of the Party, and also the *Komsomol*, labor-union and co-operative organs, have been more formal, both in respect of the proposing of candidates for offices and their actual election. The challenging of all nominations and the use of the secret ballot to assure greater freedom of choice represent the use of techniques of the western parliamentary systems. This borrowing is admitted and in fact emphasized. This tendency toward the parliamentary system is strictly limited, however, to certain mechanical processes. The more formal procedure is being adopted to combat bureaucratic tendencies that had manifested themselves. Despite these bureaucratic tendencies the effective mass reach of the institutions and organizations of the Soviet system has been very considerable. The slogan of the Bolsheviks that for them the measure of success is the degree of mass participation in a particular effort, is also a working principle. Figures on the extent of mass participation have often been inflated, particularly by local leaders. The Bolsheviks often call attention to the inflated

character of their figures on mass participation, emphasizing it in order to secure real mass activity. The proof of the considerable degree of success of the efforts to promote mass activity is the new vigor in the Soviet citizenry, in sharp contrast with the passivity of the masses under the old Russian régime. The slipshod methods of the past are still to be found in rural districts, but a new life has developed around Soviets, labor unions, and co-operatives, reaching into even the more isolated settlements.

The shaking-up of the labor-union, *Komsomol* and co-operative structures by re-election has among its aims that of preparing these organizations for the responsibility now given them under the new constitutions, of proposing candidates at the next Soviet elections. These candidates will presumably compete actively with the candidates presented by the Party. It is not to be expected that they will offer programs of policy different in any basic way from that of the Party, however. The Party exercises its functions of leadership in these organizations as it does in the Soviets by specific provision of the new constitutions. To effect this leadership the Party itself has just been given a shaking-up. For as Stalin said in March, 1937, ". . . so long as the Bolsheviks preserve contact with the broad masses they will be invincible. On the other hand, just let the Bolsheviks be torn away from the masses and lose their ties with them, just let them become covered with a bureaucratic rust, and they will lose all power and become an empty shell."

Other institutions such as the police, the army, the law courts, the press and the school will be described at other points of this analysis. The basic mass institutions noted here—and the Party that directs them—form the constitutional structure whose methods of functioning will now be examined.



## CHAPTER V

### THE DETERMINATION OF POLICY

Critics of the Soviet system, measuring it by the practices of western parliamentary democracies, do not find what they consider the conditions necessary for the development of a public opinion. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, are constantly referring to manifestations in their system of public demands and effective expressions of this public opinion. The positive leadership of the Party and the existence of institutions and organizations of mass reach outlined in the preceding chapter as the outstanding features of the Soviet system, make for a determination of public policy through opinion that is also peculiar to the Soviet type of state—a contribution to political science in the opinion of its Bolshevik authors.

The program of a revolution must be definite, even dogmatic and often intolerant in its general principles. The working out of the details of the new social order envisaged by this program, on the other hand, must be the result of the experience of the masses in the actual process of building. The five-year plans, which are the most concrete expressions of policy, are Party programs and require centralized administration. But counter-planning from below developed and was encouraged because it was realized that the plans would fail if they remained purely bureaucratic projects imposed from above to which there was no effective mass response. The extent of realization of these plans has been evidence of a mass response; and the manner of this realization has justified to a considerable extent the boast of the Bolsheviks that "millions make the plans."

In presenting the discussion of the subject of the determination of policy the differentiation between expression of opinion and actual law-making cannot be sharply made; the

authors of the Soviet system have aimed to reduce such differentiation by refusing to adopt the more formal methods of the parliamentary system. This differentiation will be followed here for purposes of presentation, however, and also to adhere as far as possible to the outline adopted for the other volumes of the series. But the use of certain terms current in the Soviet political vocabulary indicates that one has to do with principles and conditions different from those with which we are familiar from our own experience. Thus, as we shall see, discussion is "organized," the emphasis is on "self-criticism," and the concept of "enemy of the people"—a term to be found in the new constitution—is a very broad one. And the "Program of the Party" is a very positive and politically forceful fact. Finally, while basic class differences are believed to have been removed in the Soviet community, the class struggle is still going on, reflected in the determination of policy.

### 1. *The Party line.*

In the determination of policy the Party plays a decisive rôle by reason of its "ruling position." The "general line" of the Party, or as it is worded more popularly "the Party line," determines the general policy, and also the measures to be taken to carry it out for any given stage of the Revolution. The Party line is of course absolutely obligatory on all members of this novel type of political organization; it is also the basis for the "directives" which the Party issues and is able to enforce through its leadership in all institutions and organizations, and through them in practically all fields. Party directives have a decisive significance for Soviet law, according to a recent authoritative textbook on *Soviet Economic and Civil Law* (B. M. Rubenstein, Moscow, 1936, in Russian).

The Party line finds its formal expression first of all in the Program of the Party (see *Source Book*). This Program was formulated on the basis of the forming of the distinct Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workman Party, in 1903, and was the result of sharp conflict with other Russian socialist parties and within the particular party from which the Bolsheviks emerged. After the Revolution of

1905 the Program was redrafted, the experience of that revolution being taken into account. Continued conflict with other socialist parties and groups tended to give to this Program its concrete and often dogmatic character.

In 1919 the Program was again revised, to register the legislation of the first year of the new régime; with the success and progress of the Revolution many points could be given more positive formulation. A long and public discussion in the Soviet press as well as in Party meetings preceded the adoption of the new statement of aims and of policies to attain these aims. Since 1919 there has been no change in the Program, except of the name of the Party—"Communist" instead of "Social Democratic" but still "of Bolsheviks." It is possible that another revision may soon be made, in connection with the adoption of the new constitution. The new constitution, among other things, registers the carrying out of the Program to date and this relationship between the two documents is remarkably close. For the Program, one may repeat, represented—and still represents—the general principles as to aims and methods of procedure for *"the building of socialism."*

The periodic congresses of the Party supply the more specific formulation of the Party line for the given stage of development of the Revolution. These congresses were first held approximately every two years, a so-called "Conference" being held in the intervening year. Of late the congresses have been convened less frequently and at less fixed intervals. The last, XVIIth Congress, met in January of 1934, the previous one having been held in 1931. These congresses number several thousand delegates and alternates and are held behind closed doors.

During the elections for the Party Congress the points on the agenda of the Congress are widely discussed, in preparation for the decisions which the Congress is to make. The discussions in the Congress itself are published, the resolutions of the Congress being given the widest publicity in the press, and generally in special pamphlet series issued in large editions. These resolutions are then discussed in the various grades of Party organs, from the higher down to the lower primary units.

This second discussion does not go into the question of the correctness of the policy adopted, but is limited to the content of the policy in order that the policy can be more effectively carried out. One has what is called "organized discussion." The continuation of discussion as to the wisdom of a given policy is positively forbidden after an authoritative decision by a Congress. For the Party is a party of revolution, and not a debating society, to paraphrase a statement by Lenin made when an oppositionary group tried to continue the discussion of a policy with respect to which there had been a decision by the Congress. One of the grounds for the expulsion of Trotsky from the Party was his insistence on the continuation of discussion after a Congress had adopted a specific policy.

## 2. *Central Committee and Political Bureau.*

Between congresses the Party line is enforced, and when necessary modified in detail for concrete application, by the Central Committee elected by the Congress. The Central Committee numbers seventy-one with sixty-eight alternates; at the beginning of the Revolution it was a much smaller group and one of Lenin's last suggestions was to increase its membership. It has always been elected by secret ballot. Plenary sessions of the Central Committee take place from three to four times a year. Some of the discussions in these meetings, or at least the most important speeches, are generally published. The formal resolutions of the Central Committee are always given out, like those of a Congress with which they have almost equal authority. They also may be discussed for better understanding, but not for criticism or suggestions of alteration.

Between plenary sessions of the Central Committee, its Presidium acts for it, subject to control by the plenary body, as the latter is in relation to the Congress. Then in the administrative apparatus of the Party, elected by the Central Committee, the most important body is the Political Bureau, now of eleven members. The General Secretary of the Central Committee is a member of the Political Bureau, and presumably its chairman. This Political Bureau might perhaps better be called the "Policy Bureau," for in it is con-

centrated not only the current but the authoritative function of determining the Party line, and therefore in final analysis the policy of the Soviet Government and other organizations of the Soviet system.

In the earlier years the existence of this Political Bureau—to use the more current rendition of its name—was generally known. Only later, however, was there public mention of it and of its membership. At present its position and rôle are not only acknowledged but emphasized, although reports of the sessions are not published nor are its decisions given the wide publicity accorded to those of the Central Committee and the Congress. The practice of having “alternates” as well as full members in an important executive body is followed in the organization of the Political Bureau. In addition to the eleven members there are six alternates, who replace the members when necessary, and in order to do this adequately are always present at all meetings.

Among the members of the Political Bureau are found the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, usually referred to abroad as corresponding to a president in the western parliamentary republics; the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries, in a sense the prime minister of the Soviet governmental executive, and several other commissars or heads of governmental departments. Commissars who are not members of the Political Bureau report to and appear before it when the policy and work of their departments are being discussed. It is generally assumed that all important questions of policy are really decided in the Political Bureau.

### 3. *Stalin.*

The importance of the Political Bureau and his chairmanship of it have led to the current description of Stalin as the “dictator” of the Soviet system. The designation of the government as a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” and the special ruling position of the Party, have given substance to this characterization of the Party's General Secretary. The peculiar character of Stalin's acknowledged leadership is more correctly indicated by the fact that in the last two years he has been given the title of “teacher,” and thus put on a

plane of equality with the other prophets of Bolshevism—Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Accordingly, just as the interpretation and practical application of Marxism during the period of the leadership of Lenin has come to be referred to as "Leninism," similarly the policies of the last years, and particularly of the period of the five-year plans have come to carry the general designation of "Stalinism." The new constitution at first was popularly referred to as "Stalin's Constitution" and this term has now come to be almost official. Reference to and acknowledgment of the "genius-like leadership" of "the great Stalin" have become so constant, universal and fulsome in praise as to give further grounds for the interpretation, current abroad, of Stalin's position as that of "dictator."

Until recently Stalin worked mainly within the Party, spoke only on rare occasions and appeared in public very infrequently. During the last year or so he has spoken more often, and at general conferences and Soviet Congresses in addition to Party meetings. He has received visiting ministers of other governments and delegates to conferences of engineers, workmen or collectivized peasants. His speeches, of late more frequent and on a wider range of subjects, continue to represent the most authoritative statements of policy, outstanding phrases in them supplying the slogans in which the policies and stages of the Revolution are summarized.

On the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, in 1930, Stalin responded to the congratulations showered on him by institutions and organizations by referring to his debt to the Party for what he represented and had done. More recently in introducing a discussion he protested against the constant emphasis on leaders. In closing a conference of the new shock-brigaders—the followers of *Stakhanov* methods—he thanked the group of workers for what he said the leaders had learned from them. Since he has adopted the practice of appearing more often in public meetings the newspapers have carried pictures of him sitting or talking with engineers, workmen, peasants, as well as with other leaders. This abandonment of the former marked practice of keeping in the background would seem to be dispelling the tendency to think and even speak with proper reserve of "the boss."

Stalin's personality, it would seem, has been put forward to symbolize more effectively for the masses the power of the new régime; there is to be noted also a tendency to make this personality a more democratic and human one. But the Marxian doctrine, we are told, recognizes that the historical process expresses itself through persons, and that the personal qualities of an individual influence this process. This formulation covers the rôle which is credited to Stalin, although it should also be noted that his position is closely related to his former association with Lenin and his constant acknowledgment of Leninism as the basis of Soviet policy.

Stalin has not taken a governmental post in order to be free to supervise all departments of government, and this he does, in the name of the Party, either directly or through Party organs. He checks up on and makes suggestions with respect to the writing of history or the organization of the collective farms, for example. In this checking up he at the same time gives positive directions, so that the initiative is credited to him. Sometimes what is Party action comes out in his name, in order to make it more concrete in the minds of the Party membership and the masses.

The conflict of personalities as well as of policies between Stalin and Trotsky, dating back to the years before the Revolution, has tended to define both men. Stalin has been the more practical administrator, rough in his methods, with less intellectual background than the "old Bolshevik" theoreticians, but probably a more useful leader for the carrying out of the program, realistic rather than dogmatic—in this respect resembling Lenin. In the recent purge of the Party the wholesale elimination of so many of the "old Bolsheviks," and the sweeping charge of Trotskyism against all of those reached by the purge, point to a continuation of the sharp conflict that developed between these two personalities when Lenin was no longer alive to keep them in their respective places.

The discussion of the position of Stalin has gone into this detail because it has a bearing on the question of the extent to which the Party line is a rigid doctrine, imposed from above rather than the result of the experience in practical leadership as registered by the Party membership distributed

in the positions of responsibilities in all institutions and organizations. This same rôle of the Party in everyday administration will be discussed in a later chapter and should be borne in mind in this connection. It is difficult to determine the influence of the discussions in preparation for a congress, or of the reports that come up from below to the center, as compared with the influence of the "organized" discussions after decisions and of the instructions constantly going down from the central to the primary Party organs. The relative weight of the two forces represented in the formula of the principle of organization of the Party—democratic centralism—is different at different moments and in respect of different matters. The real force of "intra-party democracy" is constantly stressed, while the strict adherence to the "general line" of the Party is strongly enforced, "deviations" from the general line being constantly and vigorously combatted, and severely penalized when they persist. Stalin as General Secretary personifies also the "iron discipline" of the Party. His own actions suggest the disciplined member, albeit the acknowledged leader and teacher, of the revolutionary order, rather than the personal dictator.

This interpretation of Stalin's position is supported by the methods used to arrive at decisions. There is "collegiate" discussion in the Political Bureau and Central Committee. The latter consists of local Party leaders who also are constantly sending in reports. Responsible governmental executives—Commissars—add their reports. At conferences and congresses, of Soviets, labor unions and other organizations or particular groups the "leaders of the Party" are present and participate. There are other sources of information and influence which will be presently discussed. It seems clear that Stalin acts on the principle he recently outlined, of co-ordination of the views of the central leaders with the experience of those on whose backs, so to speak, the policies adopted have to be worked out.

#### 4. *Disputes in Party.*

There have been several serious disputes within the Party over policy, in addition to frequent long and acrimonious discussions. A "workers' opposition" developed in organized



form against the adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1921. Later an opposition characterized by the Party authorities as "pseudo-leftist" urged an even more rapid pace of industrialization and a severer repression of the individualistic tendencies in the peasantry. A "right, opportunistic" tendency, on the other hand, opposed the proposed speed of industrial expansion and particularly the forceful drive for the collectivization of agriculture. The leaders of these oppositions were penalized under Party discipline, which requires absolute unity of the Party; they were demoted from positions of responsibility in the Party and also in government institutions or labor-union organizations. In the case of the "right, opportunistic deviation" Stalin asked the Central Committee to remove its representatives from the Political Bureau, where, he explained, they were interfering with the carrying out of a positive policy by their constant doubt and fear of consequences.

The charges against alleged conspirators, wreckers and traitors tried and executed in 1936-37 often grouped them all as "Trotskyists." But the Party did not characterize these as "deviationists" or "opposition," denying that they had any political program for the working class. Although the majority of those involved in the recent purge have been Party members, their offenses have been "against the state," the "aim to restore capitalism" being such an offense, however. The requirement of absolute adherence to the Party line of all Party members follows from the Bolshevik view that economic success does not exhaust the content of the socialist building effort. The recent call for greater "revolutionary vigilance" includes careful watching for activity representing policy in contravention of the single Party line as interpreted by the Party authorities of the moment. Not all Party members are expected fully to "master" the Program, but all must "support" it.

##### 5. *An opposition.*

It is clear, therefore, that neither in the Party nor in the Soviet system as a whole is there any provision for or possibility of a legal opposition. This follows from the one-party principle believed by the Bolsheviks to be absolutely essential

to the success of the Revolution—and therefore in their view a *plus* and not a *minus* of the Soviet system. In a trial in 1931 of persons charged with “wrecking” activities, one witness—an economist—stated that he had come to realize that in the strained and responsible position in which the Soviet Union then found itself, any attempt at legal opposition was bound to lead to counter-revolutionary and “interventionist” activity.

At the present writing the Soviet Union is in an even more strained situation in its relations with neighbors in both East and West. It is also experiencing a serious political shake-up which reaches into the economic field. On the basis of the achievement of the five-year plans it is the official Bolshevik view that no alternative *socialist* program is conceivable. From their experience, it is asserted, the workmen and peasants have also come to this view. Then, on the basis of this claim that what has been achieved is socialism it is proclaimed that any opposition must be for the “restoration of capitalism.” By this reasoning any opponent is an “enemy of the people,” against whom there can be no attitude of “rotten liberalism,” to quote a phrase used by Stalin in 1931. At present the emphasis in Soviet speeches and writings is on “the idiotic disease of political carelessness” with respect to all types of deviation as well as acts of alleged wrecking and treason.

Another official view is that with the success of the Revolution oppositionary elements will become desperate as they see the hopelessness of their struggle, and will resort to desperate as well as devious and conspiratory methods. The charges of treason that have been brought against so many in the last year are then further rationalized by the Soviet leaders. These elements, it is explained, have no hope of support from the masses and therefore have to look for support outside the Soviet system, for only there, in the outside capitalist world, are there social forces that will give them an effective, economic base.

It will make this official rationalization somewhat clearer to note the wide meanings that have come to be attached to the two terms “wrecking” and “enemy of the people.” The word “treason” has also come to be used in a very general

sense. The term "wrecking" is particularly comprehensive. It is not simply the causing of railway wrecks or the deliberate wrecking of complicated machinery. It may be the advancing of a theory of law which promotes lack of confidence in the permanency or authority of the Soviet law courts of the present. It may be an interpretation of Russian history which weakens the feeling of patriotism. Or it may be the running of the union of writers in such a way as to favor second-rate work and discourage the emerging of real talent. The distinction between wrecking and sabotage would seem to be that of positive action as opposed to failure to act or work. Presumably there must be the subjective element in wrecking, but in a taut, strained situation, the political authority may find a subjective attitude where in fact there are only "objective conditions." At the plenary session of the Central Committee in February, 1937, Stalin stated the wrecking, and also treasonable activity, must be expected in a socialist order which is surrounded by capitalism. The finding of what is considered wrecking activity would also seem to be inevitable so long as the class struggle continues.

The concept of "enemy of the people" is also very broad in scope. The term is used in the new constitution to cover violation of the "sacred" state or co-operatized property. But discrediting the Soviet system by grossly bureaucratic methods of administration will lead to the application of the term. Failure on the part of certain Soviet writers to take what is considered the correct "Marxist-Leninist" view with respect to the character of the state under socialism, has led to their being proclaimed "enemies of the people" as well as "wreckers."

Purges and even "blood purges" have been, and apparently will continue to be, part of the Soviet system, particularly of the technique of leadership. Individuals pushed forward into leadership will fail to meet the demands of the type of leadership that must be maintained, and this despite their social origin as workmen and peasants, and the training given them as Party members. The lopping off of such elements will make for strength, it is believed. For despite all precautions the Party cannot prevent careerists and even enemies from getting into its ranks deliberately to abuse the

power enjoyed by Party members. The cutting off of such heads—figuratively and literally—is expected to improve the morale of the rank and file of the membership of the “one and only” and the “one and united” Party of the Soviet system. These two quoted expressions, constantly used to characterize the Party and its position, indicate clearly the impossibility of any legal oppositionary party or any opposition within the Party short of conspiracy. The enforcement of the strict discipline of the Party does not produce an opposition within the Party, Stalin asserts. Real political opposition can rest only on social-economic forces, which, it is further claimed, no longer exist in the Soviet socialist state.

It was Lenin, founder of the Party, who insisted on the strict discipline to maintain the unity and “oneness” of the Party. Stalin has been more “rough” than was Lenin, perhaps because in many respects the period of his leadership has been a more difficult one than was that of Lenin. In the “heroic” periods, before 1917 of underground conspiratorial activity and then after 1917 of active civil war, the strict, at times autocratic and even in method bureaucratic, central leadership was more easily accepted. But it is believed, and the facts would seem to support the belief, that the periods of the five-year plans—of reconstruction, of collectivization of agriculture, of development of a new attitude toward work—also require positive leadership, such as only a “monolithic iron-disciplined party” can supply, brooking no opposition within or without its ranks.

#### 6. *The Soviet Press.*

Of the organs of communication the periodical press—monthly, weekly and daily—will be taken to illustrate the rôle of other organs, such as the radio or the movie. With the newspaper and journal should be noted also the pamphlet series to which there has already been reference; among the peasants particularly these pamphlet series have the significance of periodicals, and considerable ingenuity has been shown in preparing these “Answers to Questions,” as some of the series are called.

The Soviet newspaper particularly, but also the journal and the pamphlet, has an “operative function” of organiz-

ing its readers behind the policies adopted, in addition to that of carrying on educational and propaganda campaigns for these policies. This operative function of the press was definitely in the foreground during the first years of the Revolution, and the Soviet press became exclusively an official one of the Government, of the Party, of the labor-union movement, of the co-operative movement or of specific governmental departments or institutions or organizations. The official character of the Soviet press has implied a strict censorship. The monopoly of legality of the Party in the field of political organization extended to periodicals of a general political character, the editorial boards of which are always Party members responsible to the Party authorities of the area covered by them. The most important newspapers are Party organs, either general or for specific groups such as the youth, the peasants, or the workmen. The weekly or monthly journals, like many of the daily newspapers, are directed toward particular groups, in order better to perform the task of organizing these groups. The number of newspapers and their circulation have increased rapidly, although some of the newspapers appear only two or three times a week and are of small compass. It is estimated that the total *tirage* of Soviet newspapers, including the small ones having only several issues a week, has reached thirty-six million, an enormous increase over the pre-war figure and also over the Soviet figures of a few years ago.

The Soviet press has another rôle; it is also the medium for the expression of views of its readers, although its official character and duties reduce considerably the extent and content of this aspect of its position in the community. So-called "self-criticism" has been not only permitted but actively promoted. The element of organization in this practice would seem to reduce its importance as an expression of public opinion. The "peasant-correspondent" and "workman-correspondent," who represent an important channel of this "self-criticism," have been kept on an informal basis, in order to give more significance as well as freedom to their reports. These informal correspondents, who developed especially around the newspapers published for peasants and workmen, have gradually become institutionalized, although not to such

a degree as to reduce them to official reporters. All the letters received from these correspondents cannot be used in the columns of the newspaper, for they have come in by the thousands, but they are studied and summarized for the leaders, and have thus some influence on the determination of policy. While the workman-correspondent or peasant-correspondent has been in many instances and to a considerable degree the spying eye of the central leadership, he has also been the closely attentive ear.

Informal typewritten or even handwritten wall-newspapers have been a feature of all Soviet institutions. In these the workers in the institution, whether factory, barracks, administrative office, village Soviet, collective farm or school, can criticize the working of their institution, individual comrades, and even the management. The practice of "self-criticism" found its widest application in these wall-newspapers, for they were uncensored. The criticism was limited to the mechanical working of the Soviet policies in the particular institution, and therefore could only indirectly affect the determination of policy. With the technical advance made in these last years many factories and collective farms have come to have printed newspapers. The more formal character of the printed publication may have restricted the practice of "self-criticism." There would seem to be a basis for doubt as to the freedom and effectiveness of the practice of criticism when it became more organized in the factory newspaper or the formalized correspondent.

The Soviet newspapers give much space to the speeches at congresses and conferences. As the number of the more informal conferences of rank and file workmen and peasants increases, with a greater number of apparently spontaneous speeches by the members of the conference, these expressions of workman and peasant opinion obtain a wide reach, encourage others, and therefore constitute the beginnings of a body of public opinion. These conferences provide increasingly more general discussion, where formerly they often represented little more than an audience to which the leadership made its reports of achievements and plans for the future.

The leading articles in the Soviet newspapers have always an educational and organizational aim, rather than that of

expressing the opinion of the writers; they are part of the "operative function" of the Soviet press. But the newspapers are beginning to use to a greater extent special articles by members of their staff, where the writer aims to reflect the conditions or attitudes which he has noted. The informal correspondents in factories and villages are urged to stress the social significance of the items of local news which they send in. In this development one has perhaps the beginning of a press in which actual discussion is carried on, as differentiated from mere exposition and frank propaganda. Thus the Soviet newspaper is becoming more interesting, giving pictures of everyday life, with emphasis, however, on the "heroes of labor" of the new social order. Articles on art and science have become more numerous. Foreign affairs have always been given much attention and space, and the Soviet foreign policy explained in detail.

Under the new constitution the institution of "questions" addressed to the responsible governmental authorities will be introduced. In preparation for this the leading Moscow newspapers are opening their columns to such questions, signed by individuals, and to the answers. This recent practice represents a development, in a more formal procedure, of the earlier form of "self-criticism" as carried on in the press.

The radio and the stage in the Soviet Union are also "official" in the same way as the press, subject to control by governmental authority and direction by the Party. The theatre repertories and the radio programs have come to be influenced to an increasing extent by the demands of the public, and with this development they have contributed to what has been called the beginnings of a public opinion in the Soviet system. The stage particularly has participated in the practice of self-criticism and often has gone further than the press in castigating defects and even failure in the mechanical working of this or that policy.

### *7. Education.*

All Soviet educational institutions are public state institutions. At the same time the People's Commissariat of Education has had as one of its tasks that of acting as "the

state organ for the propaganda of communism." The emphasis on the indoctrination of the younger generation with the principles of the Revolution has become less marked as the program of the Revolution has been carried out. But even in the broader educational program which has been established during the last years, "communist training" has remained one of the primary aims of the Soviet schools of all grades. In the last years the teaching of history in a chronological and factual presentation has been revived, for it was seen that the earlier practice of sheer indoctrination with abstract sociological schematic formulae was not giving the necessary background training or developing judgment. But the decree on the new methods of teaching history concluded with the phrase "for a Marxian understanding of history." Thus the fundamental aim of communist training has not been modified by the important changes made since 1931, at the demand and under the direction of the Party and of Stalin personally, in the organization and curricula of the Soviet schools.

With this emphasis on communist training, education has tended to secure support for the policy adopted, and for that very reason has not to date had a determining influence on policy. "If the Soviet child does not come out of the Soviet school a communist then it has been a bad school," was the answer given by a Soviet guide to an inquiring tourist. Although this reply represents an over-simplified and "vulgar" view of the rôle of education, it reflects the place and function assigned to the school.

The wide reach of educational facilities, so that at last universal compulsory education for the first grades could be introduced, and illiteracy very considerably reduced, has made possible the wider extension of political discussion. Lenin remarked that when people could not read, political discussion remained mere gossip. In the extension of reading and especially newspaper and pamphlet reading, the "politics" of the Revolution have been brought to all corners, even the most remote, of the Union and in the different languages of the many peoples of the Soviet Union, some of these languages having been given a written form for the first time.

Research in the various sciences has also been integrated



with the program of the Revolution. Bolshevism has claimed "science" as one of its bases, and many of its policies have been explained as the product of science, as well as of "scientific socialism." A recent illustration of this attitude toward science was the transfer of the Academy of Sciences from Leningrad to Moscow, for the purpose of relating its work more closely to that of the Government and Party. The former Communist Academy, a product of the Revolution, has recently been merged with the general Academy of Sciences inherited by the Revolution; its various institutes now form the section of the social sciences of the larger body. The important Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin is attached to the Central Committee of the Party and has among its activities that of studying and publishing the writings of these teachers. It may be assumed that the political leaders refer questions of policy to this institute, in view of the practice constantly to quote the "teachers" in the discussion or explanation of policies adopted. On the other hand, at least on one occasion of which there is public record, a research institute was upbraided for the delay in presenting the theoretical basis for a policy which had been adopted, namely that of the collectivization of agriculture.

Based as it is on a program resting on a particular doctrine, the policy enforced by the Party has the character of a creed. The Webbs have recently suggested the word "creedocracy" as applicable in characterizing the Soviet system. This term is certainly more correct than one which has been advanced by an active opponent of Sovietism, who saw, particularly in the determination of policy, features suggestive of a "theocracy." The Bolsheviks insist that their policy is that of "scientific socialism," based on dialectic materialism, and this claim has contributed to the development of their absolute faith in its success, and their ability to transmit this faith to large numbers, particularly of the younger generation.

#### *8. Pressure groups.*

The Soviet system recognizes and acts on the principle of pressure groups as evidenced by the prevalence of the factor of class in all institutions and organizations. If Soviet policy has been markedly a concise and single one, it is be-

cause it has been fundamentally the policy of a single class. One definition of the proletarian dictatorship points out that the workman class exercises a directing pressure on all other groups of toilers. In the determination of policy it is the policy of the workman class that must prevail, and it does so through the position and authority of its vanguard, the Party, its "mass organization" in labor unions and its predominance to date in the Soviets.

The "poorest peasants" were the "allies" of the proletariat in the first period. Collectivization of agriculture is believed to have brought the middle peasants also to the position of "full partners." One of the tests of the Soviet system will be the elimination of antagonism between urban and rural workers, Lenin explained early in its history; he admitted that such antagonism was possible under the Soviets, but insisted that it was not inevitable as he believed it to be under the capitalist system. In view of the possibility of opposition from the peasants—and there have been many evidences of it in the course of the twenty years of the Revolution—the rise of an organized peasant pressure group has always been opposed.

"Bourgeois elements" have been positively excluded from the Soviets, co-operatives and other organizations, precisely in order to eliminate them as effective pressure groups, and it was part of the proletarian dictatorship's function to suppress them. The rights of the "bourgeoisie"—numerically a minority unless one includes the peasants in the group—have never had any positive or permanent protection under the Soviet system.

The question of pressure groups in the Soviet system is therefore a comparatively simple one to present in its relation to the determination of policy. When economic forces "hostile" to the principles of the Revolution were allowed to continue or even to develop as a matter of economic expediency, measures were taken to prevent them from becoming a political force. When, despite these measures, "hostile" economic groups were believed to be developing political influence opposed to the program of the Revolution and the policy adopted to carry out this program, they were eliminated economically, as had been the landlords, factory owners and

bankers in the first period of militant communism. It is possible that the recent purges represented, in some instances and in part, the elimination of elements tending to become new "power groups" in Soviet industry and in the Red Army.

With the carrying out of the program of the Revolution the term "proletariat" has come to be used in a broader sense, to include all wage-earners—brain-workers as well as those who work with their hands. The "collectivized peasant" is believed to have come much closer to the urban worker in conditions of work and therefore in attitudes; the new word "*kolkhoznik*"—member of a collective farm—is rapidly replacing the old words "peasant" and "*muzhik*." And the *kolkhozniks*, side by side with all wage-earning groups, are believed to have accepted definitely the attitude of the industrial workman with respect to the ownership of the means of production, which was the factor determining in final analysis the policy of the Soviet régime. The "proletariat" in its earlier, narrower meaning was the group least interested in private property in capital goods.

The national identity and cultural aspirations of ethnic minorities are fully provided for. The policy is to encourage self-expression of these groups as part of the mass initiative considered essential to success. But despite provision for free withdrawal, all activity, even cultural, must be within the present established framework. The national self-expression can have no separatistic trend, for such would be anti-Soviet. The Ukrainian, for example, must think primarily as a workman, peasant or Soviet technician. The Soviet of Nationalities is expected to provide for the protection of the interests of these toilers as organized in national units with special cultural traditions.

The Bolsheviks consider political parties related to if not identical with a class. Their own Communist Party is based on this principle, being still that of the proletariat or the workman class; its position is the most concrete expression of the continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are told. With the carrying out of the program of the Revolution the workman class has changed and has become more inclusive, although the bench workman of a large scale mechanized industrial enterprise is still the "proletariat" in

many contexts. The majority of the Party membership must belong to this specific group of "bench workmen."

But with the peasants collectivized and the office workers and technical experts now drawn in the main from the peasant and workman classes, these elements are often classified as "proletarian" or as very close and drawing closer to the workman class. This is reflected in the larger percentage of these elements in the Party membership. The community is thus becoming "classless," one exclusively of "toilers," the name of the governmental institutions soon to be changed to "Soviets of Toilers."

The emphasis on pressure groups is to be noted in the intra-party policy. Oppositionary tendencies in the Party have always been related to economic-social forces in the country. The rightist tendency was believed to have developed because of pressure from the rich peasant element. The tendency which claimed to be more leftist than that of the group in power in the Party leadership was condemned as pseudo-leftist, adventuristic and therefore "petty bourgeois." It was on the basis of an absolute adherence to Leninism as a workman class policy that Stalin and his followers suppressed deviations to right or left, insisting that they could lead only to the "restoration of capitalism."

#### 9. *"Self-criticism."*

The term "self-criticism" has already been explained in the section on the Press of this chapter, but it is here kept in quotation marks because it represents an essentially Soviet concept—what may even be called a Soviet institution. Supposed to be a permanent feature, it has had to be constantly revived; in the last year a new wave of self-criticism has been started. This tendency of self-criticism to decline is due to the limitations inherent in the very idea, although it is by "open and honest self-criticism" that the learning from mistakes is to be effective, Stalin keeps pointing out.

Self-criticism is expected to operate most effectively through the system of so-called "signalling." But often the pointing out of defects in the work of an institution or enterprise is looked upon as weakening the prestige of the given authority. If the latter considers the criticism obstructive, involving the

lowering of "production discipline" for which he is responsible, there will come inevitably a general decline of the practice after a few instances of quashing. The recent shaking-up of all institutions and organizations has been based in part on the discovery of the widespread practice, particularly among local authorities, of suppressing any form or kind of criticism.

On the other hand self-criticism has often been extensive, apparently effective though sometimes novel in its actual functioning. In the recent Party elections many of the secretaries proposed for re-election were severely criticized, and then returned on the basis that after such criticism they would be more efficient than new ones without experience. Commissars are sharply criticized, in Party or Soviet Congresses or in the press, but continue in office, their prestige being not hurt but enhanced in the eyes of the responsible Party leadership. The active revival of self-criticism as part of the recent political "crisis" has been noted. It is possible that this effort to make it more effective than it has proven itself to be in the past, will be neutralized by another aspect of the new emphasis on politics. For there has come also an extensive campaign against all deviations from the Party line and these deviations often consisted merely of an incorrect interpretation of Leninism or a failure to understand the "dialectics" of the Revolution.

Outside students have been skeptical of the effectiveness of self-criticism even in the very wide form which it has often developed. Frequently the reference is mainly to past mistakes. And as the term implies, the discussion must be limited to the mechanical working of the given institution, and cannot go into general questions of policy. Criticism must be limited to matters not yet finally decided. Also, as there is no alternative policy to that adopted, criticism is limited in its effectiveness both before and after the determination of policy. In general the possibility of discussion in the Soviet system must be viewed in the light of its special features, of structure and policy. The absence of formally registered adverse votes leads many to believe that discussion is not effective in determining policy. The organized character of discussion, as already noted, tends to make much of the discussion mainly informative and educational—and in

instances propagandist and agitational. Instead of the practice of recording votes of representatives elected some years before, the Soviet leaders point to the number of meetings, and of speakers at these meetings, in this constant "mass" discussion. Even if organized and directed this discussion has meant thinking *en masse* on the larger questions of policy. From these discussions the Bolshevik leadership claims to have been able to define the "will of the toiling masses," and constantly refer to it as the basis for the policy followed. In a more specific way Stalin defined the relationship between leadership and masses in his analysis of the political "turning-point" at the February, 1937, session of the Central Committee of the Party. To lead properly, he pointed out, it is necessary to find the proper decision of a question, which is possible only from studying the experiences of the masses. The putting through of a decision, he continued, is impossible without the direct help of the masses. A checking up on the actual carrying out of a decision is also impossible without this same direct help of the masses, he concluded.

It is also a function of leadership—a rule of Bolshevik strategy—by the organization of discussion to see that there is attention to that link of the chain, representing the full program of the Revolution, which is considered the important link at the particular moment. A more secure hold on the particular link, and the whole chain, can be secured by such concentration of attention and effort, to continue to use the Bolshevik figure of speech. The same figure of speech explains the essential continuity of Bolshevik policy, despite its apparent jerkiness from forceful and constantly changing emphasis.

#### 10. *Issues at elections.*

On the basis of what has been the practice to date and judging by the discussion of what the elections under the new constitution will mean, one can indicate the definite limitation that exists, and will continue to exist, on issues that can come up in Soviet elections. The statement in the new constitution that the freedoms of speech, press, and meeting may be exercised only "in the interests of the toiling masses" and "to strengthen the socialist order" is clear and authorita-

tive on this point. In 1927 Stalin was asked if the question of the state monopoly of foreign trade could be raised; at that time there was private internal trade. He answered that the monopoly of foreign trade was one of the basic principles of the "platform" of the Soviet Government, and that any opposition to it, or even the raising of the question of the wisdom of it, would be an anti-Soviet move. Any group demanding its repeal could be only a group deeply hostile to the whole Soviet system, he explained. At present the nationalization of industry, the collectivization of agriculture, the concentration of the more complicated agricultural machinery in state machine-tractor stations are similar "first principles" of the Soviet system, which are not to be questioned. On the other hand there are a vast number of workaday questions that are brought forward in constant discussion and form the content of the mandates given those returned in Soviet, labor-union or co-operative elections. If the wage-scale cannot be an issue at elections, the development of the numerous public services, which make up the important social wage of the Soviet citizen, is the subject of the majority of the items in a "mandate."

There are other fundamental tenets which must be accepted, not only by the Party membership but by the Soviet citizenry as a whole. Thus it must be accepted that socialism can be and is being built in the Soviet Union, that the proletarian dictatorship is the only effective instrument for this building and can function to this end only on the basis of a leadership such as that supplied by the Party as now organized. The assumption of responsibility for policy by the Party becomes more definite as this policy is believed to have the full support of workmen and peasants because of the many manifest evidences of its success—the enormous economic expansion, the rise in production and the productivity of labor, and in living standards. A statement constantly met in Soviet writings is that the masses have become convinced from experience that the Bolshevik Party alone had the correct program for the social revolution.

## CHAPTER VI

### LAW-MAKING

Soviet legislative procedure has been conditioned by the revolutionary setting. It had to be flexible to meet the exigencies of revolutionary struggle and tactics. If the procedure for law-making took on often a somewhat loose and casual character, this tendency was deliberate, in order to encourage mass initiative and activity and allow contributions from practical experience to the working out of the norms of the new social order. The constant need of a revolution to explain, propagandize and stir up also is reflected in the methods and content of Soviet legislation. Legislative bodies were often primarily sounding boards for the reports of the leaders on what they believed they had achieved and what they proposed next to do. The provision for positive leadership, by the Party, finds expression also in the formal process of legislation. The Party has supplied, and continues to supply, the factor of integration as well as direction in the markedly fluid system of law-making.

Organizations not strictly governmental—labor unions and co-operative societies—are participants in state authority by participating in legislation. The aim of such practice has been in this way also to provide for the widest possible mass participation in the formulation of the new norms. The very wide scope of Soviet legislation also suggested the need and expediency of associating the mass economic organizations directly with the process of law-making. In the formal sense this practice has tended to reduce the rôle of the governmental authority, but from a broader viewpoint it has probably enhanced the prestige of the Soviets. Sources of law have therefore been varied and numerous, in line with the doctrine that the new order can be evolved only by the process of trial and error, and on the part of the masses themselves as well as of the leaders.



There was often need for immediate action to meet the crises that have characterized the progress of the Revolution, and this factor contributed to the lack of definition of legislative powers from the point of view of western parliamentary systems. Legislation has been one of the instruments of the maneuvering policy of the strategy of revolution. In the first years, legislation, taking the form of decrees, represented always and to a considerable extent the presenting of the program of the Revolution. As Lenin himself said on one occasion, the first decrees and laws contained the element of propaganda. The leadership probably did not expect all the meticulous regulatory provisions to be carried out nor were these regulations to be considered as permanent, many of them being enacted primarily to break down existing economic and social relations against which the Revolution was directed. Then, in a later period, as the forces of life and the new set of social relationships asserted themselves, legislation was often the formal recognition of practices that had developed. Practices that ran counter to the aims of the Revolution had to be regulated or diverted, and the legislation in such instances had as its aim such regulation or direction. Finally, in line with the admitted element of experimenting in new forms of organization and activity, legislation often has represented in fact an explanation of why a given policy or certain practices had been adopted.

The aim to reduce to the minimum the dividing line between "rulers" and "ruled" has been stressed, and one of the points of superiority of the Soviet system claimed by its authors has been a close approach to this aim. The pursuance of this purpose required a tendency toward informality as well as flexibility in the legislative procedure which at times has seemed to work against the goal in mind.

These general features of the Bolshevik procedure of law-making have led some to state that the Soviet system does not rest on strict legal norms. This was in a sense true during the first periods of revolutionary class struggle. The procedure of law-making has become more regular and formal, with the possibilities of developing what the Bolsheviks call "revolutionary legality," a term that became current only

after 1930. It should also be noted that only in the last years have the Bolsheviks spoken concretely of the development of Soviet democracy, having in mind the development of the Soviets as representative institutions with more clearly defined powers and wider and more effective exercise of these powers. As the Revolution has progressed in the carrying out of its program the legislative procedure has become more standardized. Such a standardization is one of the provisions of the new constitutions. The new system of elections to be introduced also has as one of its aims to contribute to a clearer definition of law; for the form and stage of socialism already attained have given, and also require, a more positive concept of law.

The principle of "democratic centralism," which underlies the structure and functioning of practically all Soviet institutions, is applied to the process of formal legislation. Under this principle a sharp, fixed distribution of powers, between legislative and executive, and between central and local government, is not to be found, being purposely avoided in order to make effective the general characteristics of Soviet law-making as outlined in these introductory remarks. The formula itself is flexible. The need at one time for mass effort but at another for strict control, to solve the particular problem at any of the stages of development of the new order, has determined whether the democratic or centralistic element of the formula would predominate without eliminating the other.

#### *1. The Soviet Assembly and Congress.*

In any given Soviet unit—the village Soviet, the large urban Soviet, the district congress of Soviets uniting the primary units, the regional congress representing the district units, the republic congress or finally the All-Union Congress—the plenary assembly of the primary unit or of the congress has been the basic law-making authority. The All-Union and republic congresses and the Soviets of the bigger cities have been large bodies of one to two thousand members, and their sessions have been comparatively short as well as infrequent. The large urban Soviets were expected to hold plenary sessions every few months. The district and regional

congresses also met at frequent intervals. The republic congresses in the first year of the Revolution met several times. The interval between congresses was gradually lengthened, however, at first to a year, then to two years, and in the last instance to three years.

The tendency has thus been to reduce the number of sessions of the plenary assemblies and this tendency is to be noted for the primary and intermediary as well as for the central units. Also these large plenary sessions have tended to convene only on occasions of celebration; by reason of their size they could in fact be little more than general meetings. The special All-Union Congress called to adopt the new Union constitution suggested the mass meeting more than a debating parliamentary body, although representatives from all parts of the Union and of all categories of toilers took part in the speech-making.

Lenin just before his death warned against the continuation of mere meeting-methods. At first the large units were useful sounding boards, and they had a great educational value for the large number who participated. But critics were justified in pointing out that in such large bodies the process of law-making was really reduced to reports by the leaders instead of debate or even discussion, and applause instead of formal voting. The plenary sessions have gradually produced wider participation in the discussions, and the latter have taken on increasingly a more business-like character. But in these large bodies debate could not be extensive, nor did the short period of their sessions permit of effective analytical discussion.

In the plenary sessions the executive committees report for formal confirmation the laws enacted by them under their powers during the interval between sessions. In the case of the larger congresses of Union or republics changes in the constitutions have to be reported; and the congresses have therefore been in a sense periodic constitutional conventions. The congresses for the Union and the republics have legislated on only broad fundamental issues; they could not do otherwise in view of their short sessions called of late only every two or three years. Current legislative authority has been exercised by the executive committees which will be

discussed in the next section. The same relationship between plenary session and executive committee has prevailed in the intermediary and primary Soviet units.

The weaknesses here noted in the procedure for law-making are to be corrected by the new constitutions. The Supreme Soviets are to have exclusive legislative powers. Their sessions, as also those of the other lower grades of legislatures of the Soviet system, are to be more regular, so that current legislation will be possible. Plenary sessions are to be obligatory: twice a year for the Supreme Soviet of Union or republic; four times a year for regions; every two months for district Soviets of Toilers, and once a month for the primary urban and village Soviets. As already noted, the Supreme Soviet will be composed of two chambers of approximately 575 members each, smaller than the former Union Congress but larger than the former Central Executive Committee, both of which institutions it is to replace. The legislative authority will thus be a more permanent and formal body, and at the same time is expected to be more active and responsive than the formal parliaments of the western democratic systems.

## 2. *Executive Committee and Presidium.*

In view of the size and infrequency of the meetings of congresses and plenary assemblies their executive committees had to be given legislative functions. The Central Executive Committee, of Union or republic, meets only three or four times a year and for short sessions, so that legislative powers had to be extended also to their Presidia. The Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee has numbered twenty-seven members. In the intermediary and primary units the executive committees are in permanent session, and constitute the local executive.

While the Presidia must secure confirmation of all measures from the executive committee, as the latter must from the congress or plenary assembly, one has had a wide delegation of legislative power and also the actual exercise of such by a small group. This last fact has contributed to the tendency toward uncontrolled bureaucratic action against which the Soviet leaders have carried on a constant struggle.

The recent "house-cleaning" has brought out facts which the severest critics had not noted.

It has been discovered that meetings of the Presidia often have been held very irregularly, and when held have been poorly attended. The practice developed of sending to the members at their other places of work the list of measures on which a decision had to be made, asking for a vote on the items of this questionnaire. By this practice group discussion and action were practically eliminated. In the first years of civil war the Soviet system became in fact rule by the executive committees. The irregular and short sessions of the assemblies in these last years have pointed to a return to this practice, which was violently condemned and presumably abandoned in order to "revitalize" the Soviets.

The central executive committees of the Union and the constituent republics have been larger bodies; for the Union, 607 members of the Soviet of the Union and 150 members in the Soviet of Nationalities. This size made it possible for this body to serve, as it has, as the permanent legislature. The changes introduced by the new constitutions aim to eliminate what has seemed an anomaly to the outside student, of legislative powers vested in a body which has primarily executive functions.

The new Supreme Soviet, in which legislative powers are now to be concentrated, will have a Presidium somewhat larger than that of the present Central Executive Committee which it replaces. This Presidium is given the authority to issue edicts only in interpretation of laws in force as enacted by the Supreme Soviet. The Council of People's Commissars in the future has the authority to issue only ordinances, and individual commissariats will issue only orders and instructions. Thus a definite standardization of legislative procedure is to come under the new constitution. Among the amendments suggested to the draft of the Union constitution was one providing that the Presidium of the New Supreme Soviet be given legislative powers. Stalin argued against this proposal on the ground that in the past legislative powers had been exercised by too many authorities.

Despite the new proposal respecting the exercise of legislative functions Soviet writers on the new constitution point out

that the Soviet system continues to refuse to accept the principle of distribution of powers. This principle was positively condemned by Soviet leaders and writers in the earlier period as inapplicable to the type of government being set up. What has been introduced, it is explained, is a more rational and effective distribution of functions and not of powers.

### 3. *The Party and legislation.*

The relationship between the Party and the Government in respect of formal legislative procedure requires special emphasis; it is another illustration of the ruling position of the Party in the Soviet system. In the first years there was a practical merging of Government and Party authorities, although all legislation was in form at least an enactment of the "Soviet authority," as represented by the Government. This was the period of the destruction of the old order in the setting of a civil war. Then there came apparently an attempt to differentiate between Party and Government, but in point of fact the relationship continued to be very close. The Party passed resolutions and the formal legislative enactment of the content of these resolutions always followed. Thus Party congresses generally immediately preceded Soviet congresses. The five-year plans have been programs of the Party and actually went into force before formal enactment by the Soviet Congress or Central Executive Committee. The seven-hour work day was also introduced by a Party decision, in this instance in collaboration with the labor-union organization. Decisions respecting the organization and powers of co-operative societies, made by the Party in conjunction with the central representatives of the co-operative movement, have also had all the attributes of formal legislation. Thus in the economic field particularly what were termed the "directives" of the Party came to have in practice the force of law. A citation to this effect, from a recent (1936) textbook on *Soviet Economic and Civil Law*, has been given in another context.

During the last two years a new practice gradually developed, and has become the general rule. This new practice is that of legislation by Government and Party conjointly. Most of the important laws of the last years have been

enacted over two signatures, that of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, and that of Stalin for the Central Committee of the Party. It was perhaps the rise in other countries of one-party systems in which the party and the government are actually merged that led to the franker recognition of the rôle of the Party in the Soviet system. The Rules of the Party, as revised at the last Party Congress of January, 1934, state in more specific terms that the Party is the governing party. In line with this development the current phrase in Soviet official documents is either "the policy of the Government and the Party" or "the policy of the Party and the Government." In a statement from the Party its name will be given first mention and, similarly, the government document will generally give precedence to the word "government." When Molotov, however, uses the phrase which puts "Party" before "Government" one has an indication of the actuality in practice.

It seems therefore to be the general principle that the initiative in formulating policy even in its details is part of the rôle of the Party, while formal enactment rests with the governmental body. Frequent departures from this practice, in the form of actual legislation by the Party alone, have occurred, due to the need of immediate action or of the desire to emphasize the responsibility and authority of the Party. On the other hand, there has been at times a tendency to differentiate between the Party and the Government, although it is interesting to note that no discussion of the theory of such a differentiation has been noted in the Soviet literature on its public law. If after the convening of the new Supreme Soviet there is a continuation of the present practice of joint signing of all important laws by Party and Government, this will be contrary to Stalin's expressed view that legislative powers should be reserved to the single governmental authority.

The rôle of the Party with respect to the formal legislative procedure is also determined by the presence in all grades of Soviets of the so-called "Party group." Even where in the lower units this Party group is a minority, it is the only organized group permitted and its leadership is therefore effective. In the higher units the Party group always has a

majority. There is therefore no question that the Party directives, which must be followed by all Party groups in elective institutions, the group acting as a unit, will prevail in the legislative activity of the Soviet assemblies or executive committees. The sole right to "caucus" of the Party members in any Soviet has been an effective sanction of this ruling position of the Party in the field of legislation. Whether members returned to the Soviets in the next elections on the nomination of other organizations like labor unions or collective farms will have a similar right has not been broached, so far as the writer has noted. To date all "non-Party members" of a Soviet have been designated as such and could meet only as a general and not as an organized group. And the provision of the new constitutions that Party members shall form the "directing nuclei" in all Soviet institutions may imply that they will retain as their monopoly the important right which they have enjoyed to date, of forming the only organized "group" in the Soviet legislative bodies.

#### 4. *Referendum.*

The new Union constitution provides for a popular canvas or referendum either "on the initiative of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or on the demand of one of the Union republics" (*Article 49d*). There has been no decision as to the actual procedure to be used for this test of popular opinion, presumably with respect to a specific legislative proposal.

On several occasions a form of referendum has been utilized. Thus in 1923 the impending enactment of a new marriage law was held up to allow for a "mass" discussion of its proposals in the lower Soviets. This discussion brought the important provision for registration of marriages which was not originally contemplated. In 1936 a new law on abortion was presented for popular discussion in organizations and the press. In this case, despite many expressions of opinion against the return to the principle of the illegality of abortions, the law was enacted practically as originally proposed; the wide popular discussion apparently had little influence.

The draft of the new Union constitution was the subject



of wide discussion for over five months. Five hundred and twenty-seven thousand meetings were reported to have been held, with an aggregate attendance of thirty-six million. There were formal meetings of Soviets, regular meetings of labor unions and other organizations and special meetings of institutions of all types. The number of specific, though not different, suggestions of change that came from these meetings was estimated at over 150,000. In reporting for the Committee which drafted the constitution, Stalin analyzed these proposed amendments and found only a few that were relevant or acceptable. Only forty-three changes were actually made in the original draft; the majority of these alterations were purely textual, only seven being of substantial content.

If for the law on abortion and the draft of the new constitution the wide discussion did not lead to any real changes in the projects proposed, it performed a valuable educational function; the Soviet citizenry became informed fully of what was being proposed. The factor of organization was present in this discussion, but did not prevent, in the case of the law on abortion, positive opposition to some of its basic features.

The procedure adopted for formulating the statute or "constitution" for the collective farm (*kolkhoz*) represented a form of referendum. An All-Union conference of collective-farm workers—the shock brigaders—was convened. This conference drew up a model constitution and this document was the result of real debate. Stalin participated in the conference and contributed to the formulation of the model constitution, for he assumed the responsibility and also the credit for the policy of the collectivization of agriculture. But many of the most important features of the law were suggested by the local workers, as the stenographic report of the conference shows.

The model statute thus adopted was discussed by each collective farm, and acceptance of it registered formally with the local village Soviet. To encourage discussion, acceptance and registration deeds granting perpetual use of the land by the collective farm were issued on the completion of this procedure. The provisions for self-administration and individual kitchen-garden allotments of this law made a strong

appeal to the peasants. The question of whether agriculture should be collectivized did not come up, because the policy of collectivization had been carried through and the majority of the peasants had come to realize this. But the democratic procedure for regulating the internal structure of the *kolkhoz* was considered illustrative of a method of law-making which the Soviet system provides. In the recent purge of local leadership there have been several instances where the offense was gross violation by Soviet and Party officials of this *kolkhoz* statute or "constitution," which was made the law of the land.

#### 5. *Central and Local Government.*

The integration of the Soviets by their single pyramid form of structure is reflected in the field of law-making. The principle to date has been that any unit is subject to supervision and control with respect to its exercise of legislative functions by the next higher unit. As the next higher unit has been elected from the immediately lower unit, being thus composed of members of the latter, this principle operated in practice without any friction; also there apparently could not be any rivalry or dispute over jurisdiction.

The powers of the Union are delegated. In the 1936 constitution these are enumerated in Article 14. In the 1923 Union constitution the fields for exclusive Union legislation are practically the same (see Article 1). But in the new constitution the fixing of general principles by the Union authority is extended to new fields, while detailed legislation in these same fields is left to the republics. In this way is registered the progress of the revolutionary program particularly in economic fields. In the field of the administration of justice it was decided that it was possible and necessary to establish more uniform principles and practices throughout the Union.

Within a Union republic statutes on municipal and village Soviets were enacted some years ago to define the powers as well as the functions of these primary units and in the direction of a larger measure of local initiative. But the new constitution of the Russian unit, adopted on January 21, 1937, provides in Article 91: "The higher Soviets of Toilers'

Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of the lower Soviets of Toilers' Deputies and their executive committees." Thus the introduction of the direct election of all Soviets has not altered this principle of hierarchical subordination—what the Bolsheviks insist is co-ordination.

This principle of co-ordination is another aspect of democratic centralism, providing, it is believed, for mass initiative and at the same time direction of this initiative. In the first months of the Soviet régime local Soviets were encouraged to take the most active initiative and the upper units gave only the most general "directives." Then the conditions of the internal struggle with the advent of civil war required extreme centralization of authority. At present, as part of the policy to "activize" the local Soviets, the primary units are encouraged to show initiative in the field of local legislation. The next higher unit always can quash measures that are not in conformity with the "general line" or the "policy of the Party and Government," and this right is often exercised. The general powers of supervision exercised by the higher unit are reinforced by the powers of the Procuror (see later) and his local representatives, and of the Commission of Soviet Control. In practice the power of supervision is often abused and as a result local initiative cannot in fact manifest itself. Or there is the opposite "deviation" and the local Soviet authorities go astray or even amuck, and for long periods before a revision is effected.

Because of its importance the fact should again be noted that the effective exercise of the supervisory authority of the higher unit and the acceptance of such supervision by the lower unit are made possible in practice because both units, at whatever range, are part of a single institution also in the matter of personnel. The members of the congresses of Soviets, and their executive committees, to take the higher range, are also members of regional Soviet congresses or executive committees, or at the bases, the district Soviet assemblies and executive committees have come up from the village Soviets. Superior decisions are seldom questioned because they are arrived at with the participation of those working in the lower unit. The interlocking personnel between lower and higher units will not continue in such definite form when all Soviets

are elected directly. There would seem to be no provision against a person being a member of both of a central and local Soviet, however. On this point it is not yet possible to determine the extent of the changes introduced by the new constitutions.

The ruling position of the Party in the Soviets has also been an important factor in establishing and maintaining the relations between local and intermediary and central Soviets. In all Soviets, whether in the assemblies or in the executive committees, the members of the Party form the "Party group" already described. Under Party discipline these Party members act as a unit, and it is part of their responsibility to integrate local and central government in matters of legislation.

#### 6. Codes and precedents.

The old Imperial codes were immediately repealed by the Revolution; only Soviet legislation was to have the force of law, and to emphasize this fact even decisions of the revolutionary courts were not to be cited. This was the period of the full sway of revolutionary legislative action. It was for this period that Lenin said that the actions of the masses constituted law. For certain fields the revolutionary legislation was codified in this first period: a Labor Code and a Code on the Family.

With the adoption of the New Economic Policy it was necessary to give the law and rights under it greater clarity. To this end former revolutionary codes were revised and new codes elaborated and put into force. These codes of the period of the *Nep* represented the new "socialist" law, but they also reflected the old concepts, particularly as they had to extend protection to the "capitalist" economic forces which were allowed again to develop. The recent dispute over the nature of law under socialism has its roots in this period when Bolsheviks spoke of the Soviet economic structure as falling into two sectors: "capitalist" and "socialist."

With the resumption of the socialist offensive, involving the gradual liquidation of the *Nep*, many of the paragraphs of the codes rapidly became obsolete. It has been one of the functions of the consulting jurist to know what paragraphs of

these codes have been superseded by new statutes or by interpretations of the Supreme Court or administrative rulings. New editions of these codes and legal textbooks have aided the citizen as well as the student to follow the changes effected by the drive for socialism of the period of the five-year plans.

In view of the many radical changes of the last years, in all fields of life, the question of the complete revision of the codes has been raised. With the publication of the draft of the proposed new constitution, in June, 1936, the revision of the new codes was formally started, by the appointment of commissions. The general principles set forth in the new constitutions required such a revision, as the full import of these principles would be clear only from detailed statements as embodied in new codes.

It seemed reasonable to look for the appearance of these new codes by the end of 1937. But there has been delay because of the recent political shake-up, one aspect of which has had to do with the general question of the place of law in a socialist order and therefore with the more specific question of the new codes. A former accepted authority on Soviet law, who was presumably to take a leading part in the preparation of the new codes, was found to have erred seriously in his theoretical views and was declared "an enemy of the people." The authoritative interpretation of the place of law in a socialist state is being worked out at the present writing. There can be "a socialist law," we are told, which is an integral part of the new order and not simply a heritage from the old not yet fully outlived. This view makes for a consolidation of Soviet law, the extent and content of which will be clearer when the new codes appear.

### *7. Scope of Soviet legislation.*

Soviet legislation bulks up into an enormous mass of statutes, laws and regulations. The policy of planned economy with the relating of all activity to the five-year plans has required detailed legislation with respect to all fields of human endeavor. The dates for the various steps in the agricultural process, the quotas of production, prices, the curricula in the schools, for example, are all subjects of legislative determina-

tion. The bringing in of Party and labor-union authorities into the field of formal legislation, and the exercise of legislative powers by executive bodies have been necessary for the formulation of these far-reaching norms. The comprehensive scope and specific character of the norms established are part of the new environment which is expected to change the habits of the people and develop new habits. As conflicts between revolutionary aims and actual life developed temporary adjustments have been made, which in turn had to be registered in the regulations to be enforced, that is in new legislation. The life of a specific Soviet law has been therefore comparatively short.

Another feature of the procedure of law-making under the Soviets may be noted. Changes in methods of procedure have been necessary as the Revolution progressed. The centralized character of the Soviet system has made it possible formally to effect such changes rapidly. The close integration of central and local authorities has facilitated the local carrying out of the new policy, the lag in local application being much less than one might expect. The fact that changes in policy have not been fundamental, or if sharp, only temporary and explained as tactical, has meant a definiteness in direction of legislative policy, the direction being emphasized in the constant outlining, by mass propaganda instruments, of the so-called "perspective of the Revolution." Thus the Party line, while following a zigzag course somewhat confusing to the local leadership, has had definite, concrete aims as formulated in legislation.

While the tendency is clearly toward consolidation and the standardization of the procedure for law-making, it should not be interpreted as a drifting back to the western parliamentary system. The Bolsheviks have acknowledged the taking over of mechanical features of parliamentarianism, its better features as they see them—direct election by secret ballot or concentration of legislative functions. Formal roll-call voting in the new Soviet "Parliament" may be introduced; the requirement of a two-thirds vote for a constitutional amendment suggests such a development. On the other hand the Soviet Government remains a one-party system, and the authoritative and decisive position of the single party is

considered a point of superiority, providing a responsible as well as an effective leadership. Bickerings and compromises especially in local government are thus eliminated, it would seem. The absence of basic class divisions, and in any case of provision for the protection of the rights of a minority class of owners of means of production, is both the reason for and the result of the one-party principle. National minorities are recognized, however, and their rights protected in the field of legislation by the Soviet of Nationalities, which is given greater prestige and power under the new constitution. Soviet writers tell us that the Soviet deputies must not become "mere parliamentarians." In this statement they have in mind the fact that Soviet deputies themselves work in production and administer the laws they have enacted, thus checking up on what happens in actual life under their legislation. This fact prevents them from "becoming cut off from their electors and failing to register the needs and demands of the toilers." This claim will be noted in the following chapters on Public Administration.

## CHAPTER VII

### PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A Soviet writer on political theory some years ago advanced the formula that the temple of the "bourgeois-state" is legislation and its object of worship law, while, in the "proletarian state" the temple is administration and the fetish labor. This theory has been recently condemned because it minimizes the importance of law in the present "socialist state." But it remains correct in so far as it points out the emphasis on administration in the Soviet system. While the present emphasis on law has as one of its aims to make more definitive the protection of the civil and property rights now allowed to the Soviet citizen, the Soviet state is also and often primarily economic, owning and operating the most important of the country's means of production; the state apparatus of administration touches the citizen in his workaday life and has assumed large responsibilities in the organizing of his labor. Inefficiency or corruption in public administration affects therefore the livelihood of all the people.

#### *1. Scope of public administration.*

The comprehensive character of public administration in the Soviet system can be related to the "proletarian dictatorship" on the one hand, and planned economy on the other. In the period of "War Communism," the state became in theory and to a considerable extent also in practice the absolute master of all credit, industrial and trade activity and the virtual master of agriculture. The conditions of the civil war and the struggle against hostile neighbors and outside intervention were in part responsible for the taking over by the state of control of all economic and cultural activities. The doctrinal basis of the new type of state also required the extending of its powers to practically every field of life.



Under the economic policy of the proletarian dictatorship—the nationalization of all means of production—public administration came to include business management. All institutions were so to speak “sovietized,” those that would not lend themselves to the process being abolished. If it was found impossible or inexpedient completely to abolish an institution, as for example the church, then the institution was denied the right to “exercise administrative functions” and its activity thus reduced. Labor unions and co-operative societies as mass organizations were also “statized.” Included in the nationalized “means of production” were all publishing establishments, theatres and other means of communication. The “sovietizing” of an institution or organization brought with it specific and authoritative leadership by the Party.

✓ The New Economic Policy (1921-28) allowed individual initiative to reappear in economic activity, but always under the strict supervision of the proletarian state. ✓ There came also decentralization of management in state enterprises. State and Party direction of cultural activities were retained and even increased, in preparation for the resumption of the socialist offensive, in 1928. There was no change in principle in the structure of the proletarian state during the *Nep*. In fact because of the new economic policy the proletarian and Party domination of personnel of administration was made more positive. This was part of the preparation for the resumption of the socialist offensive.

The drive for socialism under the five-year plans implied an even more positive assertion of authoritative direction of all activity. ✓ Then, as the reconstruction of the economic life under these plans progressed, there came a tendency toward decentralization in respect of management with provision for constant checking up on performance by the central authorities. ✓ It is this current application of the general Soviet principle of “democratic centralism” to the field of administration that will be here examined. The details of the many changes, to “shake down” the Soviet apparatus of administration, will be noted only in so far as it is necessary to do so to understand the methods of administration now in force. The apparatus of administration continues to be subjected con-

stantly to this process of shaking down. In 1937 the extensive house-cleaning reached many responsible heads of administrative departments, and managers of economic enterprises. Some were charged with sabotage, wrecking activities and even treason. The possibility of such activities suggests definite defects, of several kinds, in the Soviet system of public administration. These will be noted, together with the measures taken to remedy them.

## 2. *"Mass Control."*

Bolshevism has formulated several principles as basic to its aims in the field of administration. The most important of these principles is spoken of as "mass control," which is to be effectuated by wide mass participation in public administration. Lenin gave the popular formulation of this aim in a phrase already quoted which has been one of the main slogans of the Revolution: "The house-wife will learn to run the state." The Bolsheviks accept the Marxian doctrine of the gradual withering away of the state in the belief in the possibility of training a community to habits of self-discipline and co-operation through actual participation in management and administration.

The establishment of workman control of industry in the very first days of the Soviet régime represented the first application of the principle of mass control through actual participation. The problem of efficient management has required, as we shall see, certain modification of the original practices. Bureaucratic tendencies in administration were also to be combatted by mass control. Repeated and thorough-going reorganization of the apparatus of administration has adopted novel and often ruthless methods to fight "bureaucratism," as inherited from the old régime and as inherent in a system of central economic planning and state intervention in all fields of life. Cultural backwardness has also been one of the reasons for bureaucratic tendencies.

The methods of public administration and of state management in economic enterprises or state control over co-operative units operating within the state-planned economic system have been evolved by trial and error. The fundamental question is whether the result is a development or a decline

of self-administration. In general terms this is the question of whether the Soviet system is becoming more democratic. Put in more concrete terms the question is whether workmen and peasants see a development toward social administration, or one toward bureaucratic. If the Bolsheviks may confidently assert that there is no trend back to private capitalism, their system may perhaps be working more and more toward what has been termed "capitalistic statism."

### 3. *Combatting "bureaucratism."*

Various interesting devices have been adopted to combat bureaucratic tendencies. Administrative institutions have been "raided" and inspected by light cavalry detachments of young communists. Commissariats have been brought under the "patronage" of a factory, and a group of workmen introduced into its personnel, which from the inside could fight bureaucratic tendencies as they expressed themselves in conscious or unconscious neglect of the interests of the workmen. A wholesale reduction of staffs has taken place on two occasions, representing another form of "purging" for which there is provision in the Soviet system. Another device has been to increase the salary of technical experts working in the plant as opposed to those working in the central offices of the trust to which the plant belonged. A Party regulation has required central Party officials to spend a certain number of months in local work. That these measures have not always been successful is illustrated by a recent item in the Soviet press. Two engineers responsible for several years for a certain mine were unable to find it when finally they decided to visit it, although it was only a few miles from their office. Such instances cannot of course be generalized; they often are emphasized by the Soviet leaders for "propaganda-organizational" purposes.

More responsible and efficient management has been encouraged from another direction by increased remuneration and wider public recognition; the meeting of a schedule of production or of grain collections supplies a concrete basis of measurement. Bonuses for successful administration or management have thus extended the piece-work wage system to these categories of workers. The manager of a state com-

mercial store or of a consumers' co-operative is also paid a bonus on the basis of the turnover.

There has been considerable mobility of personnel in both the Soviet and Party organs. This fluidity did not promote efficiency, although the changing was often due to the failure of the individual in the particular post, or the need of the more experienced or tested worker as a "trouble-shooter" at a place where organization and management had broken down. This fluidity of personnel is being reduced, by positive action of the central authorities, and as a result of a gradual training of personnel and its proper distribution. After one of the reorganizations of the apparatus of administration (1934) each department was assigned a specific production field, and within its field was to train and distribute its *cadres*.

It is through the various types of institutions for the "active element," described in the chapter on the structural features of the Soviet system, that bureaucratic tendencies are to be dealt with as a matter of every-day functioning. The "sections" of Soviets, now to be extended to district and regional Soviets, have no executive functions but inquire and inspect, advise, propose, "signal" defects and register formal protests. "Deputy groups" and "street committees" give attention to problems of administration rather than to larger questions of policy.

The "active element" organized by the judicial and taxing authorities, which will be described later, aid the work of these departments of government and at the same time represent measures against bureaucratic tendencies. The inspection service of the labor unions, noted in another section of this chapter, is organized on a broad mass base, and has in view particularly the ensuring of attention to demands and needs of workers on the part of this or that organ of administration.

The press plays an important rôle in checking up on the actual functioning of administration and management. Individual writers or organized brigades inspect and report, and the officials criticized are expected to answer in the columns of the newspapers. This is one aspect of the "operative" function of the Soviet press examined in an earlier chapter.

Many of the letters sent in by the peasant-correspondent and workman-correspondent deal with problems and defects of local management. The wall newspaper of the institution or enterprise is perhaps the most direct and forceful instrument for combatting red-tapism or drill-sergeant methods in local administration or management of a factory or collective farm. All these devices and instrumentalities, of which the most important have been noted, indicate the constant effort to make effective the Soviet principle of mass participation in and control over the enormous apparatus of administration which the socialist state requires.

#### *4. Party and administration.*

The rôle of leadership assumed by the Party in the Soviet system extends to administration. In all except the village executive committees of Soviets, Party members have a majority and generally the chairmanship. In the local and central committees of labor unions the Party members also predominate. Party predominance in the personnel of the administrative boards of the co-operative societies is less general except for the highest co-ordinating organs; communists looked down on commercial or trade activities, and even under Party discipline were directed into this field only with difficulty. In appointive commissions the same Party leadership is found. Those appointed as directors of institutions and managers of economic enterprises—particularly the many new construction projects—are almost invariably Party members, although of late this former practice is not followed so rigidly. In a very concrete way, therefore, the ruling position of the Party expresses itself in the personnel of the multi-form apparatus of administration.

The Party control of all important responsible positions and in all fields of activity, including economic and cultural, is not the Soviet counterpart of a spoils system, although superficially it has some of the features of the latter. The assumption by the Party of responsibility for the Revolution, and then the development of the one-party principle for the Soviet system as a whole, has led logically to the practice of filling all responsible positions by Party members. During the struggle for the new order—for its political victory over direct

and indirect opposition—it was necessary to put Bolsheviks at the head of all institutions and organizations. These were the so-called “Red directors.” Where the executive authority was elected, the electors found it expedient to accept the principle of Party leadership. Administration and management have suffered as a result of this practice from the point of view of efficiency, but during the years of the evolution of the new system political considerations were bound to prevail. With the completion of the socialist framework it became possible to deviate somewhat from the former policy, and many responsible administrative positions have come to be held by individuals who do not belong to the Party. A special designation for these was suggested recently by Stalin, who called attention to the fact that some of the best workers in responsible positions did not belong to the Party, and spoke of them as “non-Party Bolsheviks.”

A development parallel to that of “non-Party Bolsheviks” has been taking place. The so-called “Red director” of a factory, appointed originally because he was an active and loyal political worker, can retain his position only if he acquires technical training in the field in which he is working. The aim of this provision is also to make the manager of a factory less dependent on his technical advisers than has often been the case. After this possibility of training, inefficient management will lead to demotion with the specific prohibition again to hold a responsible position. If there is evidence of deliberate carelessness the penalty will be more severe. Where by his action the Party member has violated a Soviet law, he will be prosecuted with particular vigor and often with the widest publicity, and the severest penalty provided by law imposed because of the very fact of his Party membership.

The provision for special training of those holding administrative positions has been generally supplied, practically from the beginning, by the special Party-Soviet schools to train not only Party organizers and workers, but chairmen or secretaries in local Soviet institutions.

A special organ of the Party—the Commission of Party Control—exercises, as its name indicates, general supervision over administration, constantly investigating and reporting,

many of its findings being made public. For this function it was decided to centralize the control over performance, in order to free this function from the pressure of local interests. Local "mass" control, formerly exercised by the organs of Workman-Peasant Inspection, was turned over to the labor unions. Replacing the Workman-Peasant Inspection, a Commission of Soviet Control, appointed by and responsible to the Central Executive Committee, checks up on performance in Soviet administrative and economic institutions. Organized like the Commission of Party Control with centralized authority through local representatives responsible only to it, the Soviet institution co-operates closely with the Party institution, and both represent the tendency toward decentralization in management and administration and centralization in respect of checking up on performance.

The very large number of Party members holding high responsible positions involved in the recent trials and executions has led to a radical shaking down of the Party, as already discussed. Theoretically these had been thoroughly tested. Also under Party discipline these should have been the most closely watched and checked; in practice they escaped the control of the Party and used their Party positions to avoid "mass control."

### *5. The Office Worker.*

In the various administrative bodies of the Soviet system the personnel is spoken of as the "office worker," as opposed to the "workman" or "peasant." From the beginning the intellectual, the technician and even the office worker have been somewhat suspect, and the attitude of these groups toward the new authority often justified the suspicion. The leaders enjoined workmen and peasants who were to exercise mass control over the bureaucracy of their new order that it should be an attitude of "healthy suspicion." Coming now in the main from workman and peasant families, and educated and trained under the Soviet régime, these technicians and office workers are believed to have been won over, always with individual exceptions.

For the technician and professional man or woman an incentive to better effort has been supplied by increased and

differentiated salaries. For the manual worker the piece-work wage as well as his position of political and social leadership have been an effective appeal. The higher administrative officials have had the satisfaction of power from their responsibility and acknowledged leadership. But for the middle group of office workers—clerks and stenographers—there has not been the same opportunity to increase earnings or to receive recognition for work done. The office worker is beginning to find his economic position better and his standing in the community of toilers higher. However, the bureaucratic tendencies that have been and still are so forcefully present in the apparatus of administration—even of the Party—can be explained by the attitude of this group of workers in any system. In the Soviet system this group necessarily is very large, and has an important relation to the details of administration and management. Recent Soviet writings take as their theme the position of this group, calling attention to its contribution to the "socialist building," and ways in which this contribution can be increased.

6. "Functionalism."

A general reorganization of the apparatus of administration of both the Soviets and the Party in 1934 was an outstanding instance of the fight against the evils of bureaucratic control; it also represented the tendency toward decentralization as part of this struggle. The new Commissions of Control—of Soviets and Party—were the product of this reorganization. What the Soviet leaders and writers called "functionalism" in administration was to be eliminated. The apparatus of administration in both the Soviets and the Party had till then been organized on the basis of the functions performed, and in this way any given enterprise was subject to a whole series of inspections and directives with respect to each of its functions. All institutions have had, in varying measure, political, economic and cultural functions, and it was necessary to organize administration on this so-called principle of functions in order to promote all of them as part of the building of the new order. This functional form of administration was one of the factors responsible for the inefficiency of management—red-tapism and dispersal of responsibility.



Here was one of the causes for the failures to meet the schedules of production, for example. One Soviet leader, in describing the results of "functionalism" in administration, suggested that it meant one authority when a hand was to lift food to the mouth, another when it was to write a report and still another when it had to hit somebody in the face, and thus for all hands everywhere.

The new basis for administration became the field of production as a whole, and the particular production unit. This has meant decentralization in administration and management, and the possibility of introducing in fact responsibility of management. The reorganization of the administrative bodies has been part of the program of the second Five-Year Plan of mastering the new technique—the new machines and the new types of organization. It was explained that the aim of the reorganization of the Party apparatus of administration was to adapt it to the new problems, produced by the progress of the program of economic reconstruction, so that the Party could attain in the field of administration and management the high standards it had shown in the field of political leadership.

1. *"Single Responsible Authority."*

In economic enterprises the principle of a single responsible manager has been established. But the workers hold production conferences, the resolutions of which are supposed to be studied by the management. The actual "counter-planning" of these production conferences, of a few years ago, has been modified, for while it was useful in promoting enthusiasm for the Plan, it was in contradiction to the ideas of strict economic planning and "single responsible authority" and was tending to disrupt both. The so-called "triangle" in an economic enterprise, composed of management, Party leadership and labor-union organization, has become an arbitration board where before it represented a form of collegiate management. But the production conference and the "triangle" still have important functions of "self-criticism" and "self-organization" and discussion in general. Through them the idea that the workers of a given enterprise have some part in the running of the plant or factory is still pres-

ent, although it is difficult to determine to what extent it is accepted as having real meaning by the majority of the workmen. The workmen are expected to look upon the enterprise as indeed theirs, on the basis of effective participation in its work even if direct control over management has been modified as compared with earlier practices. The extent to which larger numbers of workers take this attitude marks the progress in the building of socialism as it has been interpreted to them.

Other illustrations of the development of the principle of the single responsible authority are to be found in almost all institutions. In the Commissariats the former collegiate boards have been abolished, and the Commissar, with his assistants and subordinates, is the responsible head, resting on periodic conferences of local representatives and workers. In the educational institutions, particularly the lower grades, the "director" has been reinstated, the use of the old designation symbolizing the increase of this authority and of his independence in matters of current administration of the teachers' council, or of the larger council of teachers and pupils. Teachers' councils and school councils in which the pupils are represented, have not been abolished, and they play an important part in the work and life of the school. Through them, and through recently re-established parents' associations, mass participation in and a measure of general "mass control" over, the work of the school are provided for. The character of this control has been modified but the element of control would seem to be still present, perhaps more effective because it has become more general, while administration has become more efficient and responsible.

The principle of the single responsible authority has often been "bureaucratically perverted," we are told. Thus a director of a trust or factory has considered himself absolutely supreme and free from any control, even from that of his "production active element"—his technical experts and assistants in management. Not realizing the need to rely on the "active element" he has not kept in touch with the rank and file of his group through the *actif* of the collective. Engrossed in problems of production he has neglected the "political"

side of his position of leadership. Such a narrow technician is considered as not fitting into a Soviet institution, and as being even an obstacle to its proper functioning.

8. *Graft and favoritism.*

For all administrative positions, including the management of economic enterprises, the remuneration has been limited. At first it was not to exceed the wage of a skilled workman. Party members were limited to a maximum salary, regardless of the responsibility of the position. In point of fact from the very first those holding responsible positions of leadership, administration and management enjoyed better living quarters, and in the periods of shortage of food better and more regularly distributed rations. Lenin, it is reported, refused to accept these recognized perquisites of leadership. The privileged ration represented a very real increase of earnings, unrelated to the nominal money payment. In addition the responsible workers enjoyed many perquisites of transportation, vacation travel, and even clothing. But in the drive for production the Party maximum was abolished for all technically qualified workers and the concept of technical qualification has been extended to experience in management. Salaries of "responsible workers" were raised, and the former practice of publicity with regard to all salaries was abolished. An economic differentiation therefore not only has been allowed to develop but has been deliberately extended, in order to secure more efficient administration and particularly better management in economic enterprises. The purely administrative official has not enjoyed the same increase of money reward as the "economic manager" but has been able to develop more extensively the perquisites of office.

It has been possible to secure fees for consultative work in the case of the specialist, hand in expense accounts in the case of the administrative official and obtain theatre tickets, books, and even "representation" allowances. But the practice of large-scale self-enrichment seems very limited. An official—and under the Soviet system this term extends to economic managers—guilty of "violating sacred state property"—which means practically all means of production—is an "enemy of

the people." The impossibility of acquiring property except in consumers' goods and the severe punishment, generally widely publicized, of embezzlement or graft, under Party discipline and Soviet law, have been effective deterrents. Graft, and its special aspect of favoritism, have been on the whole remarkably absent in the administrative staffs of the Soviet system. There has been a practice called by the Russian word "*blat*," which represented friendly interchange of favors without any element of dishonesty. In the recent shake-up a certain number of dishonest practices have been exposed, however.

For example, local officials, through the various committees on which they serve have had assigned to themselves land for home building from a neighboring *kolkhoz*. They have had houses built on the committee funds, and occupied them. The former head of the Commissariat of Home Affairs—and of the political police—has been arrested on the charge of peculation in office. Responsible workers in state factories have been found filling orders for products on the side, pocketing the payments for these orders. Inflated expense accounts, premiums for extra work and especially for unnecessary special "consultative" work, have been other methods of graft. The wide publicity given to the instances of graft that have been discovered is part of the technique of combatting such practices.

The Soviet press in the last months has carried accounts of instances of favoritism. From the beginning there has been constant admonition against such practices, and severe penalizing of the flagrant cases. But the emphasis on "single responsible authority" in management or general administration has contributed to the development of the practice of appointing one's friends or of taking one's own staff of assistants when transferred to a new position. This practice has been facilitated by the breakdown of the principle of election in local Party and Soviet institutions.

#### 9. *Return to politicizing.*

The recent re-emphasis on "politics" touches the fields of administration and management. In Party, labor unions and co-operative societies new elections, with voting by secret

ballot, are expected to weed out "bureaucratic" as well as dishonest elements in the administrative organs of these organizations. The Soviet elections set for the end of 1937 will concentrate more on personnel than on basic political issues; for the last year local administrators, often appointed through the Party, have been busy mending their ways in anticipation of the test of direct election by secret ballot. In economic enterprises managers have been told that their political activity—organizing their group of workers by real co-operation with it—is as important as the meeting of the production schedule.

The purges have been directed against abuses of power, by sheer bureaucratic methods of administration and violations of the rights of self-administration of a collective farm for example. Instances of illegal self-enrichment by those in responsible positions are also being exposed, punished and widely publicized. The purges have also exposed many instances of wrecking activities by individuals in positions of administration and management. This feature of Soviet life has been discussed in other contexts, and must be related to the peculiar conditions of the socialist system as exemplified by the Soviet Union. The fact that wrecking activity is, so to speak, inherent in the very system was implied by Stalin at the February, 1937, plenary session of the Central Committee<sup>1</sup> of the Party. His statement was:

One must remember, and never forget, that so long as there is the capitalist encirclement there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, and terrorists, scattered throughout the Soviet Union by the espionage services of foreign states; one must remember this and fight those comrades who undervalue the force and meaning of wrecking activities.

He added that while it took tens of thousands of workers to build the Dneprostroy Power Plant, a few individuals could wreck it, or prevent its proper functioning.

The constant purges of the Party and the frequent transfer of Party members from one responsible post to another will perhaps temporarily disrupt management, by removing

able executives and making others nervous and unwilling to show the initiative necessary for efficient management. Political considerations must prevail, however, even if this means further inefficiency of administration. This is part of the cost of the building of a new order. The politicizing is expected to develop "revolutionary vigilance" in all instrumentalities of mass control. It represents another attack on the problem of "bureaucratism" in general. It aims to curb tendencies in the large apparatus of administration which the Soviet system requires, toward the entrenchment of a new kind of power group. Politicizing in the Soviet system does not mean the extension of control by a bureaucratic authority over all activity. It means the relating of all activity to the program of the Revolution, and this for all toilers, so that by seeing the purpose of their effort they will make it more effective, recognizing a gain to themselves personally in their contribution to the effort of the community. It also means that all will keep their eyes open and be on the watch for any who do not "observe the rules of the socialist community," and by this "revolutionary vigilance" eliminate the conscious "racketeer" or "chiseler," to use our American terms, but help the unconscious laggard.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PUBLIC SERVICES

The public services of the Soviet state involve extensive repressive as well as protective functions. The civil order which they are to ensure is of a particular category—"the revolutionary order" and "a socialist order." The new type of state was established on the principle of a revolutionary change of social relations, and the suppression of all opposition to this change. The first Soviet constitution spoke of "ruthless suppression"; the new constitutions of 1936-37 contain the term "enemy of the people." The dictatorship of the proletariat was defined as having as its first aim the suppression of the opposition of the bourgeoisie; and the dictatorship of the proletariat, more flexible and on a broader base, is considered as continuing under the new constitutions. Regulation has been often avowedly suppressive; it was also allegedly educative. The resulting regimentation was to decline with the carrying out of the program of the Revolution, however.

The second aspect of the protective services of government—the ensuring of national defense—has taken on special forms in line with the special concept of national defense of the "first proletarian state." The broader international implications of the rise of the Soviet type of state in the world will be interpreted in the concluding chapter. Here the structural features of the services of national defense will be the subject of examination.

Social and economic functions have been assumed by the Soviet state on the broadest possible scale, to carry out the program of the Revolution. In the field of public health, for example, the aim has been to socialize medicine under a comprehensive system of social insurance. The organization of cultural activities also became the concern—often the monopoly—of the state, to effect the "cultural revolution."

This and the following chapter on the public services—on their social and economic as well as their protective functions—will bring out the general principles on which these services have been set up and work. The closely integrated character of the Soviet régime makes it difficult to observe, even in the presentation of the material, the distinction between protective and social-economic functions.

The all-embracing scope of its public services is the feature of the Soviet state at its present stage. It should be noted that under the Marxian doctrine of the state the proletarian dictatorship is to change; the norms established by it are ultimately to lead to firmly fixed habits of action that will ensure automatic compliance by the majority, and the anti-social elements will be small, weak, and easily handled without an organization whose chief thought and functions are to use its powers of compulsion. While asserting adherence to this view, Stalin said in 1934, at the last Congress of the Party:

At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents the most powerful and mighty authority of all forms of state which have existed up to the present day. The highest possible development of the power of the state is the Marxian formula. Is it "contradictory"? Yes, it is "contradictory." But this contradiction is a living thing and completely reflects Marxian dialectics.

Among the errors of Soviet political scientists who have been declared "enemies of the people" in the recent purge, was that of seeing the "withering-away" process already starting, and even fixing its terminal date.

These doctrinal assertions of Bolshevism are here noted because they are constantly called to the attention of the Soviet citizens, to explain the character and aims of the public services developed and, at the present stage, often forcibly imposed on them. A widely-used term in Soviet legislation, in the speeches of leaders and in Soviet writings is "discipline." "Financial discipline" is spoken of in connection with taxation and expenditure. "Production discipline" is emphasized as one of the conditions of the success of the Soviet



economic plans. "Self-discipline" is part of the communist retraining, and an example is what the members of the Party accept when they apply for admission. The public services have among their aims the development of self-discipline in the individuals. As this self-discipline develops, the disciplinary character of the functions of Soviet public services is expected to disappear. In its protective as well as in its social-economic functions the Soviet system strives to promote direct mass participation, particularly in the everyday handling of the services. The aim is to have the public services handled as "socially" as possible. As has been noted, "social administration" is a more applicable term than "public administration," as the aim, if not yet the actual achievement.

#### *1. Taxation.*

The tax policy has been a very consistent one throughout the twenty years of the Soviet régime, although the methods of taxing have differed by periods, and with respect to the various classes. The tendency was to be away from direct taxation to a system of public revenue based on the socialized means of production. The main source of public revenue at present is the tax on turnover. As prices are fixed by the state, and include this turnover tax on the producer, processor or distributor, the result is a form of tax on all consumers.

Taxes on individuals have been of several types. There has been the tax to limit or destroy economic elements considered hostile. The first tax of the Revolution was an extraordinary levy, frankly confiscatory, on all "bourgeois" elements. It was never fully collected but it helped in the carrying out of the program of "expropriating the expropriators." During the period of War Communism practically no general taxes were levied or collected. All products theoretically went into the common pot, and were distributed by a comprehensive system of rationing. The limitations imposed on the individual retention of clothing and the various categories of rations operated in their practical effect as a system of levies by classes. The New Economic Policy re-established a new and reasonably stable currency, on the basis

of which a comprehensive system of taxation was introduced. Instead of having to sell all surplus products at state-fixed prices the peasants paid a tax, first in kind, later convertible to currency and finally paid exclusively in rubles.

Peasant households which had formed agricultural co-operative societies were taxed at a lower rate than were individual peasant enterprises. Completely collectivized groups, of which in this period there was a very small number, enjoyed a still lower rate. Poor-peasant householders were exempt and this category was extended, as the poorer peasants were being organized to help in the carrying through of the policy of collectivization. Peasants engaged in trade in articles other than those of their own production, or peasants having earnings from other than agricultural work, such as construction work in the cities in the winter months, were subject to a separate tax on these outside earnings. The peasant private trader, often the *kulak* of the village, was one of the so-called "hostile elements"—a *Nepman*—and was thus being limited and controlled by taxation.

So long as these *Nepmen* were needed, to help re-establish the processes of production and distribution, the power to tax was not used to destroy. The urban *Nepmen*—merchants, small traders, shopkeepers, and individuals running industrial enterprises under concessions from the state for individual profit—were taxed at a higher rate than were consumers' co-operative societies or co-operatives of handicraft workers, on the one hand; and state enterprises on the other. This discriminatory tax on individual enterprises aimed to weaken them in their competition with corresponding state or co-operative institutions.

Workmen, like the poorer peasants, were exempt from an individual direct tax, and this fact was constantly emphasized as the deliberate policy of the proletarian state. The higher positions in public administration and economic management were as a rule held by Party members, and during the *Nep* there was strict enforcement of the principle of a fixed and comparatively low maximum of remuneration for members of the Party, regardless of the responsibility attached to the position held. This limitation on earnings logically exempted those holding these higher positions from

a direct tax. The technical experts and the "spetsy"—abbreviation for specialists—were taxed on their higher earnings by a direct individual assessment and also by the system of differential rentals for dwellings according to earnings. In this way there was a tendency toward equalization under the differential system of remuneration.

So-called "self-taxation" was also actively promoted. In the rural communities the local group could vote an assessment for local cultural purposes, to build clubs or schools, improve roads or put in a bridge. The poorer peasants, led by the local Party authorities, usually took the initiative, and the local assessment was on the same basis as the regular taxes—heavier on the richer element, the poorer peasants being exempted. The purposes served by this local taxation perhaps justified the extra burden which it represented. The abuses that developed in the assessing of this alleged self-taxation led to the abandonment of it, and to the setting aside of fixed percentages of the general taxes for local improvements, particularly in the field of cultural services.

The floating of internal state loans was initiated during the *Nep*, although this practice did not assume large proportions until the period of the Five-Year Plans. Theoretically voluntary, the subscription to these loans was so organized as to make them practically obligatory, especially on office workers, but also on workmen, although somewhat less so on peasants. The *Nepmen* found it expedient to subscribe generously. These loans were at first interest-bearing; later they became also lottery-loans, and this second type has become the more usual. Then it was decided that the individual should not be allowed to sell his state bonds except when illness or accident made it necessary for him to realize on them, this fact to be determined by a state commission. For the loans represented the mobilization of the people's savings, to put through the "Five-Year Plan in Four Years," as one of the first large issues was called. Thus the state loans have come to represent for the subscribers another form of tax, especially as subscription to these loans was usually effected by a monthly deduction from salary or wages by the management of the institution or enterprise where one was employed.

All previous issues of state loans have been recently re-funded and on the interest-bearing bonds the rate has been reduced. Also greater freedom has been given to realize on the bonds to meet a personal emergency. The total amount of the internal loans outstanding at the end of 1936 was about twenty billion rubles. The comparatively small amount of public debt, as compared with the national budget which will be examined in a later paragraph, shows that the enormous economic expansion and the services developed have been already paid for. The state loans are held by over 50,000,000 individuals, we are told, and large individual holdings are exceptional.

## 2. *The State Budget.*

With the resumption of the socialist offensive it became necessary to mobilize all resources for the carrying out of the plans for economic expansion. The gradual extension of the principle of planned economy rested on the more extensive control of national income. The ordinary budget was at first supplemented by a "financial plan," which included items not found in the budget. Later these items were brought into the budget, with the progress of socialization and extension of the scope of public finance.

The budgets came to cover an increasingly larger percentage of the national income, until for 1937 the budget on the revenue side has been set at ninety-eight billion rubles as compared with eight billion in 1928-29, thirty-one in 1932, thirty-five in 1933, forty-eight in 1934, sixty-seven in 1935 and eighty-three in 1936, in round numbers. (See *Monthly Review*, February, 1937, cited in Bibliographical Note.)

Revenue from the state's share in the profits of state enterprises totals only six billion rubles. State loans have averaged four billion rubles a year during the last years. Revenue from custom duties constitute a very small percentage of the total, for under the state monopoly of foreign trade its enterprises are the main importers.

For 1937 revenue from taxation will come from the following forms of taxation. The single agricultural tax is still levied on the peasant households, even on those that have joined the collectives, although the rate for the latter is

lower than for those who have remained as individual enterprises. It is a small item assessed on each peasant household individually. But the obligatory sale to the state, at fixed prices, of assigned quotas of all agricultural products is officially likened to a tax. This tax has recently been made a tax on gross income from agricultural products. The quotas are estimated before the beginning of the agricultural season. The peasants cannot sell their surplus on the collective-farm bazaars, or to state or co-operative purchasing agencies, until the state quotas have been fully met for the entire region. Nor can there be the distribution of produce among the members of the collective farm, on the basis of the labor-days they have put in on the fields or other agricultural activity of the group, until the assigned quota has been met. The collective farm or the individual peasant household is paid for this state quota, but at prices very much below those prevailing on the collective-farm bazaars, or even below those paid when state or co-operative authorities purchase. The difference between the prices paid by the state to the peasants and those charged by the state in its own stores, or fixed by the state for the co-operative stores, is one of the important sources of public revenue.

The present system of taxation provides for a general tax on all wage-earners for cultural services. It is a sharply progressive income tax, and the exempted wage is low, being below the estimated average wage for all wage-earners. The extension of a tax on income to the lowest brackets aimed to make all feel that they were contributing to the "new building." The comparatively small amount of the total revenue produced by this tax suggests that this political consideration was the dominant one. The progressive character of the tax also reduced somewhat the spread between the higher and lower brackets which developed with the extension of the piece-work wage and of higher salaries for responsible managers or highly qualified technical experts. This tax is generally deducted from the wage or salary by the management of the place of employment.

But the main source of public revenue in the Soviet budget is the tax on the turnover of a producing, processing or distributing enterprise—for 1937 it is estimated at seventy-

six billion, of the total revenue already noted of ninety-eight billion rubles. The tax is assessed at a percentage of the estimated cost of the particular article. It may vary according to whether the purchaser is a state enterprise, a collective farm, a co-operative or an individual consumer. The tax is reckoned into the price charged by the producing enterprise. The rates are constantly being adjusted, just as prices are being changed, and one should add on the whole lowered. The rates are particularly high, often almost equal to the costs of production, for many articles of general mass consumption, such as kerosene, sugar or cigarettes. With the prevailing shortages of consumers' goods of the last years, this tax as reflected in the high prices operated to control distribution and give to those earning the higher wages and salaries the opportunity to utilize these effectively.

The very complicated and shifting methods of taxation of the Soviet system have been presented here only in their main features. At first used to destroy, the power to tax is now utilized to mobilize as large a percentage of the national income as possible for the economic expansion program of the five-year plans.

### 3. *Public expenditure.*

Under planned economy the expenditure of the national income, and of savings, is controlled to a very considerable percentage of the total by the state. Public expenditures therefore have a special significance in the Soviet system. As already noted in the preceding section the state fixes prices: it determines how much of the national income is to be used to satisfy everyday consumers' needs. It controls practically all capital investment from private savings as well as from "socialist accumulation." It determines a large percentage of the expenditures in the educational and general cultural fields. Insurance is a public service.

In negotiating the collective agreements for the wage scales, the labor-union authorities are expected to keep in mind the general economic development of the country, or of a whole field of industry, and not of a particular production unit or craft. Minimum wages are finally determined by legislation, with provision for higher wage scales in in-

dustries or fields of activity which are considered as "leading" in importance at any particular moment in the progress of the reconstruction of the national economy. But the decision is arrived at also with a view to the increase of "socialist accumulation." For the wage bill of the country in final analysis is a public expenditure under the Soviet economic system.

Thus the question of public expenditure must be related to the broad economic social and cultural functions of the state as well as to the protective functions. The social-economic functions will be examined in the following chapter. Here certain general aspects may be presented, of the budgetary distribution of that very large part of the national income which is controlled directly by the state. These aspects are the aims of the five-year plans, and can be more specifically defined because of the element of deliberate planning.

The question of the priority of the fundamental aims of the Soviet plans is a moot one. The industrialization of the country, including the mechanization of agriculture, aimed to give the new socialist economy the technological base necessary to make it more independent of the outside, non-Soviet industrialized West, increase its ability to defend itself against attack, and develop the natural resources and increase production to the end of raising the standards of living of the masses.

The raising of the cultural standards—literacy, political consciousness and a sense of social responsibility—was considered an essential element of the living standards, and also necessary for the proper handling of the new machines and the technique of collectivist organization. Then expenditures on preparedness for defense became considerably larger than originally planned. The fear of imminent attack, because of announced programs of expansion of neighbors both to the east and west, was responsible for the increase of expenditure on armaments, as it was for the emphasis on the development of heavy industry at the sacrifice of light industry. The result was a decline of living standards during the first Five-Year Plan. The second Plan, while continuing to increase the expenditures on armaments and the further development

of heavy industry, has been able to make more provision for the expansion of light industry and the production of consumers' goods. There has come, in the last years, a marked increase in the supply of foodstuffs and manufactured articles of mass consumption, with a resulting raising of standards of living. As noted in other contexts, the degree of this improvement in the terms of everyday living—in the supply of food, clothing and living quarters, of better quality and at lower prices—depends on the prices and wages as determined by the state, these being within the systems of taxation and of public expenditure.

The interaction of economic, military and political considerations in the determination of public expenditure is illustrated in an outstanding feature of the second Five-Year Plan. The proportion of the total capital investment allocated to the Asiatic portions of the Union was increased as compared with the first Plan. The rich natural resources of these regions were thus to be reached and developed. At the same time the economically and culturally backward agricultural peoples of these regions were to be brought under the proletarian political and social influence. Also the national minorities which constitute the majority of the population in the regions were to be made to feel that they had a full share of the economic and cultural development of the Union as a whole. But the preparations for defense of the Asiatic portion of the Union, its maritime province on the Pacific and the artery of communication to it, were furthered by the preferential allocation of public expenditures to the various units of the Union to the east of the Ural Mountains.

The Soviet leaders point to the small percentage of the total budget expenditures on armaments, as compared with similar expenditures of other countries. There is also emphasis on the large expenditures for education and other cultural fields. The relation of the budget to national income under the Soviet system must be kept in mind in determining the distribution by fields of public expenditure. Also the public expenditures cover practically the entire expenditure in cultural fields and the unified budget of the Union, to which the discussion refers, includes local public expenditure. The comparatively small expenditure for pub-



lic administration is also pointed to as an illustration of the minimum of non-productive public expenditure which the Soviet system makes possible, by the development of mass participation in administration as a matter of civic interest as well as duty. But what are in fact expenditures for public administration are included in the items of expenditures indicated for the various fields of state economic enterprise.

Public expenditure in the form of direct subsidies for operating costs to new and important industries is a basic feature of the Soviet Plans. With the progress of industrialization under these Plans the practice of subsidies is to be dropped, and in fact is already being dropped, as particular economic enterprises become "profitable," and contribute to the "socialist accumulation" where before they had to be carried by it.

The expenditure side of the unified state budget as estimated for 1937 falls into ten main items. The expenditures on the "National Economy" total a little under forty billion rubles. "Social and Cultural Measures" absorb over twenty-six billion; Defense—twenty billion; Commissariat of Interior—two and one-half billion; "Administration Expenditure"—one and one-half billion. There is a large item of over two and one-half billion covering interest and lottery payments on the state loans, and of one and one-third billion of accounts with long-term credit banks. The other two items of less than one hundred and fifty, and five hundred and forty million each are for the Commissariat of Justice and "Other Expenditures" respectively. (See *Monthly Review*, February, 1937, noted in Bibliographical Note.)

It is a criminal offense to violate "financial discipline" and more specifically "budget discipline"; this applies mainly to the responsible manager of the state or collective enterprise, but may apply also to the individual. The voluntary workers for the Commissariat of Finance and its local representatives number hundreds of thousands; this group is one of the largest of the category called "the active element," which has been described in the discussion of mass participation and control. It is the function of this "active" group to "signal" instances of violation of "budget discipline."

#### 4. *The "Police."*

The emphasis on policing and the wide activity of a secret political police under Tsarism led to the abolition of the old police force already in the Revolution of February, 1917. The very word "police" was dropped and in its place the word "militia" was adopted. With the advent of the October Revolution the new name was amplified, to "Workman-Peasant Militia" and this institution came to exercise the ordinary functions of a general police force. In the conditions of the civil struggle that developed this "police" force was armed and organized to resemble military units.

As the internal struggle developed it became necessary to establish a special political police, to deal with counter-revolutionary activities, and then with the sabotage of the opposition. When trade was nationalized all private trade became "speculation," and its illegal continuance, in disruption of the economic and political programs of the Revolution, came to be considered, like sabotage, "counter-revolutionary." On these bases were established the Extraordinary Commissions to Combat Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation—in the abbreviation soon adopted, the *Cheka*. The *Cheka* became the "unsheathed punishing sword of the Revolution," with the powers to try and execute on its own authority. With the conclusion of the active civil war the *Cheka* was renamed the State Political Administration—in abbreviation the *OGPU*. The powers of the new institution were somewhat limited as compared with its predecessor, but it also was an extraordinary authority, dealing primarily with political offenses. With the resumption of the socialist offensive and the accompanying sharpening of the class struggle, the concept of political offenses was greatly broadened and the activities and powers of the *OGPU* were correspondingly increased in actual practice. It was only after the completion of the framework of the new order, in 1934, that the *OGPU* as a separate institution was abolished, being merged with the newly established Commissariat of Home Affairs, in which there was a special "Department for State Protection"—the new name for the special political police. A military collegium of the Supreme Court of the Union took over the jurisdiction of political cases, with provision for secret trial

and the application of what is called the "supreme measure of social defense," namely capital punishment.

The guarding of the railways and of the frontier railway stations, which was one of the functions of the *OGPU*, came under the jurisdiction of one of the sections of the Commissariat of Home Affairs. Another section took over the administration of the concentration camps used chiefly for political offenders, organizing the economic activity of the prisoners, as did the *OGPU*. The chief fields to which this forced labor has been applied have been the lumber camps, the new construction jobs, the fisheries in the north and the building of canals, military roads and railways. Political offenders, such as engineers found guilty of sabotage or the rich peasants arrested in the process of their liquidation, have been reinstated to civil rights after loyal work in these labor or construction camps. The guarding of the new industrial plants, which was a function of the *OGPU* during the period of construction, now comes within the jurisdiction of the single policing authority.

The ordinary police, called the "militia," is recruited to a considerable extent from those who have passed through the Red Army. The political training received as part of their military training and systematically continued in the training for their "militia" work has given to these enforcers of the law a cultured manner which is in sharp contrast with the "policeman" or *gendarme* of the old régime.

It was inevitable that the kind of policing that developed in a revolutionary struggle became arbitrary in character, particularly with respect to the hostile elements, whose gradual liquidation was part of the policy of the new order. The absorption of the special political police by the general government department for law enforcement came only when the victory of the Revolution was believed to be absolutely definite. But special military sections of the Supreme Court have continued to handle political cases involving terroristic activity or treason, under a law enacted in December, 1934, after the assassination of Kirov. This was the first act of violence against a high responsible leader for many years, and a summary form of trial was immediately introduced in response to this revival of terrorism.

The political police has been one of the most efficient of the Soviet institutions. It continues, in its reduced form, to be regarded with a healthy dread by the remnants of the old "hostile" classes, even where these have been working loyally for the new order. The intention is that it should be so regarded. It seemed that the Revolution had passed out of the period of the use of general or partial terrorism toward opponents. But in the last year there has been a revival of what the outside world has called "revolutionary terrorism," limited in the main to members of the Party and to cases of espionage and treason. The Department of State Protection has again become more active, in connection with the large number of cases in which the accusation is of terroristic plans, wrecking and treason. The former head of the Commissariat, Yagoda, was dismissed for "criminal activities" not yet defined. His successor had been one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party, in charge of the 1933-34 cleansing of its ranks. This appointment of a man who had worked immediately under Stalin brought to the fore a new figure in the Soviet leadership—Yezhov.

The distinctive feature of both the ordinary and the special political police forces has been the close resemblance of their organization and equipment to those of the armed forces for external defense. The exact size of the former OGPU units, presumably still maintained, which are armed forces similar to the units of the Red Army, is not made public, nor does one know if they are included in the figures given of the size of the regular, standing Red Army. Recently the responsible heads of the Commissariat of Home Affairs and their immediate subordinates were given semi-military titles. This was done immediately after the re-introduction of titles for ranks in the Red Army.

##### 5. *The Red Army.*

The gradual self-demobilization of the Russian army which came during the summer of 1917, was the result of war-weariness, the reports of distributions of land which reached the peasant soldiers at the front and in the training camps, and also of the anti-war agitation of the Bolsheviks. The enormous number of men under colors still untrained

gave to this process of self-demobilization a mass character. Often the peasant or workman soldier kept his rifle when he started home. The gradual breaking up of the army was in line with the Marxian doctrine of "disarming the bourgeoisie."

The complement of this doctrine was the "arming of the proletariat," and this took place during the summer months of 1917 on a large scale. Taking advantage of the confusion of the period of the February Revolution, the workmen appropriated large supplies of arms. Garrison regiments in the larger cities, organized by the Soviets, also represented the "armed people" of the Bolshevik program. Units of workman militia and then the more formal Red Guards were gradually set up, and were given practice in the constant "demonstrations," of the summer of 1917, and also in the organization of the defense of Petrograd during the conflict between the provisional government and the army authorities at the front—the Kerensky-Kornilov conflict of August, 1917.

The first months of the October Revolution brought the completion of the process of dissolution of the old army, and the growth of the Red Guards. The signing of an armistice and the peace negotiations with the Central Powers made it possible for the new Soviet authority at first to accept with equanimity the practical disappearance of adequate means of defense. When Germany gave notice of the termination of the armistice and made preparations to advance on Petrograd, to force the acceptance of the severe terms of peace on which she insisted, the Bolsheviks took steps to organize the defense of the Revolution. With the establishment of the Soviet régime, of the Toilers' State, with its provisional government of workmen and peasants, a war of defense became for the Bolsheviks a "just" war. The Red Army was instituted, at first on the basis of voluntary enlistment and then, very shortly, on the principle of compulsory service. Trotsky took over the Commissariat of War, having given up his first post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

In the course of the next years of civil war the Red Army increased in size; by 1920 it probably numbered five million. In addition the Red Guards, the Workman-Peasant Militia and the armed units of the *Cheka* contributed to the defense

of the Revolution on the many fronts of the civil war and against opposition behind the lines of fighting. Partisan bands of peasants led by workmen and communists constituted an important element of the armed fighting forces of the Revolution.

With the adoption of the principle of universal military service for the Red Army only workmen and peasants were admitted to the combat units, those of other classes being assigned to subsidiary services where they would not carry arms. But the trained officers of the old army, who had not wished or found it possible to leave the Soviet controlled areas and join the various White Armies, were mobilized and their technical services requisitioned, as it were, under the control of political commissars. In many instances the families of the mobilized officers were put under special detention as hostages. When the conflict with Poland led to the invasion of the Ukraine by the latter, many former officers could serve on the basis of contributing to the national defense.

With the conclusion of the civil war and withdrawal of the forces of foreign intervention, the standing Red Army was gradually reduced to five hundred and sixty-two thousand. Territorial units were organized for those who were not taken for the regular two-year period of training. In these territorial units there was military training for short periods during five years, at or near the place of work. These territorial units represented the ideal of the new order—an armed people receiving military training without being withdrawn from production. The territorial units also allowed for the application of the Soviet nationality policy to this field; in a national republic the territorial units reflected the cultural peculiarities of the workmen and peasants of the unit, and the local national languages were used in these territorial contingents. At the same time the single Red Army established unity in the matter of defense, which was one of the fundamental aims proclaimed as the basis for the forming of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. In the last years several important changes have taken place in the structure of the Soviet armed forces. In the face of the international tension it has been increased, in 1935 to 940,000 and then in 1936 to 1,300,000. This increase was secured

by bringing a larger percentage of the yearly contingent into the regular training, thus reducing the percentage left in the territorial "militia" units. The age at which the young man begins his military service was reduced, and preliminary training for service has been extended in time and scope.

Further, with the progress in the "liquidation of classes," in the recruitment to the Red Army there is no longer the exclusion of "hostile" elements. The number of young men actually refused on political and social grounds was rapidly becoming smaller and smaller. Sons of former bourgeois elements were no longer disqualified if they had become self-supporting. The young men formerly excluded often protested against the exclusion because it entailed also the loss of civic rights. The abolition of the former discriminations is of considerable political significance. In 1936 the Cossacks were readmitted into regular military service, and in their old traditional uniforms. Used extensively by Tsarism for internal policing the special Cossack units had been abolished. The Cossack peasants had resented collectivization of agriculture with particular vigor. Much was made of the winning over of the Cossacks to the new order.

From the very beginning those serving in the Red Army have been given special privileges in the matter of food rations and consumers' goods. With the termination of the shortages this privilege will be of less and less significance. Also cultural services in the form of clubs and theatres have been of the best for the Red Armyists. And the program of training has given much attention to political and vocational training in preparation for the return to work after the period of service. The retraining of the peasant youth in the proletarian atmosphere of the barracks or camp was one of the main aims of the "political studies" in the Red Army.

The Party leadership through its own members and through those of its youth organization, the Communist Union of Youth (*Komsomol*), has been organized with particular care in the Red Army. The two years of service often prove to be the apprenticeship for Party membership. The percentage of members of the Party and *Komsomol* is higher in the army than in any other single mass institution or

organization. As in all Soviet institutions the percentage of Party members is larger in the higher positions, that is in the commanding staff. Admission to the military academies for the training of the permanent commanding staff has been in general limited to workmen and peasants, and to Party members.

The Party organizations within the Red Army are co-ordinated by a special department of the Commissariat of Defense, and through this department in turn co-ordinated with the Party authorities. This special form of Party organization was necessary because of the requirements of army discipline. This differentiation of the Red Army party organs does not, however, weaken the "ruling position" of the Party also with respect to the Red Army. The Commissar of Defense is one of the eleven members of the Political Bureau of the Party.

Apparently it was felt by the political leadership that the provision made for control of the Red Army was not adequate. Accordingly the former "single authority" in an army unit was replaced by a commission of three, one of whom suggests the political commissar of the period of the civil war. The subsequent trial and execution of eight of the highest command of the Red Army, on charges of treason, shed light on this new policy. The import of the alleged treasonable activities of Red Army "generals" will be discussed in the concluding chapter. The re-establishment of the collegiate authority in the Red Army is an expression of the more forceful politicizing of Soviet institutions. At the Soviet Congress, which adopted the new Union constitution, a large number of army deputies made speeches, and were always given special ovations.

The Soviet citizen serving in the Red Army does not lose his political rights during the period of service; the army units are represented in the Soviets on an equality with the industrial and other workers. The Soviets, it will be recalled, were originally set up in 1917 as organs of the soldiers as well as of the workmen, and remained Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies until renamed "Soviets of Toilers' Deputies" under the new constitutions. Thus the principle of mass participation in public affairs is made to in-



clude those in the armed forces even during the period of active military service.

The institution of so-called "patronage" (*Chefstvo*) is extended also to the Red Army and aims to keep those in military service in the everyday life of the community, in the politics of the Revolution and its program of economic reconstruction. Factories "adopt" regiments, and by becoming their patrons establish organizational and individual contacts between workers and Red Armyists. Cultural institutions similarly established relations with regiments, through educational or recreational activities; amateur dramatics have been a useful channel for this interchange of influence, which represents part of the political and cultural training of the contingents of young workmen and peasants during their military service.

A close contact between the Communist Union of Youth and the Red Army is promoted by active recruitment to the youth organization among Red Armyists. Part of the organized activities of the Communist Union of Youth consists of military study and physical training in preparation for the formal military service. The *Komsomol* as an organization has assumed the "patronage" for the organized naval forces. In turn, the Red Army authorities advise and assist the voluntary organizations of young amateur sharpshooters—named after the Commissar of Defense, Voroshilov—and parachute jumpers, and of the obligatory studies in military subjects in all higher educational institutions.

The emphasis on military training will not constitute militarism, we are told, because of the Party leadership in the Red Army, the inclusion of the armed forces in the political and economic activities of the community, and also the participation of the community itself in the life and training of the formal armed forces. At the end of 1935 it was decided to re-establish formal ranks in the Soviet armed forces. Five marshals were appointed, and the ranks of commanders and other officers were introduced. The former title of "general" was not included in the new hierarchy of military rank, because of the political connotation attached to the word before and as part of the Revolution—the old régime was always designated as one of "landlords, capitalists and

generals." The re-introduction of specific ranks with corresponding titles was explained as the development of a trained military profession from the workmen and peasant classes, whose achievement in technical training should be recognized as in other fields of activity, of education, engineering and art, for example.

The claim that the military machine, and the military training to which so much attention is given, are for purposes of defense, and not for aggressive territorial expansion, or to give material backing to a spread of the principles of the Revolution, will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE PUBLIC SERVICES

(*Continued*)

The preceding chapter emphasized the public services whose functions are primarily protective; this continuation aims to cover those which have social-economic functions. This differentiation—not applicable to the integrated Soviet system—has not been closely observed, however; the subject of the administration of justice—primarily a protective service—has been brought into this second chapter, which will examine the services which belong more definitely in the category of services with social functions; and of these latter the “socialized wage” of the Soviet system will be given particular stress.

It is to be noted that practically all Soviet political institutions or organizations have economic and social functions, covering the fields of economic development, communications, education and cultural life, and also health and general welfare. Organizations essentially economic in character, such as labor unions or co-operative units, perform in an organized way most important cultural and educational work, and are key institutions in public health and welfare services. Cultural institutions are all in a sense public institutions—theatres, movies and radio, as well as schools and clubs. When the drive for the reconstruction of economic life was at its height, in the period of the first Five-Year Plan, all these institutions had to “give attention to production” and contribute to the “enthusiasm of building.” The subordination of cultural activity to the economic plans has become less rigid with the marked easing up of the driving pressure. But state control and Party leadership give to the activities of all these cultural institutions the character of public services. In this way they can be made to fit in with the policies adopted and

perform a political as well as a general cultural function. The importance of cultural progress for the furtherance of the economic programs of production is a matter of constant emphasis. The increase in the mass political activity of the last year, which is claimed by the Soviet leaders, is to be utilized in all cultural institutions.

In the Soviets the "sections" cover the various aspects of community economy, public education, public health and recreation. In the rural districts the Soviet's chief concern and activity are centered on the new collective farms, and the *kolkhoz* provides for the social and cultural as well as the economic life of the group, this fact being one of the forces behind the movement for collectivization which promised an increase in cultural and social services in the backward rural communities. The labor unions have always had important educational and general cultural functions, and now for the last few years administer the social insurance funds. They also participate in the determination of the wage scales—which is essentially a political function under the Soviet system. It is on the basis of this inclusive activity that the labor unions are designated as "schools of communism." The transfer of the administration of the social insurance funds is considered one of the steps in line with the gradual realization of the principle of social administration.

The dominance of authority in all fields—with corresponding extension of the concept and practices of state functions, and therefore of public services—rests on several principles. The new forms of social-economic relationship must be enforced. Loyalty to these forms will be developed by the fact that only from them can the public services be received. One may again note the Soviet technique of "combining compulsive and educative measures." Soviet leaders in discussing this formula of theirs point out that the educative element is gradually to prevail over the compulsive, and that in practice this is already occurring. Adaptation to these new forms is to be promoted also by education. The necessary element of compulsion is supplied by the exercise of monopoly in the social services, while this compulsion is made more palatable by explanation. The "socialized wage" of workers may amount to as much as a third of what the wage-earner draws

in cash. Thus there is for the individual the element of self-interest in his contribution, through participation, to the more effective organization of these services.

*1. Administration of Justice.*

From the beginning the administration of justice was organized as part of the proletarian struggle for the principles of the Revolution. Revolutionary expediency often determined court decisions, and it was the deliberate policy not to establish or adhere to formal precedents, even of the revolutionary tribunals. The extraordinary tribunals of the *Cheka* represented the extreme of summary methods, operating behind closed doors with no public records of the proceedings. The People's Courts of the first years also functioned as instruments of the Revolution. Property rights were being destroyed, for "expropriation" was the basis of War Communism. The decrees and laws of this period, often propagandist in character to outline the kind of social order the Revolution aimed to introduce, were also minutely regulatory and restrictive. As it later became clear it was impossible to observe all the regulations and live; productive work also proved impossible.

But despite the difficulty of organizing normal administration of justice on the principle of legality in the first years, a feature emphasized in the structure and functioning of the Soviet courts of law could be realized, namely, the provision for a large measure of mass participation in the everyday work of the law courts. In the first People's Courts this practice was often carried to the point where the trial became a political meeting, the accused being the subject of propaganda and agitation. A very informal procedure in the lower courts was adopted in order to allow for this "mass participation."

The administration of justice could be systematized when the Revolution, politically victorious, entered its second period of the New Economic Policy. The new policies with respect to individual property and private trade required a codification of the laws, both the substantive law and the laws of procedure. Civil and criminal codes, codes of civil and criminal procedure, a labor code, and a code on family law,

were drawn up and the law courts were reorganized to adjudicate under the new legal norms.

The magistracy of the Soviet law courts was appointive, from lists prepared by the local Soviet in the lower instances, and by the Commissariat of Justice or the Central Executive Committee for the higher instances. In the lower People's Courts the permanent, professional magistrate has had associated with him, with equal rights, two "public assessors" or "people's associate judges." These have been selected from lists prepared by the local Soviet and serve for periods of a week or ten days. These "associates" represent the participation of the public in the administration of justice, corresponding in some respects to the jury of western systems. Similarly the state prosecuting authorities may be and often are assisted by "social prosecutors," representing for example a labor union or the public in general, who come forward on their own initiative. This institution of "social prosecutors" makes for the less formal procedure which characterizes the lower Soviet courts, and represents another channel of "mass participation" in public affairs.

The judge and his assessors not only are allowed but are positively enjoined to take an active part in the bringing forward of evidence, by questioning the accused or the plaintiff and any witnesses. They are expected to intervene actively in the interest of the proletarian state and also of the side which appears to be the weaker. It was the policy at first to take into account the class status of a defendant so that the workmen and peasants would be given special consideration because of the pre-revolutionary conditions of "exploitation" to which they had been subjected. Later this policy was abandoned as the new order established itself.

But as the class struggle is considered as still going on, the justice applied by the Soviet courts is based on the class principle. With the formal abolition of the OGPU more cases involving political considerations come before the regular courts, and in respect of these the question of the class to which the accused belonged is of moment. The gradual abolition of the class distinctions will presumably lead to the complete elimination of the hitherto class character of Soviet justice. The law of August, 1932, declaring all state

and socialized property, including that of co-operative societies and collective farms, "sacred and inviolable" and imposing severe penalties, including capital punishment, for theft of such property, brought a new type of case before the Soviet courts. The verdicts in such cases were often ruthlessly severe, and represented the two principles, of the predominance of the interests of the proletarian state and the suppression of all "hostile economic forces" or "class enemies."

The administration of justice in cases where the authorities see the element of political opposition, whether by frankly counter-revolutionary political action or by sabotage of the plans or deliberate violation of "production discipline," is always political rather than judicial according to western standards of legal procedure. This fact follows from the revolutionary character which still pertains to the Soviet system, as the instrument of a progressing revolution. "Revolutionary legality" is, however, gradually evolving, and the extensive supervisory rôle of the prosecuting authorities over the administration of justice has been developed to enforce the concept of legality and systematize the practices of the law courts. For the norms of the present laws are expected to become the habits of the people, under the Marxian theory of the gradual development of a co-operative commonwealth, and an impartial and intelligent enforcement of them is necessary if this development is to come.

Arbitration plays a very important part in the Soviet system, supplementing the regular courts of law. Wage disputes under the collective agreements are handled by boards of arbitration on which the labor unions are represented. Disputes over living quarters, which are very frequent because of the extreme congestion in all cities, are often settled by arbitration, although such cases represent a considerable percentage of the cases on the dockets of the People's Courts.

State Arbitration Boards, set up several years ago, take jurisdiction of cases of dispute between state economic enterprises, over contracts for goods or services. The State Arbitration Boards have come to be one of the most important organs of law enforcement. Through their application of statutes and contracts the provisions of "Soviet economic law" as it is termed, are being clarified. The procedure

developed is that of a law court. Control of particular state property is often the subject of dispute brought before these State Arbitration Boards. The decisions of these boards are based in final analysis on the more effective carrying out of the national economic plans.

A Supreme Court for the whole Union, appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the Union, has jurisdiction in the whole Union, with the power to review through revision the decisions of the supreme courts of the individual republics. It has original jurisdiction over disputes between republics. Also it exercises criminal jurisdiction for important political cases. The plenum of eighteen includes the presidents of the supreme courts of the constituent republics of the Union. It issues explanations and interpretations of the law and of legislation, and has certain powers of review over acts and decrees of the constituent republics.

An important innovation of the new Union constitution of 1936 is the provision for the popular election by secret ballot of the magistracy of the lower People's Courts, for terms of three years. The intermediary regional and district courts are to be elected, as has been the practice, by the corresponding Soviets of Toilers' Deputies for five-year terms. The supreme courts, of Union and republics, are to be elected by the Supreme Soviets, of Union and republics, also for a tenure of five years.

The Procuror—or Prosecutor—of the Union is an appointive office, the appointment being by the Supreme Soviet of the Union, for a term of seven years. He has jurisdiction throughout the whole Union, and appoints the procurors of independent and autonomous republics for terms of five years. The local district and urban prosecutors are appointed by those of the republics, but with the approval of the Procuror of the Union. It is emphasized that all the members of these highly centralized prosecuting organs function independently of all local organs of authority, being responsible only to the Union Procuror. In the interest of the enforcement of the law this extreme centralization of authority was recently adopted and is given formal sanction in the new Union constitution. An All-Union Commissariat of Justice was also instituted for the same purpose, in 1936.



Some of the Bolshevik theorists of the earlier periods of the Revolution expressed the view that the enforcement of the norms of the new order would become an integral part of the new attitudes developed. The rôle of law was therefore minimized by them. This view has been recently declared "anti-Leninist"; some of the recently denounced "enemies of the people" were these political and legal theorists, and they were accused of deliberate "wrecking" activity. Mass participation in the field of the enforcement of the law is expected to strengthen the authority of law. This participation has taken on at times forms which raise doubts in the minds of the outside students, as for example, the reporting of young people on their parents. The "active element" organized by the prosecuting and judicial authorities is one of the largest groups of the category of volunteers in social work, estimated at three million including the "public assessors."

The Procuror organizes his "groups of aid" presumably in all institutions; he instructs them and keeps in touch with them. He can be successful, it is emphasized, only if he has such a body of "activists" on whom to rely. He must protect them against persecution, direct or indirect. These groups meet regularly and have their "brigade leaders." They "signal" cases to the Procuror and a recent official survey found that only 10 per cent of the "signals" proved to be false ones.

Soviet punitive law has in instances become of late more rigorous. The law on treason of June, 1934 is an example in point. Other examples are to be found in the Report of the Commissar of Justice on the changes introduced in the Soviet codes, given in the *Source Book*. When the new codes are issued it will be possible to determine more precisely what is to be the tendency under the new constitutions and in the light of the purges that are going on as this is being written.

A recent article in the official organ of the Procuror—*Socialist Legality*—noted the tasks of this organ of Soviet law enforcement. The ruthless suppression of enemies was indicated as still among the first of its functions. It must protect state property and also the personal property of individuals as defined in the new constitution. The protec-

tion of the other rights—to work, leisure, education and social security—was also emphasized as one of the tasks of law enforcement. But in addition it was pointed out that the Soviet enforcement of law must aim to develop the new self-discipline and also participate in the "struggle against bureaucracy."

Legal advice has been socialized. Those qualified to represent individuals in the Soviet courts are organized as collectives, and the tariff of fees for their service is fixed, on the basis of the character of the matter in dispute and of the time the handling of the case requires. Also many cultural and economic institutions furnish free legal advice to their members or employees. The larger institutions have their own consulting jurists who fulfill the obligation of social service which all citizens, especially the qualified technicians, are expected to do apart from their regular work, by holding consultation hours for fellow workers about their individual problems. The members of the "collectives of lawyers" also meet their quotas of "social service" by giving a certain number of hours per week in smaller institutions, or in clubs. It is the universality of this service that gives it significance in the Soviet system. The new and authoritative forms of relationships established by the Revolution have made necessary this provision for assistance in understanding them.

## 2. *The "Socialized" Wage.*

The organization and the content of the economic-social functions of Soviet public services can be best examined, as suggested in the introduction to this chapter, under the heading of what is called the "socialized" wage of the Soviet wage-earner. The members of co-operative units, under the statutes of the latter, enjoy services which have a somewhat similar character. The guaranties of the new constitutions apply to the member of the *kolkhoz* as well as to the wage-earner, in the protection of the right to work, leisure, education and social security or maintenance.

Any production unit—whether it be a factory or a collective farm—is expected to contribute to the cultural and social life of its workers. The collective agreements with

labor unions under a general law fix the amount to be spent by an industrial enterprise—a percentage of the total wage fund—for social and cultural institutions attached to the enterprise. Also fixed percentages of the “profit,” over and above the Plan, of an industrial enterprise, must go to cultural services for its workers, and to the general wage fund in the form of bonus payment for excellence of work or management. The collective farm statute provides that a percentage of its net profits be spent on cultural and social services. Certain percentages of certain taxes are ear-marked for local cultural expenditures, including formal educational institutions. Thus the lower units of the Soviet economic institutions and co-operatives as well as governmental authorities, as a matter of regulation and not simply of policy, organize a large variety of public services for their workers. Other institutions of administration or education, for example, or the industrial co-operatives present much the same features as the two types selected as examples. It is said that the Soviet citizen lives to a considerable degree in and through his place of work—his “collective.” This is one aspect of the Soviet principle that the interests of individual and group must and can be harmonized.

Social insurance provides a pension when the age of retirement is reached or in case of complete disability, and the costs of illness or accident. There are special payments to mothers before and after childbirth, and allowances for the child during the first months. Unemployment doles were part of the system of social insurance up to 1928, but have been dropped; the economic expansion of the five-year plans would seem in fact to have abolished unemployment. The absence of unemployment is registered in the new constitution by the guaranty of work which it gives.

Sanitaria and rest homes, often utilizing the former imperial palaces or estates of landlords and merchants, supply to a constantly increasing number the places to spend the weeks of leisure guaranteed to all wage-earners. The special rates charged represent rewards for good records of work. In the distribution of these rewards the element of special privilege or favoritism has not always been absent. These sanatoria in many instances represent a special service to in-

dividuals which is not in conformity with the principle of a general public service. Such instances would seem to be rare, however.

The organization of public dining rooms, in factories or institutions, has progressed at a rapid rate. During the period of rationing (1929-1935) this service was of very considerable value; it meant economy, as well as the assurance of the main meal of the day. In 1934 there were over fifty-five thousand units feeding over fifteen million in the urban centers and over two million in the villages. It is not entirely clear whether there will be a further development of this "service," with the improvement in housing conditions and food supply.

Recreation is largely a public service. The inadequate facilities for recreation in the old Russia accounts for the public character of the provision for such. But it was also a matter of principle that the leisure time should be organized. A productive utilization of the hours of leisure was one of the manifestations of the constant purposefulness of life in the atmosphere and struggle of revolution. The "parks of culture and rest," now found in all large cities and in most of the smaller ones, represent in their very name this idea. Facilities for sports are becoming integral parts of community life; the emphasis on physical culture is in part the result of limited and restricted attention to it in the old Russia. Many of the labor-union clubs serve primarily their physical-culture groups.

### *3. Public Health.*

Public health has been given particular attention because of the backward conditions inherited from the old Russia. Public medical services had made considerable progress before the Revolution, even in the rural districts under the local provincial councils (*Zemstvo*). But this work had started only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and had been restricted by economic conditions, and also by police regulations based on the bureaucratic suspicion of public or social initiative. Under the Soviet system there has been a considerable extension of state medical service as part of the policy of social insurance.

Medicine has been socialized to a very high degree, and the individual receives medical attention and treatment through his place of employment, generally through his labor-union authorities. General clinics (ambulatoria) and hospitals are public institutions, run on the basis of fixed fees, which will be paid from the social insurance funds where the individual is entitled to the service.

Public health services are still inadequate even in the large cities, and are not always immediately available. Private practice in medicine is permitted, to supply the demand for more individual treatment. Those with higher earnings, and savings from these, can resort to the doctor in private practice. The responsible leader or worker will be given, or can secure at his own expense, this special medical treatment. This is part of his "reward," of recognition of his service, and there is no concealment of the practice in the case of the highest leaders, in the scientific and the economic fields equally with the political.

#### *4. Housing Rights.*

The provision for housing facilities has many features suggestive of a public service. The large dwelling houses of the strictly urban centers of population were taken over by public authorities as part of the procedure of socialization—expropriation and nationalization. Thus the "housing rights" of the Soviet citizens are based on the concentration in the hands of the state and of co-operative units of the basic fund of dwelling facilities; the land under all dwellings is state-owned. The aim of the policy with regard to housing has been to guarantee effectively the housing rights of toilers. The guaranty consists of the fixing of rents and of provisions against eviction. Sanitary norms also were set; the shortage of housing facilities has made it impossible to attain the maximum, but the fixing of a norm has made for equalization.

There was also a systematic evacuation of the "bourgeois" in favor of the "proletarian" elements. Housing space was rationed, and the assignment of rooms was by house committees, under general regulations drawn up and enforced by the local Soviet authority. State enterprises have built dwelling quarters for their workers and employees. In the centers of

new industrial construction dwelling quarters have been part of the project. Similarly, cultural centers—clubs, communal dining rooms and movies—constitute part of the enterprise. Individuals may form co-operative associations for building or remodeling apartment houses, subject to the general statutes which provide for regulation of rent and control of distribution of space. The right of the individual to living quarters on the basis of employment is thus regulated under general laws and the specific rights of public institutions or enterprises, and in such a way as to make the supply of housing facilities a form of public service.

The shortage of available living quarters in view of the rapid increase of the urban population is one of the reasons for the regulations. The private ownership for rental of living quarters in urban centers is very restricted, for such ownership might be in fact the basis for exploitation. What amounts to private ownership of one's own living quarters, with the right to leave to one's children, is possible under the laws on personal property and inheritance. The Soviet law on "housing rights" is one of the most involved, because the shortage of living quarters, even in the newly constructed centers of population, has continued to be acute. The considerable new construction of living quarters has not kept up with the increase of the urban population.

##### *5. Public Education.*

The most effective public service of the Soviet régime has been in the field of education. In other contexts there has been reference to the importance to the Revolution of liquidating illiteracy, spreading general education, supplying technical training and giving "communist training." It is the broad reach of educational facilities that will be here summarized.

Compulsory education has at last been introduced, and the age to which it applies is being rapidly raised, particularly in the larger cities. For the academic year of 1935-36 the official figure of pupils registered in primary and secondary schools was around twenty-eight million. In the special "Workers' Faculties," technical institutes and higher educational institutions a total enrollment of over a million

and a half was claimed. Schools for adults—for illiterates and semi-literates—had ten million registrants. Pre-school facilities reached seven million. In special courses organized by "economic" commissariats—the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, particularly—some seven million received training to pass the state examinations for what is called the "technical minimum." Thus there is basis for the boast that an enormous number of Soviet citizens are "at school." The provision of the new constitution guaranteeing the right to education is more than declaratory; there are facilities for the exercise of the right. The most important development of the last years has been the extension of better educational facilities to the rural districts through the collective farms.

All education is free. Grants-in-aid, from the state or from specific institutions or organizations, are made to most of those registered in the higher general and technical institutions. The worker passing the "technical minimum" test automatically is put on a higher wage-scale under the tariffs fixed by collective agreements. If Soviet education still is lacking in many things, it has been in fact made accessible to the masses. In that respect it has become a real public service. All general educational institutions are open to all young people. The former policy of limiting the rights of education for children of the old bourgeoisie was abandoned in 1935, on the basis of the elimination of these "hostile" economic groups.

Training for administration and leadership is supplied in the Soviet-Party schools already described. The labor unions and co-operative units have developed less successfully special training facilities for their *cadres*. An Institute of the Red Professoriat, Institutes of Journalism, and Military Academies supply training for those who wish to prepare for professional work in these fields. Because of the political importance of these particular professions admission to these special institutes has been in general limited to members of the Party and the *Komsomol*.

There has been much "revolutionary" experimenting in the field of education. The "self-government" as first given even to the younger pupils went very far; it has been reduced to a reasonable form by the re-establishment of more

authority in the teachers. The re-introduction of the "director" of a school has been noted. The new organization of the schools has not swung to extreme regimentation as alleged by some critics; the new discipline is essentially constructive and allows for a considerable amount of "self-government" by the group and its integration in the community. The idea expressed by those who for a time were leaders in the field of pedagogy, that the formal school would gradually waste away, to be replaced by the community in its full co-operative functioning, has been completely dropped, and these former theorists condemned.

#### 6. *The Family.*

In its effort to extend the principle of public responsibility for all social and cultural services the revolutionary theorists at first seemed to be aiming to substitute the state for the family in a very complete way. In the field of education a state monopoly was indeed set up to separate church from education and also to eliminate private educational enterprise. The school was also to retrain the children in the principles of collectivism, as opposed to individualism, and to this end the protective and social functions of the family were deliberately reduced—its economic function was definitely attacked.

Children's homes were set up for the many orphans produced by the years of war, revolutionary struggle and famines. Also nurseries for the children of working women were widely established. In a few rural communities in which fully collectivist communes were organized, the children were brought up in children's homes serving all the families; for economic reasons most of the families put their children in the "homes" which in these rural communities were always only a few steps from the parents' homes. Under the extension of the institution of communal feeding the children in city schools received the large meal of the day at the school, a charge for this being made on the parents. But there has never been any general policy of forcing parents to turn their children over to state institutions for training as well as education.

The place occupied by the school and the day nursery in



the life of the child has been one of the outstanding instances of the extension of public service in economic and cultural functions. The promotion of public health has also been an important aim in the school work as organized, and especially in the nurseries. The Soviet leaders are justified in boasting that the pre-school facilities provided by the state constitute one of the records of achievement of the Soviet system, both in the number of children reached and in the comprehensive character of the services rendered to parents in the care and training of the children.

The responsibility thus assumed tended to weaken the rôle of the family in the training of the children. The negative aspect of such a tendency was not fully realized in the years of bold and often costly experimenting. Also the first consideration was that of reducing the economic functions of the family as part of the drive against capitalism. With the establishment of the new economic structure it has been found possible to give the family larger social responsibility. In the positive way in which the Soviet authority acts as it maneuvers to attain its aims, the rôle of the family in the present and new stage of the program was fixed by legislation. A recent law defines the responsibility of parents for children and re-establishes some of the former social functions of the family.

The fuller provisions now made for personal property rights and for the inheritance of personal property give to the family certain economic functions. This change of policy has been considered possible because of the elimination of private ownership of the means of production. The admitted incompleteness of the system of social insurance—extensive as it is—is another reason for the limited revival of the economic function of the family.

#### *7. The Church.*

An illustration of the principle that all social functions must emanate from or at least pass through the state—must be in a sense public services—is to be found in the position of the church under the Soviets. Voluntarily formed religious societies have been permitted, for the purpose of maintaining places of worship and conducting religious rites. To this

extent there has been freedom of worship. But these religious bodies are not allowed to engage in any social-service activities. This is a special restriction imposed on the religious societies as such. The workers and employees of any state institution can form a co-operative society to supply better their consumers' needs. The group brought together in a religious association cannot do this. The co-operative society of the workers in a particular institution will have to fit into the framework set up for all co-operatives in order effectively to function within the general comprehensive framework of the Soviet system. In this way it becomes part of the system as a whole, in a specific way being subject to the recognized and public authority for that part of the system into which it has to fit. The religious society will find that there is no possibility for it to fit into any part of the economic or social system. It is in fact unable to perform social functions, for the Soviet state aims to supply all social services through the institutions and organizations that constitute its new framework. Religious societies are not mentioned in the new constitutions in the enumeration of organizations which can propose candidates for Soviet elections; efforts of local church leaders to ignore this omission—which was, of course, deliberate—have revived the emphasis on the anti-religious policy of the Soviet system.

#### 8. *"Mass Participation."*

The mass participation in the administration of the public services has not always been effective. Thus the handling of the social insurance fund by the labor unions has been "bureaucratic," we are told, and the measure of mass participation expected from the transfer of this enormous fund to the "mass organization" of wage-earners has not come. The recent shake-up of the labor-union organization, in respect of central as well as of local organs, has been noted.

Many of the public services had among their aims that of breaking down the social differentiation inherited from the old régime, and were eminently successful in this respect. Then practices developed which have seemed to many outside critics to point to the promotion of social differentiation. These tendencies have been noted here in this exami-

nation of their actual functioning. Instances of abuse of the public services have been noted also by the Soviet leadership, and these have been handled, and with revolutionary rigor, in the recent purges.

## CHAPTER X

### THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

If it is incorrect to classify the Soviet Union as one of the totalitarian states, the Soviet Government is, however, at the present stage of the Revolution one of the markedly "authoritarian." There is the promise that coercion will become less as the principles of the new order become firmly enrooted in the consciousness of the Soviet citizen as well as in the social-economic environment. Also, for the non-Marxist, the question of the position of the individual under socialism has always been a basic one. Thus the subject of this chapter has particular significance in the case of what can be called "Soviet socialism."

In discussing the relation of the individual to the state in the Soviet system one can use as the basis of approach the three indices of liberty, security and compulsion. But the progressing character of the Revolution requires that the periods through which the Revolution has passed be kept in mind, and also trends of the present so far as they can be determined. More particularly, the class character of the Soviet political structure, with the basic, underlying principle of class struggle, suggests that the class differentiation must be noted in discussing the relation of the individual to the state.

The aim of the revolutionary class struggle, to abolish classes, has to date expressed itself in the denial of liberty and security to some, and in the use of compulsion, indirect if not direct, to all. With the undoubted progress toward this aim, and the establishment of the new rules of economic-social relationships, the factor of the class origin or status of the individual became of less importance, and the element of compulsion was also being reduced. The Soviet system was working toward less regimentation, greater security and cor-

respondingly a larger measure of liberty for the individual. This was the general trend in the middle of 1936, when the draft of the new constitution was published. The political trials of the year 1936-37 are interpreted by the Soviet leaders as part of the consolidation of the new order, being ruthless but necessary measures to protect the security and liberty attained and formally registered.

Soviet writers have been insisting during the last years, as their system has taken on more definite forms and developed certain practices, that it has been a libel on socialism to assert that it suppresses individuality and all property rights of the individual. ✓ They go further and claim that the opportunities for individuality in effort and creative activity are widened by their system, and that the rights of ownership—of certain kinds of property—are more effectively guaranteed. In particular they point to the fact that there is full protection of “freedom from exploitation.” Thus, we are told, the Soviet system creates conditions for “the genuine personal freedom of every toiler for the flowering of individual abilities and gifts.” Stalin recently made the statement: “There is a real freedom only when exploitation has been destroyed, where there is no oppression of some people by others, where there is no unemployment or poverty, when a man does not tremble because tomorrow he may lose work, home and bread.”

In these assertions and the facts on which they rest critics have thought to see a tendency toward the rise of a new “possessing class” which may easily become a new power group despite the limitations with respect to the private ownership of means of production. ✓ Those who have been skeptical regarding the feasibility of the Bolshevik ideas, point to these tendencies as a “drift back to capitalism,” with the rise of a group which suggests in many respects the “middle class” of a bourgeois order. The developments of the immediate future will supply more specific facts on which to answer the questions that have been raised.

#### 1. *The “collective” and the individual.*

On the position of the individual there has naturally been a shift of emphasis as the Revolution progressed. In the

first years the individual was bound to and by the primary "collective" in which he worked or through which he secured his dwelling quarters or his "books" for food and other services under the rationing system. He was thus, so to speak, under a glass cover, limited and also open to view. For some individuals were to be economically and where necessary physically eliminated as a class. Social pressure was to be put on others, while some were to be positively aided, and in every possible way. Here one had the specific application of the class principle to the position of the individual.

The primary "collective"—whether the production unit, the village, the institution of learning or the apartment house—was geared into the system as a whole, as noted in the discussion of the structure of Soviet institutions and organizations. Thus the interests of the individual were subordinated to those of his group and finally of the whole community, and the dictatorship of the proletariat operated through the state to enforce the subordination, which was to become in time "harmonious co-ordination." In this way, "the cursed problem of differentiation between personal interest and the social interest has been solved," a Soviet writer recently asserted.

In the case of the member of the Party the subordination has been definite and concrete, voluntarily accepted by the fact of application for admission to the "revolutionary order." The subordination was made effective by the "iron discipline" of the Party, as described in an earlier chapter. Lenin's political acumen and power came from his ability to subordinate his individual interests to those of a class—the proletariat. Stalin's position is similarly explained by his relation to the Party as the vanguard of the proletariat. In both instances the official explanation has a basis in fact, and gives to the current expression "Party of Lenin-Stalin" a less personal implication than is generally inferred.

Then, as the new pattern of social relations became part of life, the emphasis shifted from the "collective" to the building up of the *cadres* of the new order. Technology became the center of attention with the program of industrialization. The task set the Soviet citizen was to learn to run the new machines and manage the new economic en-

terprises and increase production all along the line. It was through and within the "collective" that the "shock brigades" were to emerge. The competition was between groups, and thus was "socialist emulation." It was a feature of the shock-brigade movement that those who forged ahead should help those who lagged behind.

After a period during which the slogan was "All depends on our *cadres*," the new watchword became "All depends on the person." With the establishment of the socialist framework it was deemed possible to put the emphasis at last on the individual. An expression of this new emphasis was the so-called "*Stakhanov* movement," deriving its name from that of a coal miner who increased his output—and his earnings under the piece-work wage system—by raising his technical skill, organizing his shift more effectively and utilizing more fully the new machines. The *Stakhanov* movement was envisaged as representing the beginnings of a real communist attitude toward work, in line with what the Revolution had been striving for from the beginning, that work should become a matter of "duty, honor and glory." At the same time the individual peasant householders of the collective farms were urged and helped to "become prosperous" within the new framework of the *kolkhoz*. Another instance of the emphasis on the individual was the return to individual kitchens, as opposed to communal dining rooms, in the new apartment houses built for workmen and office workers.

This emphasis on the individual and individuality came only after the socialization of the means of production, which was practically complete by 1934. Thus it has had nothing in common with "economic individualism" against which the Revolution directed its policies and repressive measures. And the individual continued to be subject to the "rules of the socialist community," to quote from the new Union constitution of 1936 (Article 130), his security depending on the observance of these rules as determined by the political leadership.

The leadership, however, has been constantly expressing its primary "concern for human beings." Stalin once used the figure of speech of a garden, which requires the greatest

care in cultivation if it is to produce its flowers. This careful cultivation involved, it was explained, also thorough and constant weeding, and the purges of the last year have represented, in part at least, a pulling out of weeds that grew up in the "Soviet garden."

The special categories of Soviet citizens should again be noted in this connection. The Party member may be called the "citizen with special responsibility," for the individual who joins the Party accepts voluntarily the limitations on his freedom of action which the discipline of the Party involves. The Rules of the Party state this specifically. Certain privileges—preferential advancement to positions of responsibility—of Party membership are thus balanced by rigid special duties. Failure to meet the obligations of Party membership entails expulsion, which is a real penalty and is not the most severe. The severest penalties—including the death penalty—recently meted out to Party members should be related to the fact that it was through the Party that these individuals attained their positions of prominence and power. And in accepting these positions, under Party control, these individuals were fully aware of the special responsibilities they assumed. It was of course inevitable that many joined the Party without sincere conviction but for the "career." Others apparently were unable to resist the temptation of abusing their positions of power. Others, fretting under Party discipline, might sincerely question the expediency of such strict discipline, and deliberately work to reduce it. When caught in any of these "deviations" the individual was liable not only to expulsion, but to positive punishment. Soviet law with its broad interpretation of "counter-revolution" and "enemy of the people" would cover the case.

The workman in the large-scale mechanized enterprise, including transportation services, has been the "ruling class" of the Soviet system. This position has, however, carried also a responsibility to show "class consciousness" and subordinate or at least closely correlate individual self-interest with the interests of the proletarian state. In the first heroic period the proletariat was mobilized for both military and labor service. Then it was given the responsibility of leadership, as described in other parts of this study. Social pressure of



the group in a factory has been particularly strong in the case of the workmen. When the term proletariat was expanded to include all wage-earners, the social pressure in any group was organized by the manual workers with respect to the brain workers. The individual workman who failed to show the required class consciousness has been also subjected to coercive measures, although with respect to this group the educative measures of the Soviet system have been first applied. But the demand for discipline, exacted of all groups, was most specific and insistent in the case of the class that has been relied upon to be the standard-bearer of the revolutionary program.

The collectivized peasant is beginning to enjoy greater liberty. Economically he is more secure, being protected by the collectivist framework. The directing pressure on the peasants has been reduced in measure as the collectivization of agriculture was accepted. The situation of the peasants is illustrative of the general principle of the Soviet system: that the individual must function through a group, but that within that group he can show individual initiative, attain greater individual well-being, so long as he contributes to the economic and cultural progress of his group, and thus to his group's contribution to the community as a whole.

Thus in the last years it was emphasized that the human being, as opposed to machinery, was the first consideration. There were examples of this solicitude. But then came the series of trials terminating in executions, and the Revolution has tended to revert to the view that seemed to prevail in the first period, when life was cheap and victims numerous. If one accepts the view that those executed were guilty of having become, at least objectively, instruments of forces making for war, the ruthless method of dealing with them could be related to the effort to avoid war, with its enormous wasteful cost in lives as well as in property. This was in fact done, in the official writings and the resolutions passed under the inspiration of the latter.

## 2. *The right and obligation of work.*

In the first Soviet constitution of 1918 one paragraph (Article 9) stated that "labor is an obligation on all citizens."

In the new Union constitution of 1936, Article 12 develops the statement to the effect that work is not only an obligation but a matter of honor, and repeats the slogan of the Revolution: "He who does not work shall not eat." At the same time, Article 118, introducing the section of the new Union constitution on "Basic Rights and Obligations of Citizens" reads: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is the right to receive guaranteed work. . . ."

The right to work has been in fact effectively guaranteed during the last years. There was up to 1928 considerable unemployment, but it has been "liquidated" by the economic expansion. What may be called "political unemployment," under which because of his past the individual was refused work of any kind, has also in the main disappeared, even for the older children of the former bourgeois elements. It was particularly difficult for this group to accommodate itself to the new conditions, and the attitude of suspicion toward individuals of this group added to the difficulty of their position.

The question of the element of compulsion in the enforcement of the obligation to work and in the organization and distribution of labor power under planned economy is more involved. One of the sanctions behind the "obligation" to work is the fact that the right to living quarters is secured through one's place of employment. When the rationing system was still in force, up to 1935, the bread and other cards were distributed by the authorities of one's place of work.

Social pressure has been a factor making work obligatory, particularly when it was organized in the form of resolutions of groups not to leave a particular job until it was completed. This practice was widespread during the drive of the first Five-Year Plan, but has been resorted to less frequently or extensively during the last years.

In the past, in the face of specific crises, certain groups have been subjected to a form of mobilization. When the railways were found to be falling behind, all persons who had had experience in railway operation were ordered to report, and were then assigned to work in the Commissariat of Communications, often with increase of payment. On another occasion, confronted by a shortage of workers in the local public health services, the Government put pressure on per-

sons with medical training to accept assignment to the less desirable provincial posts. ✓ Failure to accept assignment led to the removal of one's name from the lists of properly qualified medical workers for positions in the central public health institutions.

Another form of compulsion in respect of the place of work was adopted in principle, but not effectively carried out, for those in administrative positions in a co-ordinating higher unit. They were supposed to spend a certain number of months of each year in the local units over which they had jurisdiction. This was one of the many measures adopted to eliminate bureaucratic tendencies in the apparatus of administration. ✓ Pressure was also brought to bear on technical experts, to work at the production unit rather than in central co-ordinating boards; higher salaries were offered for work at the factory or in the mines. The shortage of qualified technicians and the tendency to prefer the more comfortable office position were the reasons for this measure.

There has been compulsory labor in the strict technical sense for criminals, political offenders, and even for whole "hostile classes" such as the so-called rich peasant (*kulak*). The Soviet prison system emphasizes the retraining, rather than the mere punishing of criminals, and productive work is part of the prison régime. ✓ Political offenders and "class enemies" have been used for the severest kinds of work, in the lumber camps and fisheries of the north, and in the building of a canal to the White Sea. Also individuals believed guilty of sabotage have been made to give their technical knowledge to Soviet trusts, while still under detention, going to their work under escort. There have been comparatively few instances of this kind, but they are interesting illustrations of the use of compulsory labor when it is considered expedient and practicable. Political offenders, and the liquidated *kulaks*, as well as ordinary criminals, have regained their freedom on the basis of the work done during the period of detention, and a very large number have in this way worked off their counter-revolutionary or criminal pasts.

With these exceptions the Soviet system has given the fullest economic security, and also the liberty of choice of the

form of economic activity, with the exception of activity that is based on "exploitation" of the labor of another, or "speculation" at the expense of the community and its requirements. Even many of those who belonged to the hostile classes have regained their civil rights, and the right freely to work, although not in the fields of work for which they were "liquidated." ✓ Former *kulaks* cannot return to their old villages where they would be drawn into their former kind of economic activity.

The member of the collective farm can withdraw, although he will have difficulty in recovering his contribution to the inventory of the group, and in securing land on which to settle if he wishes to remain an agriculturalist. The young people in the collective farms can and do go into industry or construction work, either on their own responsibility, or through contracts signed by the collective farm authorities with the managements of construction or industrial enterprises. Within the collective unit the members are organized in brigades, to which are assigned either certain tasks or specific fields for cultivation. ✓ The kind of work and the brigades in which to work are selected by the individual within the limits of the general plan adopted by the collective unit. ✓ There is the obligation to remain in the given brigade for the entire agricultural year, or in dairy work, for example, for a period of several years.

The Soviet wage-earner has his passport in addition to his work-book and, until their recent abolition, his ration cards. These "documents" have played a part in the "rationalization" of the distribution of labor power. The ration cards involved an element of regimentation, limiting freedom of movement. They were introduced to meet the situation of scarcity and also to combat the exaggerated fluidity of labor which resulted from the shortages of supplies; in those years of chronic shortages there was always the hope that the supply of food might be better in another place, and workmen and office workers were constantly changing their places of employment.

The work-book of the Soviet wage-earner indicates the place as well as the grade of work and the scale of the wage. Theoretically the worker would not be employed in another

enterprise or institution unless on this work-book or passport, where the place of employment was indicated, there was also the official certification that he had been dismissed from his employment in the place indicated. In practice the demand for skilled labor and technically trained workers has meant that the latter could always find employment, the new employers securing their "dismissal" from former places of employment. If there has been an element of compulsion on workmen to remain at the particular place of work, the aim has been to increase their skill in a particular line. To this extent such limitation on freedom of movement was in part an educative as opposed to the compulsive measure, made necessary by the extensive recruitment of raw, untrained labor from the rural districts.

The handicraft artisan, working with the help of his family or in a producer's co-operative—the *artel*—has been subjected to the pressure, first of complete nationalization, and then, after a period of freedom, of entering the network of co-operatives. Only when he had accepted the co-operative framework did he become free of a differential tax rate and of the danger of being accused of "exploitation" in the organization of the *artel* or of "speculation" in disposing of his products. At present the individual artisan who does not wish to enter a large factory can find his place in production in these smaller industrial co-operatives.

In choosing a field for study and training the young people have had full freedom. After the choice is made, if the student accepts a stipend from a particular labor union or economic enterprise, he must work in that field of industry and even in a particular enterprise for a period of years after the completion of his training. This is a specific instance of the practical application of a principle which underlies the Soviet system, namely that the individual owes a debt to the community which made it possible for him to acquire his place, and especially a position of distinction, in the community. Grants-in-aid to students have become more generalized, not entailing the specific obligations formerly attached to them.

Members of the liberal professions now enjoy freedom of choice of place of work. Private practice of medicine is pos-

sible. Free-lance literary activity is also practiced. But the tendency in the liberal professions is toward work in a group to a greater extent than in other systems. Within the group the individual can follow his own line of work, always within the Soviet framework.

While some fields of work have been abolished—the landlord, banker, individual merchant or individual manufacturer—new professions have been created. The “economic worker” is the professional manager of economic enterprises of all kinds and grades. Then there are the “tractor-drivers” or “combine-drivers” in the rural districts. The teaching profession was recently put on a more systematic basis by the introduction of supplementary examinations and certificates. Attention has been called recently to the need to give a more definite and higher status to so-called “lesser professions,” of house-workers or barbers.

Certain fields of work and certain professions are considered at any given moment of special social value in the working out of the planned economy, and will be made more attractive by the fixing, under the Plan, of higher rates of wages and salaries. The workman in the large-scale factory has more social services organized for his benefit than have other groups, and this practice is part of the policy of industrialization. A force behind the policy of collectivization of agriculture was the larger provision for cultural benefits in the *kolkhoz*. These measures represent indirect influence on the choice of kind and place of work, but do not essentially contradict the general principle of freedom of choice which is part of the guaranty of work of the Soviet citizen. And there is considerable variety of work and employment, including self-employment, within the Soviet economic framework.

### 3. Rewards for work.

The program of the Revolution—and more specifically the Program of the Party—seemed to rest on the principle of an equalized wage regardless of quantity and quality of work. Thus the “administrator” was to receive no more than the skilled workman, Lenin explained in one of his most important statements on the eve of the October Revolution. During the period of “War Communism” the theory

seemed to be the equalized wage. If this was the announced theory, and to a certain extent also the practice, the objective was a temporary one—to break down the old system of differentiation in remuneration as part of the old social-economic relations. But even in that first period the political leadership allowed in practice the higher payment for quality of work to the technical experts. The political leaders, as members of the Party, accepted the low maximum payment provided by the Rules of the Party. There is no question, however, that the system of rationing by categories meant a differentiated remuneration for the “responsible worker” as well as the soldiers, industrial workers and children. It is said that Lenin refused to accept a privileged ration, but he was exceptional in this as in so many other respects.

The piece-work wage, supplemented by bonuses, was introduced toward the end of the period of “War Communism” also for workmen. In the period of re-establishment of production, of the *Nep*, the differentiation in remuneration assumed wider application, although the spread between the lower and the higher salary or wage was kept down, by regulation and taxation. Then, with the drive for industrialization and reconstruction there came a positive drive against the “equalized wage,” and the “de-personalization” of work and responsibility to which it had led. The equal wage regardless of quantity or quality of the work done was denounced as a “vulgarized conception of socialism.” The piece-work wage was introduced on the widest possible scale, and in the collective farms or in administrative offices as well as in industrial, manufacturing enterprises. The article (118) of the new constitution already cited on the guaranty of work adds that the guaranty is to be “with payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.” The Soviet economist showed great skill in devising the bases for various rates of pay. The differentiated payment was worked out in such meticulous detail that often its application defeated the aim in mind, for the human element had been sacrificed to a purely mechanical calculation. Also the latter proved to be in instances a miscalculation, so that the better and more responsible worker did not in fact receive the higher remuneration.

In the last years the spread between the lowest and highest rewards has in instances become enormously wide, and these cases have naturally been given particular attention by the outside critic. ✓The highest remunerations have gone to writers, actors and orchestra leaders, resulting from the popularity they have enjoyed and the payment for writings or performances on a piece-work basis. It would appear that the norms of payment will be revised to correct what was a miscalculation, or the abuse by an individual of the spirit if not the letter of the law on royalties.

The basis for the higher salaries has been in the main the responsibility assumed by the individual, the position of responsibility being acquired as the result of special training and experience as well as of individual aptitude. In the case of the shock-brigade workman, and later the *Stakhanovite*, one has a similar recognition of both background training and attitude toward work and the specific job.

The differentiation in remuneration thus aimed to act as an incentive to individual effort, in preparatory training and in work. The increased earnings allow for the satisfaction of individual tastes and requirements, in which differentiation is also recognized. In this way, it is the Bolshevik claim, there is every opportunity for the individual to apply and develop his best ability, and an incentive for him to do so, and his individual effort will also contribute to the total of the social wealth of the whole community.

The inequalities in money earnings have been supplemented by the special provision for housing facilities enjoyed by "responsible workers" as one of the perquisites of their position. Instances of gross abuse of this perquisite have been exposed in the recent house-cleaning. It is possible that the constant pointing to these instances by the outside critics awakened the Bolshevik conscience with respect to their development.

A very real reward for work has been the public recognition of good work and successful management. For the good worker becomes a "hero of labor" and one of the new "notables," by receiving not only the name of a "*Stakhanovite*," but one of the various orders of the Soviet system, the highest of which is the Order of Lenin. These decorations carry sub-



stantial economic features in the form of reduced tax rates and rentals. Often a specific bonus of a considerable sum of money accompanies the granting of an "order." The widest publicity is given to the names of those rewarded, and in the case of the highest decorations the award is made on a formal occasion by the leadership in the Kremlin. The reception in the Kremlin, in conferences or in groups as "heroes of labor," has come to be an institution of the Soviet system, to which, it is emphasized, the humblest worker in field or factory can aspire.

If the spread in the differentiated remuneration has in certain instances become very wide, the number of those in the middle brackets of the Soviet wage scale has been rapidly increasing. The aim is to raise all to the higher brackets, as opposed to a levelling downward such as seemed to be the principle as well as the practice in the first years of the Revolution. Those in the lowest brackets—and the latter are very low, often below what it is possible to live on—can rise automatically by acquiring technical skills, and the opportunities for study and training are many and easily accessible. This last fact probably eases the conscience of the Soviet leadership when it sees the low wages paid to the unskilled worker. Many cannot take advantage of these opportunities for education and training and through no fault of their own, and for these the hardship is severe. For those who do not respond to the opportunities available there is no sympathy in the drive for the industrialization of a country backward both economically and culturally.

The economic differentiation is not leading to a social differentiation, it is claimed, because the economic position of the individual is dependent entirely on the work actually done, and on continued work, unless invalidated, until the pension age. Rank is recognized, in respect of responsibility for direction or management, and is remunerated on the basis of the responsibility carried. This does not constitute a class differentiation, we are told, as the higher earnings cannot serve as the economic basis of a new "bourgeois" class. Rank is individual, and management does not imply a vested interest in any means of production. Nor does power in leadership or management rest on control of means of produc-

tion, is the Bolshevik argument. The higher paid can and do live better, in somewhat more spacious quarters and on a more varied and pleasing diet, being able to pay for these. They have no special privileges for their children in the matter of education, although they can supply them with more books and take them more frequently to entertainments.

#### 4. *Property Rights.*

While private ownership of the means and implements of production has been practically abolished, and in measure as this part of the program of the Revolution has been carried out, personal ownership of consumers' goods has been more specifically protected. The "socialist property" of means of production is made "sacred and inviolable" and not merely for doctrinal purposes; this property is considered the source of the wealth and power of the country as a whole, and at the same time the "source of the prosperous and cultural life of the toilers." It is expected that the personal possession and control—ownership—of consumers' goods will increase; it is part of the socialist doctrine that there is no objective limit to the increase in the available supply of consumers' goods for the satisfaction of personal needs—that is, no limit to the raising of the standards of living.

In the early period, in the redistribution of wealth by the "expropriation of the expropriators," possession of consumers' goods was limited. The scarcity of supply and the widespread illegal speculative trade led to the seizure of what was considered a surplus of consumers' goods in the possession of an individual. At present the aim is the widest possible distribution of consumers' goods; and with the increase in the supply of such full legal protection of possession is given; to emphasize this fact the new Union constitution specifies what can constitute the "personal property" of the individual (Article 10). It is claimed, in fact, that Soviet socialism is re-establishing individual private property where capitalism has been destroying it in its tendency toward monopolistic ownership. The "personal property" is not liable to be seized for default in interest payments or personal debts, for these latter do not exist in any large measure.

A distinction is made between the personal property of wage-earners in articles of consumption and the property that constitutes the subsidiary economy of the individual households of a collective farm. The consumers' goods of the wage-earner must be such in the rather strict sense, though they include the living quarters, household equipment and an automobile as well as articles of clothing. The student, teacher, scholar or writer can own his books. The medical man can own his instruments and equipment as the individual cobbler owns his simple tools. But the peasant household can establish a considerable subsidiary economy, in the kitchen garden he is allowed to maintain, and the domestic animals he can raise on his own initiative. However, there is a specific limit to the number of cows, hogs and sheep that the peasant household is allowed to own, ~~the number of chickens and rabbits that can be raised is not limited, except by the supply of feed available to the individual household.~~

While the amount of consumers' goods in personal ownership is expected to grow with the rise in the standards of living, the subsidiary economy of the collectivized peasant is expected to decline. This last point is important to note because many have thought to see in the granting of the right to have an individual subsidiary economic enterprise, a breach in the policy of collectivized agriculture, which could be easily widened to the point of a return to individual tenure. Measures against such a development are at present being enforced vigorously, but the success of collectivized agriculture is expected soon to reduce the need of strict enforcement.

There have been "violations" of the "sacred" public property in the form of outright embezzlement or of concealed individual use. Until 1933 land could be rented for agricultural purposes but at present there can be no utilization of land against payment because of the abuses that crept in under the practice of renting. The element of payment for use suggested the possibility of an individual getting possession of a means of production. There is provision for the use of land by the individual for the house he wishes to build if he occupies the house himself. The distinction between the ownership of producers' goods and the ownership of

consumers' goods is brought out by a homely example. ✓ An individual can own a horse for his individual transportation or for pleasure-riding, but he cannot put the horse to the plow or use it for commercial trade without coming into the category of the individual peasant and under the special tax and limitations imposed on this remnant of a "capitalist element" in the economic structure.

The present emphasis on the right to personal property is not the result of a still incomplete stage of socialist construction, a Soviet writer has recently pointed out. He added however, that the material content of the concept of personal property would change as new stages of socialist construction were reached. As already suggested, the inclusion of a supplementary household enterprise as personal property may cease with the development of production. Living quarters also may cease to be considered personal property. This authoritative writer on Soviet law stated, however, that at all stages of the future personal property will be considered as what is needed for the individual consumption needs, and is not used for exploitation of the labor or needs of others. Personal property, he continued, will increase in amount with the development of socialist production, and he pointed to the facts of the last years in support of his assertion.

##### *5. Freedom of conscience and opinion.*

The question of the freedom of the individual in the matters of conscience, opinion, research and writing has been examined in other chapters and will again be summarized in this context. If the Bolsheviks object to the statement that there is no political freedom under their system, it is because they have a different concept of political democracy from that prevalent in our western parliamentary systems. It certainly is not possible for the individual to advocate anything he wishes at any time and in any place; ✓ the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and meetings are secured only "in the interests of toilers" and "for the strengthening of the socialist order." (See 1936 Constitution, Article 125.)

Thus all discussion and debate must keep within the bounds of the program of the Revolution. ✓ There can no longer be any debate as to the possibility of building socialism, or as

to whether what is being built is socialism. Similarly the collectivization of agriculture must be accepted as an established policy. That "Soviet trade" is superior to private trade or even co-operative trade is also now a settled point. On the basis of these successes of its policy the Party's position in the Soviet system cannot be questioned.

For the intellectual the rigidity of the doctrine means the absence of any political liberty. He cannot indulge in continued debate as to the relative values of various types of political or economic systems. The peasant must accept collectivized agriculture as economically and socially the best possible system, for himself individually as well as for the larger community. The workman must accept state ownership of the means of production as guaranteeing to him greater security and also a fuller and richer life.

But the mechanical working of the new institutions can be criticized constructively, and this discussion is in fact constantly going on. Criticism is organized, by that very fact losing some of its real effectiveness. But it is developing organically within each group, and through these groups on a broader scale. It leads to changes of methods of internal organization, to new emphasis, always however within the established framework. It may in this gradual way bring considerable alterations in the structure and functioning of the various institutions and organizations. Only such changes as can be related to the program of building socialism can be proposed. ✓ The test of any measure suggested must be its contribution not only to greater production or better distribution, but also to the building of socialism as interpreted by the political leadership. ✓ The absolute faith in the possibility of improving the present system without changing its fundamental character, and in the finality of this new Soviet order, preclude the idea of political liberty as understood by the intellectuals of the western democratic systems. It should be noted, however, that the program is being carried out primarily for workmen and peasants, for toilers, and for a new intelligentsia coming up from these classes.

In the exercise of the right of self-criticism the leadership, of course, enjoys the fullest freedom. In speeches and writ-

ings the leaders are constantly pitilessly criticizing heads of departments, local Party organs, the educational authorities, Bolsheviks in general and such tendencies as boastfulness or carelessness that manifest themselves in the membership. ✓ On the other hand, this leadership cannot be criticized from below, either in general or with respect to particular acts or specific persons. The personalities or the personal life of the political leaders are not subjects for discussion except to review their records as staunch and loyal revolutionary workers. Party members in any group have as one of their duties as leaders of the group to criticize the group for inactivity, or for wrong emphasis in their work. Criticism of the Party leadership in the group must be more circumspect, although opportunity for such is provided in pre-election reporting meetings, in the procedure of Party cleansings and also in general meetings.

Workmen can criticize more freely than can office workers or technical experts, and their criticism can extend to the latter as well as to fellow-workers. ✓ In fact it can be said that while the Soviet citizen cannot criticize his higher leadership, he can freely criticize his immediate manager, the criticism being directed against the latter's inefficient or bureaucratic conduct of the "business" of the group, to the detriment of its program of production. In the lower grades of schools the criticism of directors and teachers by students and pupils has been brought within reasonable bounds, as compared with earlier practices.

The peasant, an habitual complainer, may criticize the management of the collective farm. With the extension of ~~larger powers of self-administration to the members of these~~ collective farms this criticism is carried on in a more organized form. But revolutionary watchfulness for continued machinations by "class enemies," representatives of which, it is believed, are still active in the peasantry and even within the collective units, acts as a curb on the exercise of the right of criticizing.

With the establishment of the new framework in a relatively complete and all-comprehensive form—as registered in the new constitution—there seemed to be the promise of greater intellectual freedom. That all thinking had to keep

within the limits of the system as fixed was understood. But a certain amount of theoretical discussion seemed possible and in fact was taking place in 1934. Then the assassination of Kirov and the trials and arrests from 1935 on, and the international tension of the last years, brought a gradual change, until at the present writing political scientists, historians, anthropologists and even biologists have been found guilty of "error" in the theories they have advanced in their respective fields, and have been denounced as "enemies of the people" and "wreckers." Some of these were in fact in opposition "ideologically"; but others seemed to be wrong only in their reasoning and this from the point of view of the authoritative political interpretation of Leninism.

Thus it appears from the Russian experience that revolutions cannot be carried out in the spirit of a debate such as the intellectual would wish. In the tense, strained situations that go with revolution, there is no place for sheer intellectualism. Free critical discussion would undoubtedly have prevented many of the costly mistakes subsequently admitted. However, the new Soviet intellectual is probably less worried over the limitations within which he must do his thinking and research, and while this fact represents for the outside observer a *minus*, the responsible political leadership of a revolution considers it a *plus*.

The question of freedom of conscience can be shortly summarized for it is handled in a very positive manner. Freedom to perform religious rites is guaranteed in Article 124 as constituting freedom of conscience; this same article implies that there can be no active organized effort to spread religion, for it specifies only "the freedom of anti-religious propaganda." Up to 1929, when the wording of the Constitution of the RSFSR was changed, "religious propaganda" was also permitted.

The inviolability of the person is guaranteed in the new Union constitution of 1936 (Article 127); the individual can be arrested only upon the decision of a court or with the sanction of the prosecutor (procuror). In view of the last phrase, and until the new codes have been worked out, this guaranty will remain only a promise in the minds of the western critic. The procedure of the recent purge would

seem to confirm the skepticism that was expressed with regard to this guaranty when the constitution was first published a year ago.

The refusal to allow what some believe would be necessarily implied in full political liberty, namely the open advocacy of a capitalist system as western democracies permit the advocacy of socialism, is to be explained by several factors. There is first the admitted backwardness, especially in political experience, of the mass of the people. Then the new socialist structure is recognized by its authors as far from completed in respect of smooth functioning. Also as the first and only "socialist" state the Soviet Union is the object of attack from powerful elements in all countries and from specific authorities in several countries, and there is clear evidence of programs of expansion at the expense of the first "proletarian state."

If under western parliamentary systems and their "capitalist" economic régimes the moving forces have been the acquisition of goods by the individual, the possibility to function as an individual, a feeling of freedom and a search for opportunities to advance, then under the Soviet system some of these motivations are limited. Acquisitiveness is limited to consumers' goods. The individual must co-ordinate his activity with a social program, and this implies a definite limitation of freedom in thought as well as action. But more people are secured real opportunities to advance, and the production curves of the next years will show to what extent the progress of the past years can be maintained.

✓ The second Five-Year Plan set forth as one of its goals the elimination of the remnants of "capitalism in the thinking of the people." This task has proven more difficult than the elimination of "capitalist elements in the economic structure," and has not been fully accomplished. Hence control over the individual continues, with a certain amount of regimentation in general and severe repression in particular instances; such control is one of the functions of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which also continues under the new constitution.

It is probable that there will always be elements in the



community that cannot adjust themselves to the new social economic relationships established. The apparent increase of such elements during the last years, even in the light of the progress in setting up the new order claimed for this same period, points to this probability, as do the statements of the Soviet leaders that have been here quoted. The recent laws and measures directed against these individual unregenerates who have abused the new social norms—the law on divorce for example—must not be interpreted as weakening, or even implying a weakening of the new habits engendered in the majority of the community. These laws do not necessarily represent an increase of regimentation.

The shootings, arrests, demotions and dismissals of the last year have lopped off in all fields individuals who had been rewarded for their initiative by the high positions to which they had risen. Some had been lauded to the skies for their contributions to the “building of socialism” or to the “defense program of the country.” Many had been in constant and close contact with the highest leadership; practically all were members of the Party, some members of its higher organs. How could such men have remained in high positions and close contact with the leadership for so long without being detected? This is one of the questions that rise to mind in connection with the house-cleaning of the last months. A more specific question is related to the subject of this chapter. Will these dismissals and arrests neutralize the policy of the last years to emphasize the individual and encourage him to show initiative and assume responsibility? That the danger of such a development is recognized by the Soviet leaders is evidenced by their measures to counteract it.

The “totalitarian” state of the Soviet system has as its aim—and justification—the promotion of new social-economic relationships and attitudes to which the individual must conform, and is explained as temporary until these develop, not being an end in itself.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD

In its general relationship to the rest of the world the Soviet régime has occupied a peculiar and unique position, and in its formal relations with other governments has gone through a long travail. But from a pariah among the other states of the world the Soviet Union has become one of the Powers, a member of the League of Nations and one of the most active proponents of and participants in programs of collective security and peace. The re-establishment of formal diplomatic relations with other states came only gradually after 1921; the American Government did not extend recognition to the Soviet Government until 1933. The relations between the Soviets and other governments have always been accompanied by a certain doubt and consequent friction, although the tendency has been to accept as sincere the policy of peace which the Soviet leaders have proclaimed as the basis of their relations with other countries. The Soviet view that there can be peaceful coexistence and collaboration between the Soviet sixth of the world and its non-Soviet neighbors has gradually been translated into fact for the majority of the democratic states. The programs of the military groups in Japan and of the Nazi leadership in Germany have not taken this view with respect to "communism" as exemplified by the Soviet Union.

#### *1. World Revolution.*

The attitude of other governments toward the Soviet régime during its first years is to be explained on several grounds. The Soviets were the product of revolution and Bolshevism seemed essentially internationalist in practice as well as theory. There was ground for considering Sovietism

as an international revolutionary movement rather than a national state. Established while the World War was raging, in part as a protest against this war, the Soviet régime became the object of struggle between the two groups in conflict. Both the Central Powers and the Allies seemed to be ready to take advantage of the prostration of the country to secure portions of its territory. Germany, by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, temporarily got possession of a very large share of loot. In the Far East under the cover of Allied intervention Japan sought to establish herself in the maritime provinces and the eastern portion of Siberia.

With their accession to power the Bolsheviks accepted the principle of a war of defense of their new proletarian state, and engaged in conflict, formal as well as informal, with both the Central Powers and the Allies and America. At the same time, while the Bolshevik leaders were trying to establish their régime throughout the territory of the old Russian Empire they were working for revolution also in other countries. The propaganda for and material support to revolutionary movements during the first period of the Revolution represented both the program of world revolution of Bolshevism and the technique of defense against foreign attack and intervention.

The failure of world revolution to develop in Western Europe in the post-war years was faced realistically by the majority of the leaders of Bolshevism. The assistance to the nationalist movements of "oppressed nationalism," which was part of their program of revolution, also did not succeed in bringing Sovietism to the countries of the East, although it contributed to the national revivals in Turkey, Persia and China for example. This assistance was viewed, both by those to whom it was extended and also by others, as a new, Soviet form of aggressive imperialism, suggesting in many of its features the old Tsarist imperialism. For the Soviet Union, like the old Russian Empire, by its very massiveness seemed inevitably to press out along its many miles of frontiers.

2. *"Socialism in one country."*

With the failure of supporting social revolutions in other countries the decision that the program of the Revolution could be fully realized in the single country represented by the Soviet Union was finally and definitely adopted. This fundamental point of policy was one of the principal issues in the conflict between groups in the Soviet leadership, headed respectively by Stalin and Trotsky. The victory of the Stalin group was viewed by Trotsky as an abandonment of the Revolution and a trend toward nationalism, even though it was to imply, as we have seen, an active drive for socialism and ultimately communism. While the decision was a turning-point in the history of the Revolution, authority for it was found in the writings of both Marx and Lenin. Lenin was for the full internationalism of early Bolshevism, but accepted the program of internal development when permanent and world revolution did not come out of the war-aftermath as he expected or at least hoped. His statement usually cited in support of the policy of "socialism in one country," made the reservation that full, definitive and absolutely secure socialism could not come in isolation; Stalin recognizes the same qualification in his recent emphasis on "revolutionary vigilance" with respect to the "capitalist encirclement." It is noteworthy that Trotsky has stated in the recent "hearings" in Mexico that the Left Opposition failed because of the failure of revolution to develop in Germany, China and Austria in the years 1923-26 when, under his leadership, this group was trying to prevail in the Party, the Soviet Government and the Communist International. This statement would imply that Stalin's policy was indeed the one which aimed to serve primarily the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

It should be added, however, that the present Soviet leaders have not abandoned the idea of social revolution in other countries; their creed is based on its ultimate inevitability historically. By the progress being made in the socialist reconstruction of the Soviet Union they see a positive contribution to world revolution, and they constantly make mention of this fact. Thus Bolshevism, propagandist by its every

nature, has adopted, for the present, the technique of propaganda by example—a legitimate form of propaganda. The constant emphasis on the peculiar political and economic principles underlying the Soviet system, with the drawing of contrasts between "socialism" and "capitalism," is part of this propaganda. While this propaganda has as one of its aims that of inspiring to greater sacrifice and effort at home, it also is part of the competition in which the Soviet system always sees itself in relation to the non-Soviet world. For the moment this competition may be characterized as passive, as compared with the more active forms it assumed in the earlier years. It is therefore a competition which other governments can accept without sacrifice of their self-respect; it was the active interference in the internal affairs of another country that the American Government, like other governments, resented.

The Soviet Union had in a sense set itself up in competition also with the League of Nations, but this has not prevented a proper and helpful participation of the Soviet Union in the work of the League after it became a member in 1934. For the Union follows a pattern of its own for co-operation between national groups. The Soviet leaders believe that their nationality policy secures a collaboration that makes both for peace and economic development while satisfying all legitimate aspirations for the cultural and political self-expression of a national or racial group.

If the Bolsheviks may be expected at some later date to adopt a more active promotion of their principles outside the Soviet Union, it will be only after they have established a more effective socialist system at home. Side by side with the boasts of achievement, there is full recognition of the shortcomings and defects in their system, and the recent emphasis on the latter would indicate that the Bolsheviks are not ready to present their program to the workmen and peasants of other countries as the basis for revolutionary action except in a very general way, as Stalin did at the Congress of Soviets which adopted the new Union constitution, which he characterized as a "program for action" for other countries. The Bolshevik doctrine that revolutions develop from causes within a given country, and cannot be imposed from outside,

was given definite formulation by Stalin in an interview with the American newspaperman, Roy Howard, in 1936. It is possible to believe that the Soviet leaders, while remaining fully loyal to the idea of world revolution, would prefer that revolutionary developments should not come until the first "proletarian state" has become internally stronger, and has developed in a more positive way those features of strength—and claimed superiority—of its social-economic system.

### 3. *Peaceful coexistence.*

In pursuance of its policy of peaceful coexistence of Soviet and non-Soviet states the Soviet Government adhered to the Pact of Paris, joined the League of Nations, and within the framework of the latter has worked for bilateral and multi-lateral pacts of non-aggression and of mutual assistance against aggression. It has also contributed to the definition of aggression in conventions with a large number of neighbors. These latter conventions specifically include in their definitions of aggression assistance to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary groups operating in the territory of another country. The specification of aid to counter-revolutionary activities was included because of the interventionist activities of the immediate past and the continued fear of a resumption of them. By defining aid to revolutionary movements as aggression the Soviet leaders aimed to dispel the widespread belief of their continued "revolutionary activities" in other countries. It is of course impossible to foretell to what extent these commitments would stand the test of a widespread and successful revolutionary movement in an immediately neighboring country. Steps to promote a revolutionary situation in the rear of an enemy in the event of a war are suggested in many official statements, however.

In its efforts to extend the principle of non-aggression, the Soviet Government has addressed itself to those states from which it has had good reasons to fear aggressive action against the Soviet Union. For many years a Soviet proposal to Japan to sign a pact of non-aggression has been refused by the latter on the ground that the points still in dispute between the two countries should first be settled. Progress toward a settlement of the points in dispute between the two countries was

being made during 1936, but was interrupted by the signing of the German-Japanese Pact of November of that year.

Germany refused to participate in the project of a general Eastern European pact initiated by France in conjunction with the Soviet Union, on the ground that it was unnecessary in view of other general and specific pacts of non-aggression. Poland supported Germany in this refusal, the governments of both countries contending that such a pact would promote rather than allay suspicions. Germany insisted on the same general grounds that the pacts of mutual assistance signed between the Soviet Union and France and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were not conducive to peace, although these pacts were so worded as to permit Germany to come within their provisions at any time, and were directed against Germany only in the event of an unprovoked act of aggression on her part.

#### *4. Co-operation for peace.*

As the Bolsheviks have at moments asserted that war would release latent revolutionary forces as it did in Russia, it has been assumed by many that the Moscow policy would be to work for war. Some have believed that such a policy was indeed followed in the early years of the Revolution. The present Soviet leaders refute vehemently this charge, explaining that while they do in fact believe that a war would bring discontent and perhaps revolution, it would be a costly process, the burden of which would fall mainly on the shoulders of the masses. The former Bolshevik aim carried out in 1917-20 in Russia, to "convert the imperialistic war into civil war in all countries" has not been abandoned, however. The postponement for as long a time as possible—and it is postponement since the Bolsheviks believe that wars are inherent in the capitalist system of national states—would make the revolutionary action more effective, on the basis of a stronger organization of the masses under stronger communist parties. And a social revolution would make war avoidable, the Bolsheviks claim.

The desire to avert war—or at least postpone it—manifested itself in the new policy adopted by the Communist International at its Seventh Congress of 1935. A most sig-

nificant resolution of this congress proposed to the communists of all countries to co-operate with liberal, democratic, non-communist groups to combat the rise of fascism and the accompanying threat of war. In more general terms the Communist International proposed that the formerly attacked "bourgeois democracy" be supported, against fascist tendencies, as providing more protection for workmen and toilers and as making for peace. "Soviet democracy," attained by social revolution, was not abjured, it should be noted; it was stated that the "Soviet way" would give the fullest guaranty of rights for toilers, of security for small nations, of liberation for semi-dependent and colonial peoples and of general and permanent peace.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the League of Nations is based on a concrete aspect of the latter's activity, as developed in the last years. The League became, in the view of the Soviet leaders, a positive force for peace, particularly after the withdrawal of Japan and Germany. On accepting the invitation of the League the Soviet Government stressed this fact of the more positive effort of the League to promote a program of collective security. It was a change in policy as well as composition of the League that made possible the change in the attitude toward it of the Soviet leaders. Formerly the League was viewed by Moscow as an instrument of imperialism and even more specifically as consciously anti-Soviet.

##### 5. *Alliances.*

The Soviet foreign policy has allowed of participation in collective programs and action, in furtherance of security and peace. For it is based on the principle of the "indivisibility of peace." The Soviet Union's position astride both Europe and Asia, and the attacks on its principles by groups in authority in particular countries, would point to the inevitability of its being drawn into any major conflict. But the orientation of the Soviet foreign policy is explained as always and first of all "Soviet." On this basis it is denied that the pact signed with France, for example, resembles the old Franco-Russian alliance. The Soviet-French Pact is avowedly based on calculation and on the facts of the moment.



Both countries have a common policy of peace for security; no common aims of aggression are present, it is contended, and the differences in political and economic structures of the two countries are emphasized in support of this assertion. The Soviets give a similar interpretation to their pact with Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey are on a special and unusually friendly basis, despite the fact of opposed political philosophies and structures. There was at first a form of "fraternal alliance" which has never been clearly defined. This relationship was in sharp contrast with the old traditional Russian-Turkish antagonism and this was one of the reasons for its special character. And the Bolsheviks point to their relations with Turkey as the clearest evidence of the abandonment of the imperialistic policy of the old Russian Empire.

#### 6. "Imperialism."

Somewhat difficult to define is the relationship between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The Mongolian People's Republic was established with the assistance of Moscow and its Red Army against a common foe—a White Russian régime which had seized authority at Urga and was preparing to attack Soviet territory in the civil war and intervention in progress at the time. Outer Mongolia is still under Chinese suzerainty, and for that reason the Soviet Government clearly hesitates to make formal its privileged position in Outer Mongolia, although it does not conceal the fact of its special interest in the Mongolian People's Republic.

A former "gentlemen's agreement" was recently made public as a formal pact of mutual assistance against aggression—a definite warning to Japan. While often designated as "Soviet Mongolia," Outer Mongolia is not a Soviet state. Soviet writers describe it as a "bourgeois democratic republic of a new type." It would seem that it could very readily and rapidly become Soviet, in which case it would beyond question apply for formal admission to the Soviet Union and would be admitted without delay. Should this development come, the special relationship which Outer Mongolia

had to Russia before the Revolution, which relationship was formally acknowledged by China, would give to such an extension of Sovietism beyond "Russian" territory a special character. By some this expansion would be interpreted as evidence of "Soviet imperialism," while by others, including perhaps China itself, it would not be so interpreted.

In the province of Sinkiang, also bordering on the Soviet Union and also historically occupying a special position within the larger formal China, Soviet commercial and political influences have spread during the last years and, so far as the facts are known, point to a development in this area somewhat similar to what has taken place in Outer Mongolia, with the same possibility as to the ultimate result. Both of these areas are of immense strategical importance for the defense of the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the recent expansion of Japan on the continent of Asia.

Many of the larger and more nationally conscious of the peoples that make up the Soviet Union are located geographically on or near the borders. This fact has given peculiar significance to the federal feature of the Soviet system in relation to world affairs. The granting of independence or autonomy to the national republics has been considered by some as the setting up of "show-windows" as part of the propaganda of Sovietism. These national units have been interpreted even as "spear-heads" by those who insist that Sovietism is still aggressively expansionist in its aims. On the other hand, the granting of a large measure of self-determination to the national units can be interpreted as part of the program of defense of the Soviet Union. The positive steps to promote both the political and economic development of these national units, particularly the more backward ones, is working to strengthen them and at the same time integrate them more completely within the Soviet framework. Such strengthening and integration contribute to the rôle they now play as part of the national defense and show-windows in peaceful competition. The possibility of their becoming spear-heads in a program of aggressive expansion is not a question of practical politics for the present or the immediate future.

### 7. *Armament.*

It was belief in the imminent menace of war, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably be involved, that dictated the speed of the program of industrialization behind the program of armament. This latter program was adopted only after the failure of the programs of general reduction of armament, which the Soviet Government actively supported. On the basis of the success of its industrial program, and in the face of marked increase of armaments in other countries, the Soviet Union in turn expanded its standing army, more than doubling it in the last two years, with corresponding increase of expenditures on defense preparations. The Red Army has been considerably increased in size, to 940,000 and later to 1,300,000 in view of the evident weakening of the prospects and the structure of peace during the last years. Even with this increase the standing army does not include all young men of military age. Others are reached through the territorial units. The voluntary organizations and circles interested in matters relating to defense extend the reach further, and make for continued attention to the subject of military preparedness. The earlier Bolshevik idea of an "armed people" is being practically realized. There is no glorification of war, however; on the contrary the costs and even the horrors of war are emphasized, in speeches and writings, as are the efforts to avoid war. For the Soviet policy continues to be based on the possibility of the avoidance of war between it and its neighbors; the Soviet leaders protest strongly against the statements currently made that war between it and Japan, or a war with Germany is inevitable.

The Soviet armament program, on the basis of the industrial backwardness of the country, has had a clearly constructive economic aspect; the increase of the last year may represent sheer armament expenditure, but until recently this was not so markedly the case as it has been in other countries. The burden has been heavy, preventing a more rapid rise in living standards—reducing somewhat the dividends which the Revolution has at last been paying during the last years.

The program of armament adopted aimed to implement

and also supplement the program of collective security which the Soviet Union had joined. In discussing the debates over the ratification of the French-Soviet Pact in the French parliament and press in 1936, the Soviet leaders explained that the Soviet Union had become fully capable of defending its frontiers with its own resources. The decision to increase armaments was based in part on the delays and difficulties in the progress of the program of collective security. To this program, it has been officially stated, the Soviet Union will continue to make every possible contribution, even though it has come to rely in the main on its own resources for its "national" defense.

#### 8. "Nationalism."

The name by which the Soviet system takes its place in the world of nations does not point to a national concept. The Soviet Union is, however, composed of "national republics" and from this fact is derived the official formula that it is "national in form but class in content." The emphasis on class—for the purpose ultimately of the elimination of classes—is the basis for the second half of this formula, of which Stalin is the author. But the first half of the formula should also be emphasized. In 1923 the constitution of the Soviet Union made provision for the inclusion of any other national units that might adopt the Soviet form of organization and a socialist economic policy. But the actuality of the limitation of the Soviet system within the territory of the old Russian Empire, in which the Russian ethnic element is the numerically predominant, giving the tone to the whole, has tended to promote attitudes and practices usually considered the attributes of a national state. It is the leadership of the Russian proletariat that has been emphasized, the constant effort being to avoid tendencies toward an exclusive Russian nationalism—a Great-Power chauvinism—similar to the "official nationalism" of the Tsarist Russia.

It was after the decision that socialism could be built in the single country of the Soviet Union that the expression "native land" began to be used. It was, however, the "socialist fatherland" belonging to all workers; and thus there was no sharp contradiction of the internationalist tenet of the

Bolshevik doctrine. As the new reconstruction progressed, the general emphasis on the character of the economic development made it possible to omit the specific qualification of patriotism. The word "native land" (*rodina*) came to be used in such a way to suggest the development of the attitude implied by the term "nationalism."

This Soviet nationalism was the form adopted to fit in with the world situation; the Soviet system had to adapt itself to its non-Soviet environment. The content of the "national" concept has been and is today still peculiar, and in line with Soviet doctrine. This content can be briefly characterized as "economic patriotism"—a love for the factories, collective farms, new power-plants and mines and cities which have been built and reorganized by Soviet workmen and peasants, or more specifically by Russian workmen and peasants, or by Ukrainian or Turkoman toilers in collaboration with the workers of the other republics of the Union. And while all this constructive effort is still proclaimed to be part of a program of building socialism also for the benefit of workers of other countries, the bearing of the Soviet program on the thinking of the workers of other countries is recognized as indirect, and is noted so to speak in parentheses as a formal acknowledgment of a theory.

The Red Army is still called the Workman-Peasant Red Army, and remains in theory the fighting force of all toilers. But in practice it has become a Soviet national army. The contradiction in combining the terms "Soviet" and "national" apparently does not constitute any real problem, unless it is a question of strict doctrinal interpretation. The gradual development of the use of the term "fatherland" in Soviet writings justifies the application of the term "national" to the defense policy of the Soviet Union. As part of the effort to consolidate the country one has had a certain emphasis of late on the past and rôle of the Russian people. For the Russians constitute the largest single racial group of the Union. But the "international" aspect of the new nationalism has also been stressed in special attention to the political pasts and cultural traditions of the peoples of the other republics of the Union.

9. *The Spanish Conflict.*

In the relation of the Soviet Union to the conflict in Spain several of the aspects of Soviet foreign policy here summarized are being practically illustrated. The sympathy of the Soviet Union—Party, Government and public opinion as expressed in organized form—was for the “popular front” government. The policy of support of “popular front” movements had been adopted already in 1935. It was useful to emphasize that the “popular front” government was the legally elected and recognized authority and not the product of a revolution.

In the interest of peace the Soviet Government at first followed England and France in the policy of non-intervention when the internal conflict started. When it became clear that the policy of non-intervention was not being observed by Italy and Germany, the Soviet Government began to send munitions—particularly airplanes and tanks—to the Madrid government, although it has never officially admitted the fact. Pilots and drivers unquestionably went with the planes and tanks, but there have been no Soviet units of regular armed forces under the name of “volunteers.” In the volunteers on the side of the Madrid government, composed of communists and other sympathizers from all countries, the percentage of Russians or Soviet citizens has been comparatively small. Soviet diplomatic and other officials, accredited to a recognized government, have undoubtedly extended advice and technical assistance on the request of the latter.

But it is noteworthy that Moscow has gone out of its way to point out to the Soviet citizenry that there is no proletarian or Bolshevik type of revolution in Spain, nor any immediate prospect of the development of such a movement. It is in the “interests of progressive humanity,” against “fascism and war,” and as part of its own program of defense, that the Soviet Government has given material and moral support to the Spanish “loyalists,” who represent for Moscow a “democratic parliamentary republic.” Not only the Soviet Government but also the Communist International, and Stalin in messages signed by him in the name of the Party, have supported the popular front movements in France and

Spain, and approved the efforts of the Communists of China to promote and enter a similar "national front." By this policy Moscow has "betrayed the Revolution" in the eyes of Trotsky and the old "internationalists." Trotsky interprets this policy as that of a bureaucracy which wishes to consolidate itself in power at any sacrifice of revolutionary principles.

Trotsky has asserted his adherence to the principle that revolutions cannot be exported, as stated by Stalin. But Trotsky evidently believes that a measure of encouragement to communists of other countries which Moscow could and should give would help the social revolution in these countries. The Soviet leaders evidently have seen no conditions or premises for Soviet movements in other countries, even in the setting of the civil war in Spain; in this view they have been in agreement with the majority of the more authoritative students and observers of the Spanish events of the last year.

The fascist states have justified their intervention in Spain—and recently in China—by asserting that there is a "communist menace." But it is becoming more generally recognized that this fascist "anti-communist" crusade has been in fact a mask to cover aggressive programs for economic and territorial gains. Because of the clash and the relating of the two challenging systems of fascism and Sovietism to class interests, the fascist propaganda has been very successful among conservative elements in all democratic countries.

The Soviet leaders have insisted that attention should not be paid to the ideological conflict which has developed—in the present period on the initiative of the supporters of fascism, although chronologically communism was the first challenge in the contemporary, post-war years. What Moscow suggests it is more important to consider is the question as to which of the two systems is not only potentially but actually aggressive. And facts like the German-Japanese Pact and the "Berlin-Rome axis" support the Soviet contention that fascism has become an "international movement," and for that very reason a greater menace to the security of others and to peace.

The Soviet Government has seen in what has been going on in Spain the first sally of fascism outside its own territory in Europe. Finding in the programs of Japanese militarists

and of the Nazis of Germany specific mention of portions of their own territory as acquisitions not only desirable but necessary for the Japanese hegemony in the Far East and the "destiny" of the German people, the Soviet Government and people have taken a deep interest in the struggle in Spain, not for purposes of revolution but for national defense.

10. *The treason trials.*

Although many of the aspects of the recent Soviet treason trials cannot be fully explained on the basis of the facts available, the following points are to be noted, in addition to what has already been given in other contexts in which there has been reference to the trials.

Assuming the fact of an extensive espionage service maintained by Germany and Japan in the Soviet Union—and this fact can be assumed from the practice of the past and instances in other places in the present—then the discovery and quashing of such should be interpreted as making for peace. Espionage is the peace-time weapon in preparation for war used by potential aggressors on a very large scale. The Soviet authorities applied the full rigor of a revolutionary régime to meet the situation, publicizing widely for propaganda purposes.

The provocative words and actions of authoritative groups in Germany and Japan must be borne in mind in judging of the measures taken by the Soviet authorities against what they considered treason. The new law on treason, of 1934 (see *Source Book*, Report of Krylenko) was made severe in its provision because of many evidences of the danger of attack by powers whose unfriendly attitude was not being concealed. This law reflected the international tension, as well as the revolutionary character of the Soviet régime.

One should mention the reference by responsible writers to a memorandum, allegedly sent by Stalin himself to France and Czechoslovakia, giving a version, different from the official verdict, of the actions for which the army leaders were executed. This alleged memorandum, we are told, aimed to reassure the French and Czechoslovakian governments of the continued ability of the Soviet Union to act effectively under their pacts of mutual assistance. It is said to have



stated that the "generals" were against the Soviet policy of peace and against Soviet participation in the League of Nations and pacts with "bourgeois countries." Their idea was to let war develop between bourgeois states, and then on the basis of the exhaustion and confusion caused by war, use the Red Army to establish "communist states." Such a program would be in line with some of the policies and activities which characterized the first years of the Revolution, in which these men played active parts.

If these so-called "old Bolsheviks" were working for a reassertion of the program of world revolution, on the basis of what they believed to be an opportunity in the present tensions, in many countries and between nations, their efforts to this end at home and abroad would have served the aims of aggressive fascism. The advocacy of such a policy would constitute treason in the opinion of those thinking primarily of the security and peace of the "Soviet people." Objectively, if not subjectively, these "old Bolsheviks" because of their adventuristic doctrinarianism would become instruments of forces making for war. That so-called "old Bolsheviks" could be literally guilty of treason—of selling out—has, of course, seemed incredible. But it must be borne in mind that they have believed, and for all these last years, that Stalin and his group had betrayed the Revolution. Also, the idea of treason to a particular country has always been alien to the doctrine of revolutionary internationalism.

One might have wished that the "old Bolsheviks" could have been disarmed in a less ruthless way. Those who have been "liquidated" were themselves the roughest of liquidators in the early years when they were in power and knew what opposition would mean. It is possible, however, that the very ruthlessness with which "Stalin struck" will prove to have been a contribution to the preservation of peace.

The effect of the wholesale arrests, trials and executions of persons holding high positions in army and government, on the military effectiveness of the Soviet Union will become clearer in the course of time, particularly in the event of an international crisis. The removal of so many responsible heads of administration has implied a considerable disorganization. But the thorough house-cleaning aimed to make for

real strength to resist any aggression and thus continue the contribution which the Soviet Union has been able to make during the last years to the preservation of peace.

### *11. Foreign Trade.*

In its first years the Soviet régime was subjected to a financial and trade blockade by the Allies, even after the conclusion of the war. The policy of blockade was part of the intervention, but continued after the withdrawal of the latter. The blockade was also part of the effort to combat the spread of Bolshevism to the West. But the resumption after the war of international trade reached also Soviet Russia; the adoption of the New Economic Policy by the Soviet Government greatly facilitated this development, and was in part dictated by the absolute need of assistance from outside to meet the economic collapse and famine conditions that prevailed in 1921-22.

Soviet trade relations with other countries increased during the period of the New Economic Policy, although the Soviet Government, which conducted all trade under its monopoly of foreign trade, was not able to secure favorable conditions of credit. The refusal to acknowledge the debts of former Russian governments and the claims of the nationals of other countries for their properties taken over under the policy of nationalization, did not enhance the credit standing of the Soviets. But gradually the Soviet Union and other countries found trade useful; Germany especially promoted her Soviet trade, seeing in it a factor for her own economic reconstruction. The policy of the Soviet Government was to subordinate foreign trade to its economic plans and also to a certain extent to use it to strengthen the political position of the Soviet Union. The state monopoly of foreign trade made it possible to maneuver in the world markets, on the basis of political as well as economic considerations, the latter tending, however, to be the determining ones.

The first Five-Year Plan required a very considerable increase of imports, particularly of machinery. The extensive purchases made abroad were paid for by export, this export being often at the expense of home consumption. The sacrifice required by this policy was justified on the ground that

the Soviet Union must establish its economic independence of the outside non-Soviet world as quickly as possible, in view of the hostility toward it of powerful groups in all countries. The first Five-Year Plan by supplying machine-making machinery brought this economic independence, it was claimed.

While asserting their economic independence of the non-Soviet world, the Soviet leaders do not adhere to the principle of autarchy. Believing that they can continue their plans of economic expansion on their own resources, they state that they can do so more economically and rapidly on the basis of a developing foreign trade, mutually beneficial to both sides. The constant technological progress in western industrialized countries can thus be utilized for the continued industrialization of the Soviet Union. The independence of the Soviet economic system means, however, that the Soviet Government can insist on more favorable credit conditions in other countries. In 1935 the Soviet Government received, for the first time, long-term credits in Germany and Czechoslovakia, and in 1936 also in England.

In Soviet-American trade relations the question of former debts and claims has been something of an obstacle. A dispute over the preliminary "understanding" reached at the moment of the resumption of official diplomatic relations led to the discontinuing of further negotiations on these points. The Soviet Government has refused consistently to recognize the debts of former Russian governments or the claims for compensation of nationals of other countries, except in connection with a new loan or credit facilities on new business. The repudiation of the debts of the old régime and the nationalization of all means of production have been "revolutionary" policies which the Soviet Government cannot abandon. Under agreements negotiated yearly American-Soviet trade has continued on a comparatively small but gradually increasing scale and with a minimum of friction. On the basis of its guaranty to buy goods in America to a specified total amount, the Soviet Union has come within the new trade policy of the American Government. The outside world has gradually become accustomed to the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade; acceptance of what at first was actively

opposed has been facilitated by the adoption of somewhat similar policies by other governments. In the world trade of today Soviet participation is no longer looked upon as a disrupting factor; for several countries it has in fact come to be a useful stabilizing factor because it permits of more definite calculation of trade possibilities.

The non-Soviet world cannot expect the Soviet régime to renounce its revolutionary origin. The fact that it has been a social-economic as opposed to a purely political revolution, and is still in progress, makes inapplicable to the Soviet régime the view that a leadership of revolutionary origin gradually but inevitably becomes "normal." The Soviet régime is "evolving" but within its new established framework, and always in line with its revolutionary program. The Soviet leaders constantly remind the outside world of the fact of the revolutionary origin of their régime.

The basic propaganda aspect of Bolshevism gave, and still gives, to the Soviet régime a feature that touches on the practices in relations between states. It was this propaganda activity emanating from Moscow that delayed American recognition, and has caused friction in Soviet-American relations since the resumption of normal relations. As has been noted elsewhere, the Communist International is an integral part of Bolshevism, or even of the Soviet system, although it can be claimed that technically it is not officially connected with the Soviet Government. A precise definition of the relationship is impossible in terms of western institutions. As the Soviet foreign-trade monopoly has had to be accepted in commercial relations, the presence of the Communist International at Moscow will have to be accepted in diplomatic and political relations. But both are now essentially part of the technique of defense of the Soviets.

By force of circumstances, although still in line with its program, the Revolution has come to concentrate on the large "Soviet" area—the old Russia—where it started and in which it had its roots. The Soviet policy of the last years has been to "cultivate its own garden," and at the same time not to permit of any trespass on this garden. In this way, Sovietism has remained revolutionary while at the same time becom-

ing "nationalist" in a peculiar but real sense. The "totalitarian" features of the Soviet state are reflected in this new type of patriotism for defense of the new order, aiming to promote and establish the new social-economic relationships and attitudes and not developed primarily to increase the striking power of the state.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Current Soviet legislation and key speeches by Bolshevik leaders at congresses or conferences are available in English in several publications of which the following are the more accessible. These same sources have been noted for specific documents in the *Source Book on European Governments* published in connection with this series:

*Slavonic Review*

(of the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies in the University of London)

*Monthly Review*

(of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Great Britain, London)

*Economic Survey*

(of the USSR Chamber of Commerce, Moscow)

*Moscow News*

(Weekly Edition, Moscow)

*Russian Economic Notes*

(of the Division of Regional Information, Department of Commerce, Washington)

The Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR issues with a minimum of delay in what amounts to a *pamphlet series* translations of public documents and speeches; these may be obtained through the Bookniga Corporation of New York City.

Interpretations and summaries of Soviet legislation and politics appear regularly in several publications:

*Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union.*

(Monthly, by the American-Russian Institute, New York City)

*Soviet Russia Today*

(Monthly, New York City)

The *International Press Correspondence* (English edition published by R. Bishop, London) is an official service of the Communist International. *Contemporary Russia* (Quarterly, London) is on the other hand an aggressively "anti-communist" publication.

The Soviet Union is one of the fields covered in the *Foreign Policy Association Reports* (New York City) and the *Far Eastern Survey* of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York City).

The *Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union* supplies a very comprehensive list of books and of articles in periodical publications which have appeared each month.

Several volumes of translations of Soviet documents contain recent, if not current, material. Of these the following bear more directly on the topics here discussed, and are published or handled by International Publishers (New York City):

*The Soviet Union—A Symposium* (1935)

*Socialism Victorious* (1935)

*Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan of the National Economy of the USSR* (1935)

*The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR* (1936)

*The U. S. S. R. in Figures* (of the State Planning Commission, 1935)

Of the writings of Lenin *The State and Revolution* (Vanguard Press, 1927) has a very direct relation to the subject-matter of this study. *Readings in Leninism* (International Publishers, 1936) give selections from his writings in four small volumes, entitled:

*What is Leninism?*

*Theory of the Proletarian Revolution*

*Strategy and Tactics*

*The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*

The two volumes by Stalin on *The Problems of Leninism* (International Publishers, 1928 and 1932), supply the background for his statements and policies, which have come to

be spoken of as "Stalinism." A more recent volume entitled *Marxism and the National and Colonial Questions* (1936) is a collection of writings and speeches by Stalin on this aspect of Soviet policy to which he has always given special attention.

Of Trotsky's extensive writings his latest book, called *The Revolution Betrayed* (Doubleday Doran, 1937) has a direct bearing on the subject of the Soviet system in its present-day functioning.

The court proceedings of the recent Moscow trials are available in English under the titles:

*The Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre* (August, 1936)

*The Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre* (January, 1937)

These were published by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow. The full proceedings of the "hearings" at Coyoacan, Mexico (April 10-17, 1937) at which Trotsky was given an opportunity to present his answers and interpretations, are also to be published.

Books in which the structure and functioning of the Soviet system are discussed in a general way may also be noted although they relate in the main to earlier periods:

Batsell, W. R., *Soviet Rule in Russia* (Macmillan, 1929).

Maxwell, B. W., *The Soviet State* (Steves and Wayburn, Topeka, Kansas, 1934).

Chamberlin, Wm. H., *Soviet Russia* (Little, Brown, 1930).

—, *Russia's Iron Age* (Little, Brown, 1934).

Hindus, Maurice, *Humanity Uprooted* (Jonathan Cape, 1929).

—, *The Great Offensive* (Harrison Smith, 1933).

Harper, Samuel N., *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (University of Chicago Press, 1929).

Hecker, Julius, *Moscow Dialogues* (Chapman, Hall, 1933).

—, *The Communist Answer to the World's Needs* (John Wiley, 1934).

*The Soviet Union and World-Problems*—Harris Institute Lectures (University of Chicago Press, 1935).



Special mention should be made of the two large volumes by Sidney and Beatrice Webb under the title: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (Longmans, 1935). This comprehensive study by these pioneers in the field of the social sciences may be criticized on several grounds but is an important contribution in approach and interpretation.

Three recent outstanding critical books may be selected because of their peculiar interest. André Gide in *Return from the USSR* (1936) frankly expresses the disillusionment of a recent convert. Walter Citrine, the British trade-union leader, in *I Search for the Truth in Russia* (1936) notes many achievements but makes many criticisms from his particular viewpoint. Both of these men were handicapped by their lack of knowledge of the Russian background and language. On the other hand, in his small volume *Moscow Admits a Critic*, Professor Bernard Pares, a pioneer in Russian studies in England (School of Slavonic Studies, University of London) objectively registers the progress made by the Russian people in the years of the Revolution.

Among the books on the Soviet Union that have appeared in 1937 three may be mentioned. Anna Louise Strong has written extensively on the Soviets, and in *The New Soviet Constitution* (Henry Holt) gives a carefully collated text with brief commentary. Simon, Robson and Jewkes, *Moscow in the Making* (Longmans) is a thorough study of the functioning of the Moscow Soviet by this group of British authorities on municipal affairs; although limited to one of its units, this is the most detailed study in English that has appeared on the actual working of a Soviet. In *The Soviets* (Harcourt Brace), Albert Rhys Williams has given the results of close contact with the Revolution and long residence under the Soviets. He presents his material in the form of questions and answers, and of his eighty-eight section-headings many are questions on the structure and functioning of the Soviets. The titles of the very extensive literature on the history of the Revolution and on more specific aspects of Bolshevism have not been here included; a very complete and classified bibliography is given under Williams' last question on what to read about the Soviets.

## INDEX

- Abortion law**, 93, 94  
**"Active element,"** 49, 58, 60, 105, 111, 126, 142  
**Aggression, definition of**, 179  
**American-Soviet relations**, 175, 178, 192, 193  
**Arbitration boards**, 140-1  
**Armament**, xii, 184-5  
**"Armed people,"** 130, 131, 184  
**Armenians**, 5, 6  
**Artel**, 162  
**Asia**, 4  
**Autocracy**, 11, 12  
**Autonomous republics**, 8, 183
- Baltic provinces**, 4, 7  
**Berlin-Rome axis**, 188  
**Bessarabia**, 2  
**Black Sea**, 1, 5  
**"Blat,"** 113  
**Bolsheviks**, *see* Party  
**Brest-Litovsk treaty**, 176  
**Budget, state**, 121-3, 124, 126  
**Bureaucratic tendencies**, xii, 55, 57, 60, 62, 103-4, 109, 111, 114, 115, 143, 151, 160
- "Capitalist encirclement,"** 41, 114, 177  
**Caspian Sea**, 1  
**Caucasus**, 4, 5  
**Central Executive Committee**, 45, 50, 66, 89, 139, 141
- Cheka*, 31, 32, 127, 131, 138  
**China**, 176, 182-3, 188  
**Church**, 5, 7, 17-8, 102, 150-51  
**Claims, of foreign nationals**, 191, 192  
**Classes**, x-xi, 37, 38, 56, 63, 79-81, 100, 118, 131, 132, 139, 140, 146, 148, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 166-7, 171, 185<sup>a</sup>  
**Clinics**, 146  
**Clubs**, 143, 145, 147  
**Codes**, x, 97-81, 138, 142  
**Collective bargaining**, 57, 123, 143-4  
**Collectivization of agriculture**, 36, 39, 63, 79, 84, 95, 143, 158, 170  
**"Collectivized peasant,"** 81, 94-95  
**Commissariats**, 50, 104, 111  
**Commission of Party Control**, 107-8, 109  
**Commission of Soviet Control**, 108-9  
**Communal feeding**, 149  
**Communist Academy**, 78  
**Communist International**, xi, 32, 177, 180-1, 187, 193  
**Communist Party**, *see* Party  
**"Communist training,"** 34-5, 40, 77, 118, 132, 147, 149, 173, 194  
**Compulsory labor**, 160-1

- Constituent Assembly, 29, 32  
 Constitutional amendments, 88,  
     94, 99  
 Constitutional Democrats, 23,  
     24  
 Co-operative societies, viii,  
     35, 43, 58-9, 60, 85, 91,  
     102, 119, 136, 143, 144,  
     147  
 Cossacks, 46, 132  
 Council of People's Commis-  
     sars, 50, 60, 90, 92  
 Counter-planning, 62, 110  
 Counter-revolution, 9, 127,  
     157, 160  
 Credits, 191, 192  
 "Cultural front," 35, 116  
 Czechoslovakia, 180, 182, 189  
  
**Debts**, 191, 192  
 "Democratic centralism," 44,  
     53, 69, 87, 96, 102  
 Department of State Protec-  
     tion, 127, 129  
 Deputy groups, 105  
 "Discipline," 82, 117-8, 126,  
     149  
 Divorce, 52  
 Duma, Imperial, 12, 17, 18,  
     22, 23  
  
**"Economic patriotism,"** 180  
**"Economic worker,"** 112, 114,  
     163  
 Education, 76-78, 147-9, 162,  
     166  
 Elections, 32, 46, 47-50, 53,  
     54, 55, 60, 61, 82, 84, 96,  
     113, 114, 141, 166  
 "Enemy of the people," 63,  
     72, 112-3, 116, 117, 142,  
     157, 172  
 "Equalized wage," 163-4  
 Esthonia, 1, 4  
  
 "Exceptional measures" (old),  
     14-15  
 Extraordinary Commission to  
     Combat Counter-revolution,  
     Sabotage and Speculation,  
     *see Cheka*  
  
**Family**, 149-50  
 Famines, 30, 36  
 Fascism, xii, 181, 187, 188,  
     190  
 Favoritism, 58, 112, 144-5  
 Federal principle, *see* National  
     minorities  
 Finland, 16  
 Five-Year Plan, xi, 35, 37-8,  
     39-40, 91, 102, 110, 124-5,  
     144, 191, 192  
 Foreign trade monopoly, 84,  
     121, 191, 192, 191-4  
 France, 180, 181, 185, 187,  
     189  
 Freedom of conscience, 172  
 Freedom of opinion, 169-73  
 Freedoms, of speech, press,  
     meeting, 83-4, 169  
  
**Georgians**, 5, 6  
 German-Japanese Pact, 179-  
     80, 188  
 German racial groups, 4, 7  
 Germany, 16, 174, 176, 180,  
     181, 184, 189, 191, 192  
 Graft, 54, 57-8, 101, 112-13,  
     114, 168  
 Great Russian (Russian), 5, 6,  
     10, 15, 25, 185, 186  
 Greek Orthodoxy, *see* Church  
  
**Handicraft industry**, 30-1,  
     162  
 Health, 145-6  
 Heroes of labor, 76, 165, 166  
 History teaching, 77

- "Hostile economic forces" and  
   "hostile classes," 29, 79-80,  
   119, 129, 140, 148, 160,  
   161  
 Housing, 120, 140, 146-7,  
   159, 165  
 Illiteracy, 147  
 Independent republics, 183  
 Inheritance, 147, 150  
 Institute of Marx, Engels and  
   Lenin, 78  
 Institute of Red Professoriat,  
   148  
 Insurance, 123  
 Intelligentsia, 19, 23, 46, 49,  
   108, 170  
 Intervention, xi, 30, 31, 39,  
   71, 101, 124, 176, 191,  
   192  
 Inviolability of person, 172-3  
 Japan, 174, 176, 179, 181,  
   183, 184, 188, 189  
 Jews, 4, 7, 15  
 Judicial procedure, x, 13, 136,  
   138-43  
 Kerensky, 24, 25, 130  
 Kirov, assassination, 28, 172  
 Kolkhoz, 80, 81, 137, 143,  
   156, 163  
 Kulak, 36, 37, 119, 128, 160,  
   161  
 Labor Unions, viii, 35, 43,  
   56-8, 67, 79, 85, 88, 91,  
   99, 102, 136, 137, 140,  
   151  
 Land, renting, 37, 168  
 Latvia, 2  
 Law, Soviet, x, 63, 87, 91,  
   97, 98-9, 101, 140, 150,  
   169, 189  
 Law Court Reform (1865),  
   14  
 League of Nations, 175, 178,  
   179, 181, 190  
 Lena Gold Fields, 27  
 Lenin, x, xi, 22, 24, 26, 27,  
   31, 42, 58, 65, 67, 68, 72,  
   73, 81, 86, 88, 103, 112,  
   142, 155, 168, 177  
 Letts, 4, 6  
 "Liberation, Union of," 20  
 Lithuania, 2, 4, 6  
 Little Russian, *see* Ukraine  
 Loans, state, 120-1  
 Local government, 12, 95-7,  
   99, 100  
 Madrid, 187  
 Mandates 84, 148  
 Marxism, x, xi, xiii, 26, 67,  
   68, 72, 77, 101, 103, 117,  
   130, 140, 149, 167, 178-9,  
   190  
 Mass participation and control,  
   61, 62, 103-4, 106, 108,  
   111, 118, 126, 133-4, 138,  
   139, 151-2  
 Means of production, 30, 31,  
   33, 40, 44, 80, 101, 102,  
   112, 118, 156, 170, 192  
 Military Academies, 133, 148  
 Military Revolutionary Com-  
   mittee, 29  
 Mobilization of labor, 32, 131,  
   157, 159-60  
 Mohammedanism, 7  
 Molotov, 92  
 Mongolian People's Republic,  
   182-3  
 Movies, 136, 147  
 Municipal Councils (old), 13,  
   18  
 Muscovy, 1, 2, 4

- Mutual assistance pacts, 179,  
180, 181, 182, 185, 189, 190
- National defense, 39, 116,  
124, 126, 130, 131, 135,  
176, 183, 185, 190-1, 193
- "National district," 45
- National minorities, 8, 9, 40,  
42, 44-6, 80, 90, 100, 131,  
178, 183, 185, 186
- "Nationalism," 176, 177, 185-  
6, 193-4
- Nep*, *see* New Economic Policy
- New constitutions, viii, xii,  
40-41, 64, 76, 87, 93-4,  
97, 98, 143
- New Economic Policy, 33-4,  
35, 37, 97, 102, 118-9,  
191
- Nobility (old), 17
- Nomination of candidates, 48,  
53-4, 55, 60, 151
- Non-aggression pacts, 179-80
- Non-intervention, Spain, 187
- "Non-Party Bolsheviks," 107
- Occupational representation,  
46
- October, 1905, Manifesto, 12,  
23
- "Official nationalism" (old),  
16
- OGPU, 127, 128, 129, 139
- Okhrana*, 14
- "Old Bolsheviks," 54, 190
- Opposition, 30, 38, 65, 69-70,  
70-73, 81, 84, 116, 172
- Order of Lenin, 165-6
- "Organized discussion," 63,  
65, 69, 82-3
- Outer Mongolia, 182-3
- Pacific, ocean, 125
- Pact of Paris, 179
- Pamphlets, 73, 77
- Party—congresses, 64, 91,  
92; line, 62, 66, 68-9, 70,  
96, 99; maximum, 52-3,  
112, 119, 164; program,  
viii, 28, 62, 63-4; rul-  
ing position, viii, 22, 27,  
28, 42, 43, 61, 62, 74, 84,  
85, 91, 92-3, 99-100, 102,  
106-8, 133, 170, 171;  
structure, viii, 27, 38, 43,  
51-5, 61, 64, 76, 80-1, 84,  
92-3, 97, 155, 157
- Party-Soviet Schools, 107
- Passport, 161, 162
- Patronage, 104, 134
- Peasant-correspondent, 74-5,  
76, 106
- Peasant Union (old), 21, 22
- "People's associate judges,"  
139
- People's Courts, 138-41
- Peoples of Russia, Declaration  
of Rights of, 8, 44
- Persia, 176
- Personal property, 101, 147,  
150, 154, 167, 168, 169
- Piece-work wage, 104, 109,  
156, 164, 165
- Planned economy, ix-x, xiii,  
34, 45, 98, 101, 103, 126
- Pobiedonostev, 11
- Poland, 1-2, 4, 7, 131
- Political liberty, 170, 173
- Pre-school facilities, 148, 150
- Press, 73-76, 81, 105-6
- Procuror*, *see* Prosecutor
- Production conferences, 110
- Propaganda, in other countries,  
176, 177-8, 179, 193
- Prosecutor, 96, 141, 142
- Protestantism, 7
- Public dining rooms, 145
- "Purges," vii, xi, 9, 41, 52,

- 53, 54-5, 57, 60, 68, 72,  
80, 90, 103, 104, 114, 152,  
157, 174, 190-1
- Radio**, 76, 136
- Rationing**, 31, 32, 36, 112,  
118, 132, 145, 155, 159,  
161
- Recreation**, 145
- Red Army**, 128, 129-35, 180,  
184, 190
- "Red directors,"** 107
- Red Guards**, 130
- Red Terror**, 31
- Religious societies**, 151
- Rentals**, 146
- Reporting meetings**, 48, 60
- Rest homes**, 144-5
- Revolution of February**, 1917,  
12, 23, 24, 28-9, 127
- Revolution of 1905**, vii, 12,  
16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27,  
29
- "Revolutionary legality,"** x,  
86-7, 140
- "Revolutionary vigilance,"** x,  
54, 70, 115, 177
- Right to work**, 143, 159, 164
- Roman Catholicism**, 6, 7
- Rumania**, 2
- Rural Chiefs (old)**, 13
- Russian Empire**, vii, 1, 2, 3,  
4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 176, 182,  
193
- Russian Social Democratic  
Workman Party**, vii, 21-4,  
64
- Sabotage**, 103, 127, 128,  
160
- Savings**, 123, 146
- School Councils**, 111
- Science**, 76, 78
- Secret ballot**, 53, 54, 55, 57,  
60, 113-4, 141
- Sections, of Soviets**, 49, 105,  
137
- "Self-criticism,"** 63, 74, 75,  
76, 81-83, 110, 170-1
- "Self-taxation,"** 120
- Serfdom**, 13, 16, 17
- Shock-brigades**, 67, 156, 165
- Siberia**, 1, 3, 7, 125, 176
- Sinkiang**, 183
- Slogans**, x, 29, 34, 42, 58,  
67, 71, 103, 150, 159
- "Social administration,"** 58,  
118, 137
- Social insurance**, 57, 116,  
144-6, 151
- "Social prosecutors,"** 139
- Social revolution**, vii, x, 84,  
180, 181
- "Social service,"** 143
- "Socialist accumulation,"** 123,  
124, 126, 144, 156
- Socialist emulation**, 144, 156
- "Socialist fatherland,"** 185-6
- Socialist Legality***, 142
- Socialist property**, 33, 112,  
139-40, 167, 168
- Socialist Revolutionary Party**,  
21, 23, 29
- Soviet-Party schools**, 148
- Spetsy***, *see* Technical experts
- Spies**, 114
- Sports**, 145
- Stage**, 76, 136
- Stakhanov* movement**, 67, 150,  
165
- Stalin**, 31, 61, 66-9, 73, 77,  
81, 83, 84, 92, 107, 114,  
117, 129, 155, 177, 178,  
187, 188, 189, 190
- State Political Administration**,  
*see* OGPU
- Stetsky, A.**, x
- Street committees**, 105
- Supreme Court**, 98, 128,  
141

- Supreme Soviet, 50, 89, 90,  
92, 93
- Tatars, 4, 5, 6, 8
- Taxation, 33, 35, 118-21,  
122-3, 125, 144
- Teachers' Councils, 111
- Technical experts, xiii, 33,  
57, 80, 81, 107, 108-9,  
120, 122, 160, 164, 168,  
171
- "Technical minimum," 148
- Territorial units (of army),  
131, 132, 184
- Terrorism, 114, 128, 129
- Transcaucasia, 2, 6
- Trans-Siberian Railway, 3
- Treason, x, 9, 71, 103, 133,  
189-91
- "Triangle," 110
- Trotsky, 24, 65, 68, 70, 130,  
177, 188
- Turkestan, Russian, 7, 186
- Turkey, 2, 6, 176, 182
- Ukraine, 4, 5, 15, 80, 131,  
186
- Urals, mountains, 1, 3, 4, 125
- Voroshilov, 134
- Wages, 112, 122, 123-4, 125,  
144, 148, 163-4, 166
- Wall-newspaper, 75, 106
- "War Communism," 30-32,  
101, 118, 138, 163-4
- Webbs, 43, 51, 78
- White Russian, 5, 15
- White Sea, 1
- "Will of the People," 20
- "Withering away," of state,  
xii, 103, 117
- Work-book, 161-2
- Workers' Faculties, 147
- Workman control, 103
- Workman-correspondent, 74-5,  
76, 106
- Workman-Peasant Inspection,  
108
- Workman-Peasant Militia, 127,  
128, 130
- World revolution, 135, 175-6,  
178, 179, 188, 190
- World War, vii, xi, 1, 12,  
13, 14, 24, 27-8, 30, 176
- "Wrecking," 71-72, 103, 114,  
142, 172
- Yagoda, 129
- Yezhov, 129
- Youth, organization of, 55-56,  
132, 134

